A member of a group under police surveillance who had entered into a sexual relationship with an undercover police officer was unable to establish that her lack of knowledge as to the officer’s true identity vitiated her consent to sexual relations within the meaning of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.74. There was no justification for extending the common law position as contended for by the claimant, namely that the matter to which the deception related had to be sufficiently serious in objective terms as to be capable of being regarded as relevant to a woman’s decision-making and that, subjectively, the deception went to a matter which the woman regarded as critical or fundamental to her decision-making.
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 s.44(1)(b), which made it an offence for the donee of a lasting or enduring power of attorney to willfully neglect or ill-treat a donor, required the prosecution to prove that the donor, at the relevant time, had lacked capacity, or that the defendant donee had reasonably believed that the donor had lacked capacity.
A police officer who had been bitten by a man whilst helping other officers restrain him was “acting in the execution of his duty” for the purposes of the Police Act 1996 s.89(1). Although the restraint by his colleagues had been unlawful, the officer had an independent justification for his intervention, namely to prevent his fellow constables from being assaulted. In so finding, the court distinguished the case of Cumberbatch v Crown Prosecution Service  EWHC 3353 (Admin).
A slaughterhouse had been under a strict obligation to sever a chicken’s main arteries systematically and a concomitant strict obligation to spare the bird avoidable pain under Regulation 1099/2009 art.3(1) and art.15(1), as enforced in the UK under the Welfare of Animals at the Time of Killing (England) Regulations 2015 reg.30(1)(g). Social concern regarding animal welfare meant that it was appropriate to displace the presumption that proof of mens rea was required.
A recorder had been wrong to find that a driver who died in a car crash while speeding down a dual carriageway had been engaged in a criminal joint enterprise of dangerous driving with the driver of another car, which barred a damages claim by the deceased’s partner on the grounds of ex turpi causa. The partner’s claim was to be determined in accordance with the normal principles of causation and contributory negligence.