An individual who had been made the subject of a stop and search pursuant to the Terrorism Act 2000 Sch.7 para.18(1)(c), and had refused to provide the PIN and password for his mobile phone and laptop computer, had been validly convicted under that provision. Although the magistrate had accepted that his refusal was to protect the confidentiality of others, he had not said so when he was stopped, and did not do so until after the offence was complete and he had been arrested.
Application of the “multiple conviction rule” under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975 art.2A(3)(c) and the Police Act 1997 s.113A and s.113B, requiring disclosure of spent convictions, resulted in an interference with ECHR art.8 which was neither in accordance with the law nor necessary in a democratic society.
The court prohibited the use, by the subject of a search warrant or his lawyers, of redacted material which had been improperly disclosed to those lawyers by a police commissioner who had failed to obtain the prior approval of the National Crime Agency. The material was not to be used in judicial review proceedings brought by way of challenge to the warrant, but was to be returned to its owner. Any copies, including electronic copies, were to be destroyed.
The state was obliged under ECHR art.3 to conduct an effective investigation into crimes involving serious violence to persons, whether that had been carried out by state agents or individual criminals. For the right to be practical and effective, an individual who had suffered ill-treatment had a right to claim compensation against the state where there had been a failure to conduct a sufficient investigation. To succeed in a claim, a claimant had to establish that there were serious defects in the police investigation into the particular case; there was no need to establish that there were serious failings of a systemic nature.
It was important not to impose unrealistically demanding standards of care on police officers acting in the course of their operational duties, but officers did not have blanket immunity from suit in respect of their conduct in investigating or preventing crime. They were generally under a duty of care to avoid causing personal injuries where such a duty would arise under ordinary principles of negligence.