Body modification, such as the removal of an ear or nipple, or tongue splitting, performed on a consenting adult by a practitioner with no medical training or qualification, could not form an exception to the general rule in R. v Brown (Anthony Joseph)  1 A.C. 212 that consent was no defence to causing actual bodily harm or wounding. Even if Parliament or the Supreme Court revisited the general rule and adifferent line was drawn to allow consent to act as a defence to causing actual bodily harm and wounding, body modification caused really serious harm.
The Serious Fraud Office was entitled to a civil recovery order under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in respect of £4.4 million held in a UK bank account representing the proceeds of sale of the defendant’s shares in a Canadian company which had provided corrupt inducements to foreign officials. The defendant had acquired the shares at a nominal price as part of the company’s corrupt arrangements to induce Chadian officials, including her husband, to procure the grant of oil production rights in Chad.
A judge’ directions to the jury as to the meaning of “acts of terrorism” and other terms within the Terrorism Act 2006 s.2 had adequately protected a young offender’s ECHR art.10 rights.
The court considered the correct approach when making a confiscation order to calculating the benefit arising from fraudulently obtained remortgage transactions, where the property had originally been acquired legitimately using untainted funds and the offender had either repaid, or had undertaken to repay, the sum due under the remortgage. The approach was the same as for mortgage transactions, namely a proportionate calculation based on the equity increase achieved in the property.
A prisoner facing the death penalty following his conviction for the murder of a fellow inmate was not permitted to admit fresh medical evidence in his appeal against conviction and sentence. He had wanted to rely on new evidence relating to his mental state at the time of the offence, with a view to supporting a case of diminished responsibility, but that evidence was directly contrary to the case advanced at trial, and there was nothing to explain the change of position. The Privy Council also rejected his renewed appeal against a judicial direction in respect of evidence of propensity.