The Serious Fraud Office was entitled to a civil recovery order under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in respect of £4.4 million held in a UK bank account representing the proceeds of sale of the defendant’s shares in a Canadian company which had provided corrupt inducements to foreign officials. The defendant had acquired the shares at a nominal price as part of the company’s corrupt arrangements to induce Chadian officials, including her husband, to procure the grant of oil production rights in Chad.

The court made a certificate of inadequacy where a defendant’s realisable property was inadequate to meet a confiscation order made against him. The confiscation order amount had been calculated by reference to the value of a number of properties, and the evidence showed that for various reasons they were not going to realise what had initially been estimated.

[2018] UKSC 2 [2018] UKSC 2

When determining the period of imprisonment to be imposed in default of full payment of a confiscation order made in the Crown Court, accrued interest was not included in the starting point under the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 s.79(2) for the purpose of the calculation of the reduction in days of imprisonment when giving proportionate credit for part-payment of the order. The natural construction of s.79(2) was that the starting point was the sum outstanding at the time of the Crown Court order.

[2018] EWCA Civ 34 [2018] EWCA Civ 34

A judge had erred in holding that disciplinary proceedings brought against a police officer were barred on the basis of res judicata. A decision by the Police Appeals Tribunal, allowing the officer’s appeal against his dismissal for gross misconduct without remitting the matter, had not been a final decision on the merits for the purposes of cause of action estoppel.

[2018] EWHC 23 (Comm) [2018] EWHC 23 (Comm)

The “iniquity exception” did not defeat a claim for legal professional privilege where there was no nexus between the third party wrongdoer and the client which took the lawyer/client relationship outside the ordinary scope of professional employment. The third party’s wrongdoing was parasitic upon an existing lawyer/client relationship, which was created and continued for a normal and legitimate purpose.