The appropriate sentence to be imposed on an offender who had pleaded guilty to stalking over a three-month period was three years’ imprisonment. In imposing a seven-year extended sentence, the sentencing judge had been wrong to assess harm as high, and had been wrong to find that the offender was dangerous.
A 16-year extended sentence for the rape of an ex-partner was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle where the judge had been entitled to conclude that the offender was dangerous and a post-sentence report documented no change in mentality. There could also be no proper complaint about a concurrent 12-year sentence imposed for a second count of rape against the same victim.
Professional criminals who persisted in dealing with Class A drugs, after having been previously convicted and punished by a substantial term of imprisonment, required appreciably longer terms of imprisonment than others when they were subsequently convicted again. Accordingly, a judge was entitled to move into the category 1 range, and specifically, to the top of that range, in relation to an offender with previous convictions for drug offences who had pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to supply a controlled drug.
A sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment was quashed and substituted with a sentence of 10 months’ imprisonment suspended for two years, together with a 30-day rehabilitation activity requirement and a 100-hour unpaid work requirement, for an offence of causing bodily harm by wanton and furious driving. The sentencing judge had erred in taking too high a starting point for the offence on the basis that the appellant had deliberately driven at the complainant, causing him injury, whereas the offence involved a level of intention less serious than a deliberate act.
A sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment was appropriate in the case of the appellant, who had pleaded guilty to two offences of outraging public decency after being seen masturbating in public places.