[2019] EWHC 529 (Admin) [2019] EWHC 529 (Admin)

The court could extend the period during which an unpaid work requirement under a community order could be completed, unless and until the offender had completed the specified number of hours work or the order had been revoked, irrespective of whether the 12-month period specified in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.200(2) had ended or the end date specified in the order had passed.

[2019] EWCA Crim 235 [2019] EWCA Crim 235

Where an offender who had completed the detention and training period of a detention and training order committed a further offence while still subject to a period of supervision, the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.106 required a sentence of detention in a young offender institution to be imposed with immediate effect. Such a sentence could not be made consecutive to any detention period imposed for breach of the DTO.

[2019] EWCA Crim 102 [2019] EWCA Crim 102

The court reinforced the guidance given in R. v Thorsby (Adrian Kenneth) [2015] EWCA Crim 1 regarding giving credit for time served pursuant to a qualifying curfew. Diligence was required from the parties’ advocates and the Crown Court so as to ensure that the sentencing judge was informed of instances where a qualifying curfew had been imposed upon an offender who had to be sentenced.

[2019] EWCA Crim 31 [2019] EWCA Crim 31

A sentence of three-and-a-half years’ imprisonment imposed on an offender for historic offences of buggery and indecent assault on a fellow resident at a children’s home was unduly lenient. The offender satisfied the dangerousness criteria and a sentence of five years and ten months’ imprisonment with a three-year extension period was appropriate.

[2018] NICA 52 [2018] NICA 52

A judge had erred in concluding that alcohol, which was the culpable cause of an offender’s dangerous driving, and a record of dangerous driving 20 years earlier, together required the offender to be sentenced within a higher culpability category. Judges had to be careful not to double-count against an offender by treating the sole cause of the accident as an aggravating factor of itself. He should have been sentenced within the intermediate category, and the appropriate term was 27 months’ imprisonment.