An individual charged with offences in France, who had been permitted to return to the Netherlands before her conviction and sentence were issued, was not a fugitive under the Extradition Act 2003 s.14. She had not knowingly placed herself beyond the reach of French justice; she had already been beyond its reach. She was therefore permitted to rely on delay by France in seeking her extradition.
The “bulk” surveillance powers contained in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 were not incompatible with ECHR art.8 and art.10. The Act contained interlocking safeguards against the possible abuse of discretionary power which were sufficient to prevent arbitrary interference with rights under art.8 and art.10.
Challenges to extradition based on prison conditions in the requesting state should be properly evidenced. Clear evidence was required relating to the specific circumstances that the requested person would face.
The court refused an application to amend grounds of appeal against an extradition order to France due to the appellant’s delay in seeking permission. Further, it dismissed the appellant’s appeal as any concerns that had existed regarding his ECHR art.3 rights had been allayed by assurances given by the French judicial authority concerning penal institutions in which he might be detained.
Where a prisoner had been released on licence under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.244, there was no statutory requirement for any formality for the existence of the licence. Accordingly, the secretary of state had been entitled to recall an individual to custody who had breached the standard conditions of his licence, even though the individual had not been provided with a formal licence document.