Rated criminal defence solicitor who will defend your charge of causing grievous bodily harm (“GBH”)

A gang member's conviction for his involvement in the shooting and injuring of a woman and her seven-year-old son was upheld. The judge had not erred in refusing to exclude evidence identifying him as one of the attackers on fairness grounds under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.78. Furthermore, police officers' views as to the identity of the person in an e-fit picture, produced by the female victim after the attack with the help of a technician, had correctly been ruled inadmissible as evidence based on hearsay within the meaning of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Pt 11.

A sentence of concurrent terms of eleven years' detention in a young offenders institution on each of two counts of wounding with intent was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive where the attack had involved well planned, brutal and sustained assaults on two unarmed youths.

A Polish national who had allegedly stabbed a victim in Slovenia could not be extradited to Poland as the requirement of the Extradition Act 2003 s.64(4)(b) was not satisfied, namely that the conduct had to constitute an extra-territorial offence under UK law. The relevant extra-territorial offence under UK law would be attempted murder, but it could not be necessarily implied from his conduct that the individual had intended to kill the victim.

Concurrent sentences of 40 months' imprisonment imposed following guilty pleas to three counts of grievous bodily harm with intent was not manifestly excessive where the injuries were in the form of body modification procedures carried out with the victims' consent. Although such consent could not provide a defence, it did place the offences in the "lower culpability" category for sentencing purposes, notwithstanding the use of a knife.

The court quashed an extended sentence imposed on a homeless man who had carried out a premeditated attack on a bus driver. Although the offence was concerning, there was no pattern of escalating violent behaviour and the offence appeared to arise from the consequences of the appellant being homeless, suffering ill-health and tiredness. He was not "dangerous" within the meaning of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and a custodial sentence of four years and four months would be appropriate.

A judge had erred when imposing a life sentence on an offender already serving an extended determinate sentence, in setting the minimum term to run from the expiry of the custodial element of the extended sentence rather than from the offender's earliest release date from that sentence.

Although two defendants who had pleaded guilty to violent disorder and had been convicted of applying a corrosive fluid with intent to cause grievous bodily harm were dangerous within the meaning of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Pt 12 s.229, determinate sentences of 12 and 14 years' imprisonment provided a sufficient degree of protection to the public to make an extended sentence unnecessary. An extended sentence, including a custodial term of 16 years, was appropriate for a third defendant convicted of similar offences, who had armed himself with the corrosive fluid and had used it indiscriminately, and had previous convictions which indicated a pattern of offending.

A judge had failed to pay adequate regard to the likelihood of a young offender's development and susceptibility to change in the right environment when imposing an extended sentence for offences including robbery. The judge had been wrong not to find that the offending, serious though it was, could be sufficiently punished and the public sufficiently protected by a determinate sentence.

In assessing the dangerousness of a young offender a judge should specifically address, and give sufficient weight to, the age and apparent maturity of the offender.

Applying the rule of speciality, an extradition defendant should only be dealt with for the offences detailed in the European Arrest Warrant. Furthermore, under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.240ZA and s.243, time spent in custody awaiting extradition counted towards a subsequent sentence of imprisonment.

A sentence of three and a half years' imprisonment for inflicting grievous bodily harm where the victim had been in the first trimester of pregnancy was not manifestly excessive given the seriousness of the injury caused with a single punch and the context of domestic violence.

An application for permission to appeal against a 13-year extended sentence imposed following a conviction for wounding with intent, where the judge had made a finding of dangerousness without the benefit of a pre-sentence report, was refused. Although such a finding without a pre-sentence report required careful justification, the trial judge had been able to form an impression of the offender and had a proper basis for making the finding.

A judge had not erred in admitting as hearsay evidence under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.114(1)(d) evidence from a person who had been at the scene of an offence of wounding with intent but could not subsequently be identified. The unidentified person, a passenger on a bus travelling past the incident, had recorded the registration number of the assailant's car on her mobile telephone, which was reported to the police by a fellow passenger.

In a case of domestic burglary which attracted the minimum sentencing provisions of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.111, there were no particular circumstances which made it unjust to apply the minimum sentencing provisions. Many years had passed since the commission of the first burglary which qualified under s.111, but not since commission of the second, and the offender had committed a succession of other criminal offences in the meantime. It was to his credit that he had shown a willingness to address his drug habit, but there was no evidence capable of providing a solid foundation for saying that there was a realistic prospect of successful rehabilitation.

In a trial of wounding with intent contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.18, the judge had been entitled not to leave to the jury an alternative count of simple wounding under s.20. The defendant's position was not that he was guilty under s.20 having stabbed the victim without intending to cause really serious harm, but that he was not guilty at all. Accordingly, s.20 had not been an obvious alternative count.

There was a powerful case that the appellant was a party to a joint enterprise in which he had personally intended that grievous bodily harm would be inflicted on the victim. There was a proper basis on which to conclude that the jury's verdict that he was guilty of murder would not have differed notwithstanding the change in the law of joint enterprise following R. v Jogee (Ameen Hassan) [2016] UKSC 8.

A sentence of four and a half years' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of an offender who had pleaded guilty to attempting to cause grievous bodily harm with intent after carrying out a sustained assault on his partner.

A total sentence of six years and six months' imprisonment for aggravated burglary, wounding with intent and having an offensive weapon was unduly lenient and a term of nine years was substituted.

A total sentence of 16 months' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of an appellant who had pleaded guilty to two counts of assisting an offender. He had taped over the number plates on the offender's van and concealed a CCTV unit in order to impede the offender's apprehension and prosecution for offences of criminal damage and grievous bodily harm with intent.

The court quashed a sentence of imprisonment for public protection imposed for wounding with intent and replaced it with hospital and restriction orders under the Mental Health Act 1983 s.37 and s.41 respectively. The offender had served more than twice the minimum term ordered and the s.37 and s.41 regime was the most effective way of protecting the public and of monitoring his continued treatment.

If it was a condition of consent that Botox injections would be administered by a doctor, then that affected the question of the identity of the party administering the injections and the legal validity of the recipients' consent. That was different to the circumstances in R. v Richardson (Diane) [1999] Q.B. 444 and did not amount to including qualifications within the definition of "identity".

Concurrent periods of three years' disqualification from driving were appropriate in the case of a 26-year-old offender who had pleaded guilty to causing grievous bodily injury to two people by driving carelessly when unfit to drive through drink or drugs, and had been sentenced to an 18-month custodial term. In reaching that conclusion, the court discussed the factors to be taken into account by a court in Northern Ireland when determining the period for which disqualification should run following an offender's release from prison.

A sentence of 20 years' imprisonment for causing grievous bodily harm with intent expressed as an extended sentence pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.226A, comprising a custodial term of 15 years and an extension period of five years was quashed and replaced by a determinate sentence of 15 years' imprisonment. A significant determinate sentence was appropriate without the need for an extension.

A 10-year extended sentence, comprising a seven-year custodial period and a three-year extension period, was appropriate in the case of a 17-year-old offender who had pleaded guilty to affray, having a bladed article and wounding with intent after he stabbed a teenager in the street, causing serious injuries.

A determinate sentence of 12 years' imprisonment for attempting to cause grievous bodily harm was unduly lenient and replaced with a 17-year extended sentence where the offender had attacked a sex worker with a claw hammer having been released on licence from a life sentence for manslaughter. He was a dangerous offender and the judge had been wrong in principle when sentencing to take account of how the Parole Board would approach the offender's release.

The court upheld an offender's convictions for indecent assault and attempting to inflict grievous bodily harm committed against his younger brother when they were both under 18. It could not be said that the manner in which the trial was conducted by the offender's own counsel was so flawed as to render his conviction unsafe.

An eight-year extended sentence, comprising a five-year custodial term and a three-year extension period, was appropriate in the case of a 15-year-old who had been convicted of wounding with intent. The nature of the offence, the stabbing of a woman on the street at night, together with the offender's lack of self-control and propensity for aggression meant that he was dangerous and an extended sentence was necessary to protect the public.

An extended sentence should not have been imposed on an offender where none of the co-accused had received an extended sentence and there were no factors which significantly differentiated him from the co-accused.

An extended sentence, comprising a custodial term of nine years and an extended licence period of three years, was appropriate in the case of a young offender who had been convicted of wounding with intent after repeatedly stabbing a man with a kitchen knife.

Sentences of three years, nine months' imprisonment for an offender who pleaded guilty to causing grievous bodily harm, and four years, six months' imprisonment for an offender who had been found guilty after trial for the same offence, were unduly lenient.

A sentence of six years and eight months' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of an offender who had pleaded guilty to grievous bodily harm and attempted robbery. He had gone to the home of a vulnerable acquaintance and, in an incident lasting some 30 minutes, had threatened him with a knife, demanded money, and assaulted him, causing bruising and lacerations to his face and arm and a bleed to the brain.

A sentence of five years and four months' imprisonment for two violent offences against a mother and her child was unduly lenient and was replaced by a term of seven?and?a?half years imprisonment where the aggravating features had not been properly taken into account, such as the fact that the assault had been committed against a child, that the victims had been forced to leave their home, that the offences had been committed under the influence of alcohol and that the accused had previous convictions for violence.

Body modification, such as the removal of an ear or nipple, or tongue splitting, performed on a consenting adult by a practitioner with no medical training or qualification, could not form an exception to the general rule in R. v Brown (Anthony Joseph) [1994] 1 A.C. 212 that consent was no defence to causing actual bodily harm or wounding. Even if Parliament or the Supreme Court revisited the general rule and adifferent line was drawn to allow consent to act as a defence to causing actual bodily harm and wounding, body modification caused really serious harm.

A two-year youth rehabilitation order which had been imposed on a 17-year-old offender following his plea of guilty to wounding with intent was unduly lenient. The knife attack which the offender had launched on another youth justified a sentence of three years' detention.

A sentence of nine years' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of an offender who had been convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent after carrying out a sustained assault on his tenant.

When sentencing an offender for burglary, the recorder had been entitled to take into account the offender's intention to commit grievous bodily harm by breaking into his former girlfriend's home and attacking her new boyfriend. The fact that the offender was charged under the Theft Act 1968 s.9(1)(b), and was not charged with grievous bodily harm or with an offence under s.9(1)(a), did not preclude the recorder from taking the full facts into account.

The appellant's conviction for wounding with intent was not rendered unsafe by the fact that he was tried in his absence. By absenting himself despite knowing of the trial date, he had waived his right to attend his trial, and he had been represented by competent counsel.

The appropriate sentence where an offender who had attacked police officers with a hammer had pleaded guilty to two counts of attempting to cause grievous bodily harm with intent, was life imprisonment with a minimum term of three years, taking into account the offender' guilty plea, the early release provisions, and the time that he had already spent in custody.

Where four men had attacked another man by punching him and stamping on him, convictions against two of them for causing grievous bodily harm with intent under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.18 were quashed and substituted with convictions for causing grievous bodily harm under s.20, as medical evidence not adduced until after trial strongly suggested that a blow from one of the others had caused the victim's brain injury. The further evidence was demonstrably credible, it had been positively agreed and was highly relevant.

A sentence of eight years' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of an offender who had pleaded guilty to encouraging or assisting the commission of the offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent after arranging from prison for two men to be beaten up.

An extended sentence of 19 years, which included a custodial term of 14 years, was appropriate in the case of a 17-year-old youth who had pleaded guilty at a late stage to causing grievous bodily harm with intent and robbery. The defendant had launched unprovoked and very violent attacks on two members of the public.

Life sentences with a total minimum term of 23 years were imposed on offenders who had tortured a couple in their 60s in order to force them to hand over a large quantity of cash and had later shot a man in the head in a conspiracy to kill him.

Evidence produced after a conviction indicating that the defendant had mental limitations, which meant he had not been afforded any measures for vulnerable defendants before or during his trial, did not make the trial unfair. Although a joint enterprise direction was not compliant with the later case of R v Jogee (2016) UKSC 8, a Jogee-compliant direction would have made no difference as the defendant's intention could not have been clearer.

A judge had taken too high a starting point for an offence of attempting to inflict grievous bodily harm by driving a car over the legs of a police officer who was lying unconscious on the ground. Eleven-and-a-half years was appropriate, taking into account a 10% credit for a late guilty plea. Although the judge should have spelt it out in clearer terms, it was clear that he had intended to disqualify the offender from driving for 10 years with an extension equivalent to the time he was expected to serve in custody before release on licence, making a total disqualification period of 17 years and 3 months.

Where offenders had thrown sulphuric acid into their victim's face, the trial judge had been correct to admit a text message sent by one of them containing a photo of the acid with the caption "this is the one face melter" as evidence of their intention to use the acid to cause the victim serious harm. The message was not hearsay because, although satisfying the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.115(2), it did not satisfy s.115(3), as there was nothing to make the recipient believe that it would actually be used to melt a face.

Convictions for wounding with intent, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, having an offensive weapon and criminal damage were upheld. The judge had not erred in her summing up and the appellant had not been prejudiced by an agreed admission placed before the jury.

Sentences of seven years' detention were appropriate in the case of two young offenders who had pleaded guilty to wounding with intent and assault occasioning actual bodily harm after launching a sustained and brutal attack on two gay men.

A six-year extended sentence imposed following a guilty plea to causing grievous bodily harm was unlawful because it exceeded the maximum term that could be imposed for that offence. The appropriate sentence was five years, comprising a four-year custodial term and a one-year period on extended licence.

An application to treat a notice of abandonment as a nullity was granted where the applicant's counsel had told him that his appeal would have to be abandoned, and his solicitor had signed and submitted the abandonment notice despite the applicant's objection; the mind of the applicant had not gone with the notice.

A sentence of nine years' imprisonment following a guilty plea for causing grievous bodily harm with intent was reduced to eight years where the offender had deliberately reversed a car over the victim's legs, causing very serious injuries. The offender had lived a blameless life until shortly before the incident, accepted full responsibility for her actions and would miss seeing her son grow up whilst she was in custody.

An offender was sentenced to nine years' imprisonment for causing death by dangerous driving where he had consumed a large amount of alcohol, had driven dangerously for a prolonged period and had failed to stop at the scene. In cases of dangerous driving causing grievous bodily harm or death a deterrent sentence had to be imposed.

The prosecution had been guilty of non-disclosure during the appellant's trial on charges of burglary, aggravated burglary and causing grievous bodily harm with intent; however, the non-disclosure did not undermine the safety of his conviction.

A sentence of life imprisonment for causing grievous bodily harm with intent was quashed and replaced with a hospital order under the Mental Health Act 1983 s.37 and s.41. Fresh expert evidence indicated that the offender was suffering from a personality disorder and mental illness at the time of the offence and a hospital order was appropriate having regard to the interests of the offender and the protection of the public.

A sentence of 18 years' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of a man who had been convicted of manslaughter and wounding with intent after stabbing his father to death and injuring his brother with the knife he was using.

The court declined to permit fresh evidence in an appeal against a conviction for wounding with intent. The evidence was hearsay evidence and did not pass the test for admission in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 s.23(2).

A sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum term of 14 years was appropriate following an offender's convictions for grievous bodily harm and child destruction. The offender had carried out a planned attack on his pregnant girlfriend, after unsuccessfully attempting to persuade her to have an abortion. He had enlisted the help of another man and they had kicked the girlfriend and stamped on her stomach. She had sustained life-threatening injuries and the unborn child had died.

In a trial of counts of affray and attempting to cause grievous bodily harm with intent arising out of the defendant's altercation with some police officers, the judge had erred in not leaving the issue of self-defence to the jury.

Medical evidence detailing a baby's injuries that had been shaken was sufficient to justify advice to an appellant that he caused serious bodily injury to the child and to plead guilty to a charge of inflicting grievous bodily harm. A subsequent acquittal from manslaughter as the jury was satisfied that the shaking had not caused the cerebral injuries leading to the child's death years later, did not mean that the defence advanced for manslaughter would have been a successful defence to inflicting grievous bodily harm.

An offender's progress in prison completing courses, jobs, charitable work and acting as a buddy did not amount to exceptional and unforeseen progress such as to justify reducing his minimum term.

A judge had not erred in refusing to sever an indictment where during an aborted drug deal the appellant had been the victim of a kidnap by his co-defendants and following the deal he was the perpetrator of a kidnap of an associate. The indictments had been properly joined, as evidence in one kidnap was very likely to be referred to in the course of evidence about the other, and a single jury was in the best position to try both sets of charges.

A sentence of 46 months' imprisonment, following guilty pleas to possession of an offensive weapon, criminal damage and racially aggravated unlawful wounding, was reduced to 36 months' imprisonment where, contrary to the sentencing guidelines, the judge had applied the guilty-plea discount to the sentence for unlawful wounding before taking into account the increase for the racially aggravated form of the offence.

The Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 r.25.14(3)(a) required the court to summarise for the jury, to such extent as was necessary, the evidence relevant to the issues they had to decide; however, it was not necessary for the judge to recount all relevant evidence. A conviction for inflicting grievous bodily harm was safe despite the judge's failure to summarise evidence on causation from a consultant forensic pathologist.

A two-year suspended sentence imposed on a woman who had pleaded guilty to wounding with intent was lenient but not unduly so. A number of mitigating features were present, including the woman's mental health issues and the fact that she was the primary carer of her six-year-old daughter.

A judge had been entitled to go above the ranges indicated in the sentencing guidelines when sentencing offenders for aggravated burglary and wounding with intent involving the use of knives to threaten and torture two victims during a prolonged attack in their home. However, the judge had adopted too high a starting point of 30 years after a trial; a starting point of 25 to 26 years was appropriate.

A sentence of three-and-a-half years' detention imposed on a 16-year-old for wounding with intent was unduly lenient and replaced with a sentence of seven years' detention. The sentencing judge had made too much allowance for the offender's young age.

Once it had been decided that a sentence had been unduly lenient based on the facts as known to the sentencing judge at the time, it was the appellate court's responsibility to pass the appropriate sentence, and in doing so it was at the very least open to it to take into account whatever new information had become available since the original sentence was passed.

A total sentence of 10 years' imprisonment, imposed following a conviction for wounding with intent and guilty pleas to violent disorder and aggravated burglary, was unduly lenient. A sentence of 16 years was appropriate for what were very serious offences committed in separate incidents with a background of drugs and gang-related activity.

A judge had been fully entitled to reject a submission of no case to answer made by the appellant when he was on trial for conspiracy to rob and to cause grievous bodily harm following a gang-related revenge attack in which one victim received a very serious stab wound. Although the appellant had not been present during the attack, the evidence, which consisted principally of text messaging, was sufficient to show that he had been a party to the conspiracy to rob.

An offender who, with another, had prevented a rape victim from calling the police for fear that police involvement would result in loss of their tenancy, had his prison sentence of six years for false imprisonment and a concurrent three years for assault reduced to match that of the co-accused, namely four-and-a-half and two years respectively. The rapist had received an eight-year prison sentence.

The appellant, who had been convicted of murder, would not be permitted to adduce fresh testimony from a witness who had given evidence at his trial which was favourable to the prosecution. The fresh evidence, which appeared to undermine the prosecution case, was not capable of belief.

A total sentence of 11 years instead of 13 years was more appropriate for an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent and an offence of burglary. Although the offences were serious, the sentence was excessive having regard to all the circumstances.

An extended sentence of 15 years was appropriate in the case of the appellant, who had pleaded guilty to robbery, causing grievous bodily harm with intent and other offences after stealing from, and carrying out a serious assault on, an elderly couple in their home.

A sentence of 18 months' imprisonment following a guilty plea to wounding with intent was unduly lenient. The victim had been stabbed with a knife three times and was kicked whilst on the ground. A sentence of five years' imprisonment was appropriate in the circumstances.

Refusal to admit a complainant's previous convictions for carrying knives or bladed weapons had had no bearing on whether a defendant had been involved in a joint enterprise wounding with intent in which the complainant had received five knife stab wounds, and did not affect the safety of his conviction.

A sentence of five years and four months' imprisonment imposed following a plea of guilty to wounding with intent was reduced to four years, where the sentencing judge had erred in placing the offence between categories 1 and 2 of the Definitive Guideline on Assault. The offence fell squarely within category 2, given the broad balance between factors indicating greater harm and greater culpability, and factors indicating lesser harm and lesser culpability.

A sentence of imprisonment rather than a hospital order had been appropriate for an offender notwithstanding psychiatric reports made after sentencing that indicated that he had paranoid schizophrenia. Even if evidence were to establish that the offender had been mentally unwell at offence and sentence, it would not follow that a hospital order should inevitably have been made.

The court quashed an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment and replaced it with a hospital order and a restriction order pursuant to the Mental Health Act 1983 s.37 and s.41. Fresh medical evidence showed that the offender was suffering from a longstanding schizophrenic illness that had not been identified at the time of sentencing.

In the appellant's trial for unlawful wounding, the judge had been justified in refusing to allow him to adduce evidence of the victim's bad character in the form of a previous conviction for common assault. That conviction was not important explanatory evidence, nor did it have any other substantial probative value.

The Crown did not oppose an appeal against conviction for wounding with intent and attempting to cause grievous bodily harm where the victim's identification of the appellant had been crucial and new evidence suggested that the victim had offered to retract his statement in exchange for money, significantly undermining his evidence.

A conviction for wounding with intent was safe where an offender had run a defence of self-induced automatism and the judge had refused a defence application for an adjournment to obtain expert evidence about the effect that a combination of drugs and alcohol had had on the offender. The defence of automatism was not available to an offender who had induced a state of automatism through their own fault.

Sentences of nine years' imprisonment were appropriate following the convictions of two offenders for causing grievous bodily harm with intent. The offenders had perpetrated a motiveless and sustained attack during which they had repeatedly punched and kicked a prone victim. However, neither had a record of a repeated and escalating pattern of violent offending and the risk that they posed could properly be met by a determinate sentence of an appropriate length rather than an extended sentence.

A young offender's sentence of a fixed custodial term of four years and six months with an extension period of two years for attempted wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, after attacking a rival gang member with a knife on a crowded underground platform, was not manifestly excessive. The judge had been entitled to find that the offender was dangerous for the purposes of the imposition of an extended sentence.

An extended sentence of 12 years, comprising an eight-year custodial term and an extended licence period of four years, was appropriate in the case of the appellant, who had pleaded guilty to wounding with intent and three other offences after attacking people with a knife at a party.

A judge had correctly placed an offence of wounding with intent in category 2 of the relevant sentencing guideline and imposed a sentence of seven years' imprisonment where the offender had bitten his victim's eyebrow, biting away part of his flesh.

Where an offender had been convicted of an offence of unlawful wounding, but not convicted of an offence of racially aggravated unlawful wounding contrary to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 s.29(1)(a), the sentencing judge was nevertheless entitled to take into account, as a factor which increased the seriousness of the offence, that it was racially motivated.

A judge was entitled to take a 15-year starting point instead of the usual 12-year starting point for wounding with intent as a result of the aggravating features of the offence, namely the offence being premeditated, the offender being drunk and high at the time of the offence, and his having previous convictions for violent and weapon-related offences.

A defendant's freedom of choice had been improperly narrowed where he entered a plea of guilty to wounding with intent to cause serious bodily harm without having been advised that by doing so, he was accepting that he intended to cause the complainant really serious bodily harm. Instead of an offence under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.18, the defendant had intended to plead guilty to a s.20 offence. The court therefore substituted a conviction for the s.20 offence for the original conviction.

Fresh evidence relied on by the appellant did not undermine the safety of his conviction for murder and wounding with intent.

The admission of evidence from two witnesses who claimed to have been intimidated into changing their evidence against an offender did not make the offender's convictions for wounding, violent disorder and possessing a firearm unsafe.

A conviction for grievous bodily harm with intent was not unsafe on account of insufficient evidence to prove to the required standard that the injuries sustained amounted to "really serious bodily harm". The victim's self-reported harm from injuries sustained when he was attacked by the offenders, should not be discounted just because it was not supported by medical evidence.

Leave to appeal against a conviction for wounding with intent contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.18 was refused where a psychiatrist's report in relation to the complainant did not go to the issue of the offender's response when she claimed she had stabbed the complainant, her partner, in self-defence.

Extended sentences comprising a four-year detention period and a three-year licence period were appropriate in the case of a 14-year-old and a 15-year-old who had been convicted of wounding two youths by stabbing them in the course of an unprovoked attack in a public place.

A sentence of two-and-a-half years' imprisonment for inflicting grievously bodily harm was not manifestly excessive where the victim had been left partially deaf and the offender had many previous convictions for violence.

An individual failed to show that his detention for offences of affray and wounding had breached his rights under ECHR art.5. The Crown Court had clearly had jurisdiction to pass the sentence it had imposed, and he had been unable to demonstrate that the court had sentenced in a way that involved a gross and obvious irregularity, that it had failed to observe a statutory condition precedent, or that it had acted in a way that was arbitrary.

There were special circumstances which meant that a sentence of two years' imprisonment, suspended for two years, was not unduly lenient following a plea of guilty to an offence of wounding with intent. The offence was completely out of character and the offender's state of mind had been affected by a combination of anti-depressant medication and alcohol. She was a single mother who had demonstrated considerable remorse and there were concerns about the impact upon her children if she received a sentence of immediate imprisonment.

The appellant's conviction for attempted robbery and wounding with intent was safe despite the fact that the defence team had not obtained unused material which revealed inconsistencies in the victim's account: every possible opportunity had been taken during the trial to exploit known inconsistencies in his account.

A judge had erred in focusing on the risk an offender posed to the public, rather than the seriousness of the offences, when imposing what was in effect a whole life order for multiple counts of rape and further counts of kidnapping and causing grievous bodily harm with intent. The very high test of exceptionality for whole life orders had not been fulfilled but, given the aggravating features of the case, a notional determinate sentence beyond the sentencing guideline range was justified.

A three-and-a-half-year determinate custodial sentence for an offence of wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm which had involved the use of weapons and shod feet was unduly lenient. A sentence of five years was substituted. It was an entirely appropriate case for the activation of the offenders' previously suspended sentences to run consecutively.

A sentencing judge had been justified in imposing a sentence of 11 years' imprisonment in respect of a series of commercial robberies committed over a four-month period, and in ordering that sentence to run consecutively to a 14-year sentence which had been imposed for a separate offence of wounding committed during the same four-month period. The starting point of 16 years' imprisonment adequately reflected the offender's criminality, and the judge was entitled to conclude that his past criminal record was such as to constitute a significantly aggravating factor which distinguished him from his co-defendants.

In a case referred by the Attorney General, the court found unduly lenient a sentence of two-and-a-half years' imprisonment where the offender had pleaded guilty to wounding with intent after biting off a piece of a person's ear; the appropriate sentence was four-and-a-half years' imprisonment.

A young offender's age was a mitigating factor in sentencing that was not to be cancelled out by adverse findings of fact against that offender. A starting point of three-quarters of the sentence for an adult offender was appropriate for two young offenders convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent.

The drinking of alcohol to excess by a pregnant woman in the knowledge that it would harm her unborn child did not amount to the criminal offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm by administering a noxious substance to any other person contrary to the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.23 so as to entitle the born child to criminal compensation as the victim of a violent crime. A foetus was not to be regarded as a separate legal person and, except under statute, could not be the victim of a crime of violence. Consequently, an unborn child could not constitute "any other person" within s.23.

A sentence of eight-and-a-half years' imprisonment imposed on one member of a drunken sectarian mob for, among other things, grievous bodily harm with intent would be maintained, but a sentence of three years' imprisonment imposed on another member of that mob for affray would be reduced to one year's imprisonment in view of a disparity with the sentence imposed on a co-defendant.

A father and son who had committed acts of violence against a family of travellers had their convictions upheld. The judge's approach to the admissibility of hearsay evidence after seven of the witnesses had disappeared after receiving threats was meticulous, and his conclusion to admit the evidence was unassailable.

An extended sentence of 13-and-a-half years' imprisonment imposed on an offender following his guilty pleas to criminal damage, breach of a restraining order, wounding with intent and two offences of possessing offensive weapons, all committed during an attack against his estranged wife, was reduced to one of 11-and-a-half years, where the offender had been suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder at the time of the attack.

It was appropriate to quash an offender's conviction for wounding with intent contrary to the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.18, and to replace it with a conviction of simple wounding under s.20, where, on the facts, an alternative charge under s.20 should have been placed before the jury.

Although there had been a flawed disclosure exercise before a trial for grievous bodily harm with intent, no prejudice had arisen as a consequence of that.

An alternative verdict of unlawful wounding contrary to the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.20 should have been left to the jury at a trial for an offence of wounding with intent contrary to s.18 where it had been open to the jury to reject the appellant's defence of self-defence and the victim's allegation that she had threatened to kill him.

An indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of seven years was appropriate for an offence of wounding with intent involving a sudden attack on a 64-year-old man, where eight severe stab wounds had been inflicted. It had been open to the judge to conclude that the offender posed a risk of serious harm upon release.

Applying United Kingdom law on unfitness through drink to a description of conduct in a European arrest warrant, which was the only source of that information, was insufficient to meet the double criminality test in respect of a drink driving charge because nothing had been said about the degree of intoxication. It had not been open to a district judge to conclude that the only inference was that an appellant, at the time he had been driving, was so intoxicated as to be unfit to drive a car.

In a trial for wounding with intent, a judge had been entitled to admit into evidence the accused's previous conviction for an assault, which had been committed in similar circumstances to the instant offence, on the basis that it went to the central issue of the identification of the perpetrator.

Sentences of five and six years' imprisonment imposed on two nightclub bouncers who had conducted a sustained attack on a man while armed with weapons including a knife and a baton were unduly lenient and were each replaced with 10-year sentences of imprisonment.

The power under the Mental Health Act 1983 s.35 to remand an accused to hospital for a report on his mental condition could not be used to enable the Crown to obtain evidence about whether the accused had the intention, or the capacity to form the intention, to commit an offence of grievous bodily harm. The Divisional Court quashed a s.35 order made by the Crown Court, even though the Senior Courts Act 1981 s.29(3) excluded High Court jurisdiction, because the misinterpretation of s.35 was a defect so severe that it deprived the Crown Court of jurisdiction to make the order.

A sentence of three-and-a-half years' detention was appropriate in the case of a young offender who had pleaded guilty to conspiracy to rob and been convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm.

An appellant's defence of using reasonable force in defence of another had been a live issue that ought to have been put to the jury, so her conviction for unlawfully and maliciously causing grievous bodily harm was quashed. The circumstances of the co-appellant's offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent had been properly reflected in a starting point of six years' imprisonment, so that term was substituted for a seven-year term of imprisonment.

Convictions for attempting to cause grievous bodily harm and attempted theft were safe even though the judge had erred in advising the jury that it could draw an adverse inference in respect of the defendant's no-comment interview. The case had turned on identification evidence in respect of which the judge had given adequate directions

A conviction of inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.20 for infecting his partner with an incurable genital herpes virus was deemed safe, after the consideration of fresh evidence as to whether the appellant's guilty plea had been fully informed and voluntary.

A decision not to grant bail to a 17-year-old with no previous convictions, following his charge for grievous bodily harm, was Wednesbury unreasonable as the judge had relied on speculative and highly improbable matters that had been neither raised by the prosecution nor put to the defence.

Although circumstantial, there was strong evidence in a case involving charges of conspiracy to rob and wounding with intent that the defendants were part of a gang who conspired to attack and rob a man in his friend's flat whilst the owner, who had been duped by one of the conspirators, was out of the way. The decision that there was a case to answer was justified by the evidence.

Convictions for attempted murder and causing grievous bodily harm with intent in respect of three offenders who had pursued a member of a rival gang and shot at him intending to kill him after he had sought shelter in shop premises, missing him but hitting a young child and a customer, were safe.

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The court gave guidance on sentencing for the offence of encouraging or assisting suicide under the Suicide Act 1961 s.2(1).

A judge had not erred in finding that there was a significant risk to the public from an offender who had been convicted of grievous bodily harm. Although it was unfortunate that the judge had said that the sentence was "required" by law, his general approach to the statutory scheme and his saying that the imposition of an indeterminate sentence was "appropriate" showed that he knew the sentence was not mandatory and had considered less restrictive sentencing options.

A judge had erred in allowing only a 20 per cent discount for an offender's guilty plea to wounding with intent. CCTV showed that the victim had initiated the violence; the offender could therefore have raised issues of self-defence and lack of intent. Further, although the offender was dangerous, the public could be adequately protected by the imposition of an extended sentence with appropriate licence conditions, rather than a sentence of imprisonment for public protection.

The court upheld a conviction for manslaughter and two counts of unlawful wounding where the offender had deliberately driven into another car, resulting in the death of the driver and injury to the two passengers. Evidence given at the trial by an accident and collision investigator had not been inadmissible, and fresh evidence, which the offender claimed could undermine that evidence, did not satisfy the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 s.23(2)(b).

Where an offender subject to a suspended sentence for drug offences re-offended within the operational period and was convicted of grievous bodily harm, the fact that the new offence was of a different category from the previous offence was no good ground for objecting to activation of the suspended sentence. The fact that he had complied with supervision requirements attached to the suspended sentence was not sufficient to justify activating only part of it.

In a trial for an offence of wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm contrary to the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.18, the judge should have left an alternative count under s.20 to the jury. However, notwithstanding that irregularity, the appellant's conviction was safe as the jury must have been sure that he had the necessary intent under s.18 as they convicted him of that offence on the evidence.

The power to admit evidence under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.114(1)(d) was not to be used to circumvent the conditions in s.116.

A judge who gave a "rolled up" direction incorporating a Watson direction had been attempting to ensure that the jury understood that their primary duty was to try to reach a unanimous verdict, and that the possibility of a majority verdict, while it existed, would not arise until they had been afforded a significant period of deliberation to assist them to do so. In the circumstances, the use of the Watson formula at that point had not placed the jury under any degree of improper pressure to bring in a verdict.

An appeal against convictions on 12 counts of sexual assault by penetration, four counts of rape and a count of unlawful wounding was dismissed where a judge had been correct not to treat as evidence the offender's admissions made in a written statement and police interview as the prosecution had only relied on them to a very limited extent.

Convictions for both causing and attempting to cause grievous bodily harm with intent were safe where a judge had not misdirected or failed to direct a jury appropriately in relation to certain issues.

Where a defendant suffering from an insane delusion that he was being attacked or threatened reacted violently, using force that was reasonable in the circumstances as he perceived them to be, he was not entitled to an acquittal based on self-defence. An insane person could not set the standards of reasonableness as to the degree of force used by reference to his own insanity. The court considered the meaning and effect of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 s.76.

A three-rank demotion of an army officer, imposed for inflicting grievous bodily harm on a fellow officer, was not wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. The fact that the officer had left the army and was no longer exercising command was not a proper basis on which to ask the court to alleviate the financial consequences for his pension by ordering a less severe demotion.

A sentence of 15 months' imprisonment, comprising 10 months on licence and five months in custody, imposed on an offender for causing death and grievous injury by dangerous driving where she had lost consciousness at the wheel because of a pre-existing medical condition, was unduly lenient. Although the judge had been entitled to take a starting point of three years, which fell outside the guidelines, he was wrong to reduce the starting point to 15 months in consideration of the offender's personal circumstances.

A judge's mistaken explanation as to the length of time an offender would serve in custody for an offence of wounding with intent did not render the sentence unfair, but the aggravating factors the judge identified did not justify a sentence so far in excess of the starting point.

Where a participant in a gang fight was convicted of violent disorder but acquitted of two counts of wounding with intent, there was no inconsistency between the verdicts: there was evidence of actions that were discrete from the actions behind the wounding counts on the basis of which the jury could convict of violent disorder.

The court was entitled to interfere with the Public Prosecution Service's decision to prosecute a 17-year-old girl following an allegation of inflicting grievous bodily harm. The decision-maker had not taken into account public interest considerations when determining that the girl's case was not suitable for diversionary disposal.

A sentence of 20 months' detention was appropriate in the case of an 18-year-old who had inflicted grievous bodily harm on a police officer following arrest. He had a bad record of offending, and judges were to protect police officers against being assaulted in the course of their duty by passing sentences that reflected the public's condemnation of such offences.

A judge's refusal to discharge a jury, following the acquittal of one of the accused on the basis that there was no case to answer, did not render the remaining offenders' convictions unsafe. Even though the acquitted individual had run a cut-throat defence which implicated the others, the judge had correctly directed the jury as to the consequences of the acquittal and fully summarised the evidence for the jury.

A sentence of two-and-a-half years' imprisonment imposed following an offender's late guilty plea to inflicting grievous bodily harm in a drunken assault on a taxi driver at night was not manifestly excessive.

A six-month detention and training order was appropriate in the case of a 17-year-old who had pleaded guilty to inflicting grievous bodily harm by kicking a youth in the head. The offender had been part of a group who had attacked the victim and his friend in the street for no reason, he had a record of repeated violence, and the offence put him in breach of two youth rehabilitation orders.

A sentence of 15 years' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of the appellant, who had been convicted of various offences, including causing grievous bodily harm with intent, after driving his taxi into a group of people following an altercation.

A 35-year-old criminally-experienced offender who had made a random and unprovoked attack on a security officer during a drunken group rampage through a family holiday resort had falsely alleged that the officer had attacked him and had failed to admit the offence until the plea and case management conference showed CCTV evidence. The sentence had properly reflected the offending and the full discount for the guilty plea had been overgenerous.

Although a failure to disclose the first description of a suspect given by an eye-witness prior to an identification parade had been a clear breach of PACE Codes of Practice Code D, it did not render the subsequent conviction for murder and wounding with intent unsafe, given the powerful support provided to the identification evidence by the other circumstantial evidence.

A minimum term of 15 years for murder, causing grievous bodily harm with intent and perverting the course of justice had been unduly lenient and would be increased to 17 years, but the sentences of the other offenders would not be altered.

Sentences imposed on three offenders aged 17, 14 and 18 for attempted grievous bodily harm with intent after they had kicked and punched their victim on the ground did not reflect the seriousness of the attack and the need for deterrence. The sentences were unduly lenient and were increased.

The conviction of an offender for grievous bodily harm was not safe, as although he claimed not to have been at the scene and had relied on the defence of alibi there was evidence from which a jury could infer that if he was at the scene he had acted in self-defence, and the judge had wrongly refused to put that to the jury.

A conviction for wounding with intent was quashed as unsafe where the trial judge had admitted a witness statement, having been satisfied that the witness was in genuine fear of giving evidence, but where the statement was inherently unreliable in ways that a jury direction could not possibly have redressed.

Although a victim had only been shot in the leg despite the gunman's proximity to him, evidence of prior death threats and extensive planning meant that there had been a case to answer on a count of conspiracy to murder rather than merely conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm.

Sentences of five years' and four years' imprisonment imposed for wounding with intent imposed on a 19-year-old with a relevant criminal history and a 20-year-old with no convictions or cautions were unduly lenient and were replaced by sentences of eight years and seven years respectively in a young offender institution. They had taken part in an appalling group attack on a man helpless on the ground, kicking, punching and stamping on him and inflicting deep lacerations with a handsaw.

Sentences of 15 years' imprisonment for two counts of wounding with intent imposed on offenders who had been 16 years and 9 months and 17 years and 8 months old at the time of the offences were not manifestly excessive. The attacks had consisted of unprovoked, brutal, gangland-type violence inflicted on innocent passers-by and the judge had given careful thought to possible reduction of sentence in consideration of their ages.

A total sentence of five years' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of the appellant, who had pleaded guilty to inflicting grievous bodily harm and damaging property being reckless as to whether life was endangered.

A hospital order and restriction order were imposed in place of a sentence of imprisonment for public protection for wounding with intent, where the offender's personality disorder had not been diagnosed at the time of sentence.

A defendant's conviction for possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life had not, in the circumstances, been inconsistent with his acquittal of wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm.

Sentences imposed on three young offenders involved in the murder of a youth during the rush hour at a busy central London station were reduced. The minimum term in the case of one offender convicted of murder was reduced from 18 years to 16 years as although he was one of the ringleaders in planning the attack he did not have the intention to kill. Sentences of 7 years' detention in a young offender institution for the other two offenders for conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm and violent disorder respectively were substituted with sentences of five-and-a-half years due to their more limited involvement and bearing in mind their youth, good character and positive reports.

A total sentence of four years and two months' imprisonment for an offender's four assaults on his partner properly reflected his criminality and was not manifestly excessive. Where someone was put in constant peril and fear in his own home as a result of repetitive domestic abuse, that was potentially a substantial aggravating factor for sentencing purposes; the aggravation was compounded where the perpetrator was in reality controlling the victim and abusing his position in the home and the victim was, in the domestic context, vulnerable.

A conviction for causing grievous bodily harm with intent, caused during a fight involving a group of males outside a pub, was quashed where the identification evidence in relation to one of the group members was so weak that the matter ought to have been withdrawn from the jury following a submission of no case to answer.

Sentences of eight years' detention were appropriate in the case of two offenders who had been convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm with intent. They had been involved in a brutal and sustained group attack at night in a public place, and their victim had sustained serious injuries as a result of being punched, kicked and thrown into a canal.

A sentencing judge had adopted the correct approach in exercising his discretion to impose a determinate sentence of 16 years' imprisonment for an offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, where he believed that the resulting licence period would be sufficient to protect the public, rather than imposing an indeterminate sentence.

The jury's verdicts giving rise to three offenders' respective convictions for causing grievous bodily harm with intent, murder and manslaughter, arising out of an assault on a victim who was placed in a car which was set on fire, were not inconsistent so as to render the convictions unsafe. The different verdicts represented an assessment of the evidence by the jury in the different cases.

Although an offender had taken no physical part in a serious assault, in which the victim was stabbed, burned and had his wrist broken, he had played a full part by being there throughout and encouraging the attack by his presence. His sentence of 27 months' imprisonment for unlawful wounding was not excessive, and his continued presence and extensive criminal history justified his receiving the same sentence as a co-defendant who had broken the victim's wrist.

A judge had erred in finding that a young offender presented a significant risk of serious harm to the public when imposing a sentence of detention for public protection for robbery and causing grievous bodily harm. The pre-sentence report and background information had not justified a finding of dangerousness.

The First-tier Tribunal had been entitled to uphold a decision by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority not to award compensation to a driver who was severely injured when a suicidal person ran onto a dual carriageway. Having concluded that no offence had been committed under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.20, the tribunal had not been required to ask itself whether there had been a "crime of violence" for the purposes of the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme 2001.

Sentences of three years' imprisonment, thirty months' imprisonment and 27 months' imprisonment were appropriate in the case of four young offenders who had variously pleaded guilty to, or had been convicted of, wounding with intent following a planned and sustained gang attack upon another youth.

Sentences of three years and six months' detention for an offence of wounding with intent contrary to the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.18 and 18 months consecutive for burglary were unduly lenient. The principle of totality applied but it was not appropriate to reflect that principle in the sentences imposed for both wounding and burglary.

A judge had been right to conclude that a young offender could not be fairly re-tried for murder and to stay further proceedings on that issue as an abuse of process where the young offender had been convicted of the alternative charge of manslaughter and the jury had been unable to reach a verdict on murder.

A sentence of five years' imprisonment, imposed after a guilty plea to wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, was not manifestly excessive where the offender had bitten off a portion of the victim's nose during a fight, causing severe injuries.

There was no truth in allegations made by parents convicted of wounding and wilfully neglecting their 18-month-old daughter that they had received an unfair trial on the basis of the judge being biased. Criminal trials involved an adversarial process that required counsel to withstand robust comments and continue to firmly and fiercely represent their lay clients.

In imposing an extended sentence of 15 years for wounding with intent where the offender had squeezed the victim's throat until she was unconscious and inflicted multiple wounds with a pair of scissors, the judge had selected too high a starting point. The injuries sustained, none of which required stitches, were not really serious in the context of the offence. An extended sentence of 12 years was substituted.

Sentences of 12 years' imprisonment imposed on offenders for causing grievous bodily harm with intent were replaced with 10 years' imprisonment where, although there had been a significant degree of premeditation, a vulnerable victim and a sustained or repeated attack, the injuries caused were not serious in the context of the offence so as to, by themselves, place the offence into category 1 of the sentencing guidelines.

The court considered the issues of insanity, automatism and voluntary intoxication in a case of attempted murder, one of wounding with intent and one of aggravated arson.

The court determined matters concerning residence, contact, reporting restrictions and disclosure to the police in long-standing family proceedings involving a mother who was charged with murder and with grievous bodily harm to one of her children.

Where an offender had been convicted of an offence of grievous bodily harm, a recorder had erred in imposing a sentence of life imprisonment and a sentence of imprisonment for public protection was substituted. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 Pt 12 s.225 did not stipulate that if an offence carried a sentence of life imprisonment and there was a finding of dangerousness, a life sentence was an automatic consequence.

It had been manifestly excessive to activate a full suspended sentence of 12 months' imprisonment, imposed for an offence of grievous bodily harm, where the offender had completed a requirement for unpaid work.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection for wounding with intent was inappropriate where the presumption of risk in the assessment of the offender's dangerousness need not have applied. A determinate sentence of seven years' imprisonment was substituted.

Sentences of 16 years' imprisonment imposed on three co-offenders for an offence of grievous bodily harm with intent for a premeditated, sustained attack with weapons on an unarmed man, against a background of a local feud, were not manifestly excessive in view of the serious nature of the assault and the aggravating features.

In criminal trials, there was much wisdom in a discussion between the judge and counsel taking place after the conclusion of evidence and prior to the summing up so that counsel could, if necessary, remind the judge of any directions he had resolved earlier in the proceedings to give. In the instant case, a conviction for wounding with intent was unsafe where the judge resolved to give a "strong" direction to the jury as to the effect of hearsay evidence from a co-accused, but then overlooked to actually give it.

In a case of unlawful wounding, the judge had not erred in allowing to be admitted the evidence of an accident-and-emergency consultant who had made a statement, served five weeks before the trial, which cast doubt on the defendant's account of how the victim had sustained his injuries.

Extended sentences of eight years for an offence under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.20 and 66 months for affray were quashed because they exceeded the maximum terms permitted for the offences. Determinate sentences of three years and six months respectively, to run consecutively, were substituted.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection for an offence by an obsessively jealous man of wounding with intent, with a minimum term of 32 months was not warranted. Substituted for it was an extended sentence of imprisonment for public protection; a custodial term of five years and four months, and an extension period of two years and eight months.

A sentence of two years' imprisonment for wounding with intent was quashed as unduly lenient where the offender had attacked his victim with a knife that he had been carrying around for personal protection. A four-year sentence was appropriate.

An earlier conviction for an offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm contrary to the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.18 was admissible to prove, following the death of the victim, that the defendant was guilty not merely of causing grievous bodily harm with intent, but of murder.

A judge's failure to give the jury an expanded direction on the meaning of intent in relation to an allegation of wounding with intent was not a misdirection and did not render the conviction unsafe.

A rehabilitation order of 18 months imposed on a young offender for wounding with intent was held to be unduly lenient and was replaced with an 18-month detention and training order.

Convictions for aggravated burglary and inflicting grievous bodily harm were unsafe where the judge had given an explicit jury direction that one of the victims was of good character when she was not. If for any reason he was minded to make such an observation, he should at the very least have checked that it was true.

In a case where the defendant alleged that a charge of wounding with intent was based on the victim's false allegations, the judge had been correct to refuse defence counsel permission to cross-examine the victim about false allegations he had allegedly made in the past against his mother; those allegations did not have "substantial probative value" in relation to a matter in issue for the purposes of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.100(1)(b).

In a case involving offences of grievous bodily harm committed against a child by the child's mother and her boyfriend, a judge had not erred in refusing the boyfriend's application to adduce evidence of the mother's apparent animosity towards her child. Relevant information had already been put before the jury and the evidence sought to be adduced added no substantial probative value to the matter in issue between the defendants.

A European arrest warrant did not comply with the requirements of the Extradition Act 2003 s.2 where it stated that the person sought was charged with murder which carried a life sentence when, as a result of decisions of Polish appeal courts, he could only be found guilty of fatal wounding which carried a maximum ten year sentence.

A sentence of seven years' imprisonment for causing grievous bodily harm with intent was unduly lenient where the offender had chosen a victim who was unlikely to press charges, had caused grave injuries and had stamped on the victim as he lay injured. A sentence of 13 years' imprisonment was appropriate.

A judge had been correct to impose a sentence of detention for public protection upon a 17-year-old young offender who had slashed his friend's face with a knife, after a drugs dispute, causing cuts down to the bone. However, a notional determinate term of 16 years was too high; 14 years was more appropriate, leading to a minimum term of seven years.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of seven-and-a-half years, imposed for an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent, was not wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. The judge had been entitled to find that the risk to the public posed by the offender could not be adequately addressed by an extended sentence.

A sentence of two years' imprisonment for an offence of wounding with intent where the victim was slashed in the face with a knife was unduly lenient and a sentence of three years' imprisonment was substituted.

Eight years' imprisonment was not manifestly excessive following a late guilty plea to causing grievous bodily harm with intent to resist arrest where the offender had driven his car at an off-duty policeman, run over the policeman's legs while he was on the ground, and later drove at a police car.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection was affirmed as appropriate for an offender who had pleaded guilty to an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent, as he had not availed himself of psychological treatment in prison and no longer accepted the totality of his offence as he had previously done.

A sentence of eight years' detention following a 15-year-old young offender's guilty plea to causing grievous bodily harm with intent had been too high where the judge appeared not to have followed the relevant sentencing guidelines and had failed to take into account the offender's age.

Although "necessary" was not used in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 s.5, it was implicit from the Human Rights Act 1998 that a restraining order could be imposed only if necessary: its terms would impinge on the subject's private life and would only comply with the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 art.8 if they were necessary.

The convictions of two soldiers of causing grievous bodily harm with intent and actual bodily harm on a joint enterprise basis were quashed where neither defendant had the protection of a direction on joint enterprise or self-defence and where the findings of fact of the Court Martial Board did not support the allegation of joint enterprise from the outset.

A sentence of six years' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of an offender who had pleaded guilty to taking part, along with two others, in a violent, racially aggravated attack, as a result of which the victim sustained significant injuries including broken ribs and damage to his spleen and lung.

Although a suspended sentence imposed following a guilty plea to causing grievous bodily harm was unduly lenient and custody should have been inevitable, the sentence was left undisturbed because, after sentence, the offender had shown that his actions were spectacularly out of character and his remorse was unreserved. He had quickly paid an unusual proportion of the compensation ordered, performed an unusual amount of his unpaid work requirement, and had behaved impeccably since the offence.

A conviction for causing grievous bodily harm with intent was safe as the judge's wording during his summing up did not undermine his directions to the jury on secondary liability and joint enterprise. Whilst the direction may have been lengthy and confusing, the trial judge ultimately gave an accurate and clear direction.

A judge had erred in finding that an attempt to inflict grievous bodily harm with intent fell within category 1 of the sentencing guidelines for assault on the basis that there had been the potential for greater harm or serious injury. However, given the serious aggravating features, which indicated a high degree of culpability and gravity, the offence was to be placed at the top of the sentence range in category 2 and the appropriate sentence was one of nine years' imprisonment before any credit for a guilty plea rather than 12 years.

A sentence of detention for public protection, imposed following a guilty plea to offences of false imprisonment and wounding with intent, was quashed and an extended sentence substituted where there was available to the appeal court information as to the offender's conduct in detention which had not been available to the sentencing judge and which indicated a sustained intention to progress.

A trial judge had been entitled on the material before her to conclude that a sentence of imprisonment for public protection was appropriate for an offence of wounding with intent where the offender, who had 26 previous convictions and was assessment as being at a high risk of possessing the potential to cause serious harm to the public, had intimidated a bus user before attacking him with a knife as he tried to exit the bus.

The court quashed a sentence of imprisonment for public protection and replaced it with hospital and restriction orders where there was fresh evidence that the offender was suffering from mental illness to a nature and degree that required hospital treatment.

Convictions for wounding with intent and violent disorder were unsafe and were quashed as the judge had misdirected the jury in respect of identification evidence.

A starting point of 18 years for a sentence of imprisonment for public protection imposed following a guilty plea by a 23-year-old to offences of grievous bodily harm and carrying a firearm with criminal intent was too high where no injury had been inflicted on the victim, having regard to the need to respect the proportionality of the offence in relation to sentences for attempted murder.

A total sentence of seven years' imprisonment for an offence of grievous bodily harm and cannabis offences was not manifestly excessive and the judge had taken account of totality and correctly identified the assault as a category one offence.

A judge had erred by failing to have regard to the likely sentence a young offender would have received for an offence of grievous bodily harm had he been sentenced before he reached the age of 18.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a specified period of almost four years was appropriate in the case of a 28-year-old offender who had pleaded guilty to causing grievous bodily harm with intent and to assault occasioning actual bodily harm, the offences arising from street violence between rival groups of young men.

A judge had not erred in imposing a sentence of imprisonment for public protection on an offender who had carried out a planned attempted robbery of a convenience store, seriously injuring the shopkeeper.

A conviction for having an offensive weapon was unsafe as the judge had failed to direct the jury as to the elements of the offence. However, the offender's conviction for wounding with intent was safe as, despite the judge's misdirections, the jury would have inevitably found that the offender's use of a hammer was with more force than was reasonable in the circumstances.

The court quashed as unsafe convictions for murder, violent disorder and conspiracy to commit grievous bodily harm. The convictions had been based on flawed identification evidence and, as a result of fresh evidence, the basis of the Crown's case had fallen away.

Contrary to the submission of the appellant, who had been convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm, the judge had not put the jury under pressure to reach a verdict.

The decision of a judge to extend custody time limits was quashed where the case was not remotely within the category of cases of real complexity such that it could be established that the unavailability of a court room, or which required a particular judge provided good and sufficient cause of itself for extending the custody time limits.

Whilst a judge was wrong to allow the prosecution to adduce evidence of an offender's conversation with a police officer made in breach of the Codes of Practice C:10.1, the case against the offender was a strong one and his convictions for wounding with intent, aggravated burglary and possession of a firearm at the time of committing an offence were safe.

A sentence of 32 months' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of a man who had pleaded guilty to unlawful wounding after injuring his mother with an axe in a drunken domestic dispute.

Convictions for dangerous driving, inflicting grievous bodily harm and unlawful wounding were safe despite the judge having incorrectly made reference to unlawfulness in his summing up to the jury.

The imposition of a hybrid sentence comprising imprisonment for public protection and hospital and limitation directions under the Mental Health Act 1983 s.45A for offences of kidnapping and causing grievous bodily harm with intent was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive where, although the offender had been suffering from an undiagnosed serious mental illness, criminal culpability was not wholly absent, and the degree of harm caused together with the significant risk to the public of future serious harm was also taken into account.

Sentences of 16 months' imprisonment which had been imposed following the appellants' pleas of guilty to unlawful wounding were justified. The judge had given an indication that he would impose a suspended sentence but it was not a binding indication and no unfairness had arisen from his departure from what had been merely a provisional view.

It was not appropriate to lengthen an unduly lenient sentence of three years and four months' imprisonment, imposed on an offender for wounding with intent and possession of an offensive weapon, where the offender's brother had committed suicide while the offender had been in prison and so he had been unable to attend the funeral.

A sentence of three years and three months' imprisonment was appropriate where an appellant with relevant previous convictions had pleaded guilty to a serious offence of unlawful wounding, and a further offence of assault occasioning actual bodily harm committed while on bail for the first offence.

Sentences of three-and-a-half and four years' imprisonment following late pleas of guilty to conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm were unduly lenient as the judge had given too much credit for late guilty pleas and had categorised the offences as Category 2 rather than Category 1. Sentences of seven and eight years' imprisonment were imposed.

A judge had been wrong to withhold credit for a guilty plea in the case of a young offender who had caused grievous bodily harm to a stranger. Although applying a discount would have meant imposing an 18-month detention and training order instead of a 24-month order, there had been no justification for departing from the general principle that an offender was to be given discount for his guilty plea.

A driver's words to the effect that anyone who was in his way would get run over were evidence of his aggressive intent sufficient to found a conviction under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.18 after he had run over a pedestrian, notwithstanding that the driver had had no specific intention against the victim in particular.

A 12-month sentence of imprisonment, suspended for two years, for wounding with intent was unduly lenient where the offender had smashed a glass into the victim's face. His sentence was quashed and replaced with a three-year sentence of imprisonment.

A judge had been correct to exclude hearsay evidence in circumstances where a co-defendant's interest in excluding it far outweighed the defendant's in having it admitted.

A judge had been wrong to impose sentences of detention for public protection upon a 19-year-old offender guilty of robbery and grievous bodily harm. Given the offender's age, a positive reference and the possibility that he might gain maturity, extended sentences would have protected the public and met the justice of the case.

Where a judge had been entitled to allow certain DNA evidence, and the interpretation of it by the Crown's witness, to go before a jury, and his summing up in respect of that evidence had been adequate, there was no reason to doubt the safety of the appellant's convictions for possession of a prohibited firearm and causing grievous bodily harm.

An indeterminate sentence might be appropriate where a person of good character committed a serious offence which was inconsistent with his usual behaviour and for which no explanation had been given.

Convictions for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm were upheld where the accused had chosen not to have a victim's statements read out or to call any other witnesses because that victim refused to give evidence and so could not be cross-examined. The accused had understood the trial process but had considered that he could manipulate it to his advantage when he understood that the victim would be unwilling to attend.

The court indicated that prosecuting authorities should be alert to the need to protect public funds and should not usually instruct prosecuting counsel to attend straightforward appeals against sentence.

A conviction for unlawful wounding was quashed where the judge, in summing up, had minimised the significance of a discrepancy in the evidence.

The Crown had a responsibility to properly consider written bases of plea as, although they sometimes identified an entirely proper and realistic factual scenario which could and should be the proper basis for sentence, some were unrealistic and an attempt to force the hand of the Crown or the court.

An offender's conviction for causing grievous bodily harm with intent was upheld, as fresh evidence adduced on his behalf was quite incapable of belief.

The House of Lords in R. v Rahman (Islamur) [2008] UKHL 45, [2009] 1 A.C. 129 had not altered the rule that, in cases of murder by joint enterprise, for an accessory to be guilty it had to be shown that he foresaw that the principal would act with the intent either to kill or to do grievous bodily harm.

The court set out jury directions which could be used in trials where a qualified supervising driver was accused of failing to act when accompanying a learner driver and as a result was charged with aiding and abetting causing death by dangerous driving or aiding and abetting inflicting grievous bodily harm.

A sentence of 12 months' imprisonment suspended for two years imposed on an offender for an offence of wounding with intent contrary to the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.18 was unduly lenient and was, accordingly, replaced with one of 30 months' detention in a young offender institution.

A judge was entitled to impose a six-year extended sentence on an offender following his guilty plea to an offence of wounding with intent despite previously indicating, in accordance with the procedure in R. v Goodyear (Karl) [2005] EWCA Crim 888, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 2532, that a three-year determinate sentence would be imposed. Reports read after the indication had been given suggested that it would be in the public interest to impose the extended sentence, and the defendant had not suffered any prejudice as he had been given the opportunity to change his plea.

Total sentences of imprisonment of three years and nine months for robbery and aggravated burglary and four years for causing grievous bodily harm with intent imposed on two offenders were unduly lenient. They were therefore replaced with sentences of imprisonment for public protection with minimum terms of nine and six years respectively.

A recorder's summing up was not as clear as it should have been regarding whether an intention to wound was sufficient to constitute an intention to cause grievous bodily harm but, in light of concessions made at trial by the defendant relating to the weapon and the type of injury it would cause, his conviction for wounding with intent was safe.

In a hearing of three joined appeals involving shaken baby syndrome, the Court of Appeal gave detailed guidance on case management, particularly the management of expert evidence and on the content of the summing up.

A two-year supervision order imposed for an offence of grievous bodily harm with intent to which the offender had pleaded guilty was not unduly lenient when proper account of all the mitigating features associated with the offence were taken into account; in particular that the offender was a vulnerable young girl who had been provoked with the threat of sexual assault.

A sentence of seven years' detention imposed on a 15-year-old young offender following his conviction for causing grievous bodily harm with intent was reduced to a term of six years to take into account his age, that he had demonstrated insight into his offending and that he had made positive progress since conviction.

The decision of the judge, during the course of a murder trial, to permit admission of closed-circuit television footage from a bar and the consequent development of the prosecution case that that evidence was consistent with the defendant having been involved an attack on a victim had not rendered the defendant's convictions for murder and wounding with intent unsafe.

The court quashed a conviction for wounding with intent in circumstances where the jury's verdict was so illogical as to make the conviction unsafe.

It was very important that Practice Direction (Supreme Court: Criminal Proceedings; Victim Personal Statements) Times, May 19, 2009, which set out the procedure to be followed when a basis of plea was entered, was observed, as it was the duty of the court to examine a basis of plea to ensure that its acceptance was in the interests of justice.

An extended sentence of nine years made up of a custodial term of four-and-a-half years with an extended period of licence of four-and-a-half years, for an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent was not manifestly excessive where the offender kicked his victim in the head whilst he lay on the ground. The use of a shod foot could be equated with the use of a weapon, an aggravating feature was the offender's significant antecedent history of violence and the judge's finding that the offender was dangerous could not be faulted.

A community punishment and rehabilitation order imposed on a 17-year-old who had pleaded guilty to wounding with intent after carrying out a premeditated attack with a hammer was unduly lenient. It was replaced with a detention and training order of 18 months.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection, with a minimum term of five years, imposed on an offender for an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent was not wrong in principle or manifestly excessive. However, a sentence of imprisonment for public protection imposed on a co-offender was wrong in principle as the co-offender had no previous convictions for violence, played a secondary role in the offence and showed real remorse.

Three men had been part of a joint enterprise to cause really serious harm to another group of men; their various convictions for murder, manslaughter and grievous bodily harm with intent were safe as the judge had been right not to risk confusing the jury with directions per R. v English (Philip) [1999] 1 A.C. 1 or R. v Brown (Kevin) (1984) 1 B.C.C. 98970. An apparent inconsistency in the verdicts had a rational explanation.

A sentence of detention for public protection was appropriate in the case of a 19-year-old who had pleaded guilty to kidnapping and causing grievous bodily harm with intent after luring a man to a flat and taking part in a savage attack upon him.

Various convictions of murder, manslaughter and violent disorder and conspiracy to cause grievous bodily harm with intent that arose out of a group attack that resulted in a fatal stabbing were upheld. The sentences for murder and violent disorder and conspiracy were quashed.

A suspended sentence of two years' imprisonment imposed on an offender for wounding with intent was not unduly lenient where the offender, who had been attacked in his home by the victim with an axe, stabbed the victim once under serious provocation. The sentence was, however, unlawful because the maximum sentence which could be suspended as a matter of law was 12 months' imprisonment; a suspended sentence of 12 months' imprisonment was therefore substituted.

A sentence of five years' imprisonment following a guilty plea to an offence of wounding with intent was unduly lenient even though the offender was of impeccable good character and had pleaded guilty at an early stage. Making every allowance for the features in mitigation, the appropriate sentence was eight years' imprisonment for what was a horrific revenge attack on a defenceless man in a case of mistaken identity.

Merciful sentences were called for where two men had attacked and seriously injured a burglar in a revenge attack as he was escaping. The case in relation to the victim of the burglary was truly exceptional, and there was ample justification for ordering that his sentence of two years and six months' imprisonment be reduced to 12 months suspended for two years. In relation to the other offender, his sentence was reduced from three years and three months to two years' imprisonment.

A sentence of nine years' imprisonment for causing grievous bodily harm with intent was appropriate where the offender had delivered a heavy kick to the victim's head while he lay unconscious, causing life-threatening injuries with profound and permanent consequences.

A sentence of five years' detention imposed on a young offender for causing grievous bodily harm with intent following his involvement in a group attack with weapons was unduly lenient and a sentence of seven years was substituted. The judge had been too merciful in sentencing a young, immature offender who had been influenced by others and the sentence had not reflected the seriousness of the offence.

A life sentence with a minimum term of 16 years' imprisonment imposed on an offender for murder, wounding with intent and attempted murder was unduly lenient and the minimum term was increased to 25 years' imprisonment in circumstances where the offender had repeatedly stabbed his step-son to death whilst he was asleep.

A total sentence of 10 years' imprisonment imposed on an offender following his convictions for inflicting grievous bodily harm, rape and assault by penetration was unduly lenient where he had raped and sexually assaulted his partner while she was paralysed as a result of actions. It was replaced with a sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of nine years.

Where the precise concatenation of events leading up to offences of murder, wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm and assault occasioning actual bodily harm was not specifically foreseen by the group who committed the offences but what had occurred was within their contemplation, common enterprise was made out.

Although a sentence of three-and-a-half years' detention imposed on a young offender for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm was not manifestly excessive in isolation, there was disparity with the sentence imposed on a co-accused who was convicted after trial and sentenced to four years' detention as the judge had not given enough credit for the offender's guilty plea.

An 18-month detention and training order imposed following a guilty plea to an offence of grievous bodily harm was quashed and a 12-month detention and training order substituted where the offender had fled the scene of the incident and had denied the offence when he was arrested several weeks later, but had pleaded guilty in the Crown Court. The judge had failed to properly apply the definitive guideline relating to discounts for guilty pleas which required the court to apply an appropriate discount to the sentence determined as the starting point and to then make a further reduction to reflect time spent in custody on remand.

Notwithstanding the age of a young offender and his inability to appreciate his actions and their consequences, there were a number of aggravating features including the seriousness of the injury sustained by the victim and the absence of remorse that justified a sentence of 10 years' detention for an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent.

A suspended sentence of 52 weeks' imprisonment for offences of unlawful wounding and aggravated burglary was unduly lenient and was replaced with a total sentence of three years and six months' imprisonment. Although violence had not been used during the aggravated burglary, that point receded in significance when violence was used moments later, giving rise to the unlawful wounding offence.

Where a defendant did not have a previous conviction for a specified offence or had not received a custodial sentence of at least four years, it had not been lawful to extend his sentence under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.227. A total sentence of seven years' imprisonment for offences of unlawful wounding, possession of an offensive weapon and battery was reduced to one of three years and nine months.

A sentence of two years' detention was appropriate in the case of a young offender who had pleaded guilty to an offence of wounding and who had spent some 16 months on bail subject to a night-time curfew.

A conviction for causing grievous bodily harm with intent was quashed where a judge had erred in failing to leave to the jury a lesser alternative verdict of assault occasioning actual bodily harm which there was evidence to support.

A sentence of three years' imprisonment imposed for inflicting grievous bodily harm was manifestly excessive, as the judge had wrongly placed the offence in the highest sentencing category and had subsequently taken too high a starting point. The appropriate sentence was one of two years' imprisonment.

Given that it was inappropriate for the court to receive fresh evidence that was either not central to the issue at trial or was simply a reiteration of the defendant's expert's evidence advanced at trial, but by a different expert, the defendant's conviction for causing grievous bodily harm with intent was safe.

The case against the offender who was convicted of wounding with intent and affray was compelling and fresh evidence would not have reasonably affected the decision of the jury to convict.

A detention for public protection with a minimum term of two years imposed on a 17-year-old boy following his guilty pleas to wounding with intent and assault occasioning actual bodily harm was quashed as the judge had misunderstood the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and had failed to consider an extended sentence. A total extended sentence of six years' detention with a custodial term of four years and an extended licence period of two years was appropriate.

Psychologists' reports commissioned and produced after conviction and sentence that detailed an offender's limited intellectual ability did not impugn the sentencing judge's decision to impose an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of five years for conspiracy to rob and wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm where the defendant had contributed substantially to the conspiracy and there was clear evidence of dangerousness.

The conviction of offenders for serious violent offences that arose out of the same incident for which they had already received fixed penalty notices under the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001 did not constitute an abuse of process where the subject of the caution and the actual prosecution were not the same offence.

A total sentence of four years and three months' detention imposed for wounding with intent, perverting the course of justice, and assault occasioning actual bodily harm was manifestly excessive and was reduced to two years and nine months' detention due to the exceptional circumstances, namely the existence of extreme provocation.

A judge had erred in failing to leave an alternative verdict of unlawful wounding to a jury considering a charge of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, as it was a realistically available verdict on the evidence. It was particularly important that an alternative verdict was left to a jury where the offence charged required proof of a specific intent and the alternative did not.

Although there had been deficiencies in a summing up, there was sufficient evidence before the jury to conclude guilt on the issue of intent and for the conviction to be considered safe.

Sentences of nine and six years' detention for two young offenders convicted of rape and, in one case, grievous bodily harm were unduly lenient where the female victim, who was just 16, had been subjected to a group sex attack and had caustic soda thrown over her. The sentences were increased to 14 and 9 years' detention.

A judge had directed a jury in accordance with the Judicial Studies Board specimen directions on intention, which were a framework to provide assistance and guidance and not to be followed slavishly, and an offender's conviction for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm was safe.

Whilst a judge was not bound to accept the opinion of a probation officer that a young offender convicted of wounding with intent should not be sentenced to an extended sentence or detention for public protection, there had to be cogent reasons for departing from that opinion.

Whilst a judge had been right to rule that an offender being sentenced for an offence of wounding with intent committed whilst in a depressive state posed a substantial risk of being a danger to the public, he had been wrong to impose a sentence of imprisonment for public protection. An extended sentence comprising five years and six months' imprisonment with a term of extended licence of four years was substituted.

An extended sentence of eight years comprising a custodial term of four years and an extension period of four years imposed on an offender for grievous bodily harm with intent and robbery following his guilty plea was unduly lenient and the judge had clearly fallen into error. The custodial part of the sentence was increased to seven years and the licence period remained.

A judge was not wrong to have given a direction under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s.34 in circumstances where the offender had given a no-comment interview, but had issued a prepared statement and a defence case statement. Further, the direction had been clear and had not affected the safety of his conviction for wounding with intent to commit grievous bodily harm.

Convictions for assault by penetration of a child under the age of 13 and unlawful wounding were safe where the judge had been right to admit hearsay evidence consisting of statements made by the 30-month-old victim.

A conviction for conspiracy to inflict grievous bodily harm was safe where there was no evidence to suggest that alternative counts should have been left to the jury. However, as the offender was only 19 at the time of the offence, a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive and was reduced to eight years.

A sentence of 30 months' imprisonment was manifestly excessive where an offender had pleaded guilty to inflicting grievous bodily harm after punching a 15-year-old girl and fracturing her jaw in an unprovoked attack. It was replaced with a sentence of 18 months' imprisonment.

When summing up a case of grievous bodily harm, a judge had erroneously advised the jury that it was possible to interpret the medical evidence to support a finding either for or against the offender. He should have directed that if the jurors adopted the view that the evidence supporting the accused was or might be true, having considered all the evidence, they could not be sure that the accused was guilty.

The Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, when allowing an appeal against the secretary of state's refusal to revoke a deportation order, had clearly taken into account the secretary of state's policy on deportation of foreign nationals who had committed serious crimes.

Convictions for assault and unlawful wounding were unsafe, as the judge had failed to remind the jury of any of the material contradictions and inconsistencies between the complainants' evidence. As the offender had served a significant part of his sentence, it was not in the interests of justice to order a retrial.

A conviction for unlawful wounding with intent was quashed, as the judge had misdirected the jury by stating that they had to be sure that the prosecution had proved that the offender had intended to cause grievous bodily harm or to wound, rather than directing them that the prosecution had to prove intention to cause really serious harm. As there was not enough evidence to prove that the offender had intended to cause really serious harm, the conviction was replaced with one of unlawful wounding.

A total sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of seven-and-a-half years imposed following pleas of guilty to theft, battery, wounding with intent and aggravated burglary was manifestly excessive and the minimum term was reduced to five years' imprisonment.

A person who cared for young children and was prepared to act recklessly and subject those children to the risk of transmission of a sexual disease could be made the subject of a sexual offences prevention order.

Convictions for blackmail and causing grievous bodily harm with intent were upheld as the judge had been correct to refuse a submission of no case to answer as there was material to support the offender's presence at the scene. A sentence of 15 years' imprisonment for grievous bodily harm with intent was not manifestly excessive as the victim had been subjected to horrific and brutal torture.

The minimum term of a sentence of imprisonment for public protection imposed for wounding with intent was reduced from nine years to seven-and-a-half years on an offender that had also committed drug and firearms offences. A co-defendant's sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of four years was upheld.

The assessment of the seriousness of an offence involved a broad judgment of overall criminality and even a definitive sentencing guideline was not to be approached as if each offence could be put into a fixed and inflexible compartment. The recommended starting point for setting the notional determinate sentence for the gravest cases where a defendant was under 18 was 13 years, with a sentencing range of 10 to 16 years. In the instant case, a minimum term of 16 years and three months was reduced by nine months to reflect an element of remorse.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of six years and two weeks imposed for manslaughter and wounding with intent was replaced with a sentence of detention for public protection with a minimum term of six years owing to the offender's age. Apart from that, the judge's reasoning and conclusions were sound, and the fact that the victims had thrown things at the offender's house was properly categorised as low provocation.

A sentence of two years' detention and training imposed for wounding with intent was unduly lenient and was replaced with four years' detention and training as, even though the offender was only 15 years old, the crime was very grave.

Where an offender had attacked his neighbour in his home with a knife, inflicting repeated and serious injuries upon him, a sentence of four years' imprisonment, after a conviction by a jury of wounding with intent, was unduly lenient and was replaced with one of seven years.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of two-and-a-half years for wounding with intent and assault by beating was replaced by a sentence of five years' imprisonment, as the previous convictions taken into account when the judge had assessed dangerousness should have been disregarded, since they were very old and had been committed when the offender was a teenager.

Applying modern standards of fairness, a conviction from 1986 for grievous bodily harm with intent was unsafe where the appellant had been denied access to a solicitor and contemporaneous records of police interviews had not been made.

A sentence of detention for public protection, with a specified period of three years, had been appropriate for a 17-year-old offender who had pleaded guilty to causing grievous bodily harm with intent by stabbing his victim in a gang fight.

Sentences of imprisonment for public protection with minimum terms of 10 years and eight years' respectively imposed for an atrocious set of offences including firearms offences, offences against the person and causing another to engage in sexual activity without consent were not manifestly excessive.

A conviction for grievous bodily harm was unsafe, as the judge had incorrectly directed the jury to assess objectively whether the offender had acted in self-defence.

A conviction for seven counts of robbery and one count of unlawful wounding had not been made unsafe by the admission of evidence from a criminal intelligence analyst, as the evidence had been probative and was not unfairly prejudicial. A concurrent sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of four years was unlawful and was substituted with two years' imprisonment and an extension period of two years.

Where an offender convicted of possessing a firearm with intent and wounding with intent had been found to be dangerous a sentence of imprisonment for public protection was required: a minimum term of six years was appropriate where the impact of the offences had been to cause serious physical and mental harm to the victims and the offender had a record of previous convictions for offences with serious aggravating features.

Having regard to the sentencing categories in the sentencing guidelines, a period of three years' imprisonment for grievous bodily harm imposed on a 42-year-old well-respected family man, who had been largely out of trouble for 15 years, was unduly lenient even though the man was unlikely to have become involved in the incident but for the actions of his friend, the co-accused. The sentencing judge had taken the right approach in disregarding the offender's previous record, but still a man of his age could be expected to behave appropriately and not indulge in serious violence.

A sentence of detention for public protection with a minimum term of two-and-a-half years imposed for wounding with intent, attempted robbery and inflicting grievous bodily harm was not wrong in principle as the judge had assessed an offender's future risk to the public and correctly applied the dangerousness test.

An offender had satisfied the dangerousness test and therefore a sentence of detention for public protection with a minimum term of four years imposed for attempted robbery and wounding with intent was not manifestly excessive. However, due to the age of the offender he should have been sentenced to imprisonment for public protection rather than detention for public protection.

An extended sentence of five years comprising a custodial period of four years and an extension period on licence for one year imposed for causing grievous bodily harm was excessive and the custodial period was reduced to three years in light of the Sentencing Guidelines Council's guidance which had not been in force at the time that the offender was sentenced.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of five years was appropriate for an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent which had left the victim in a vegetative state.

Even though the prosecution had not complied with a disclosure order it was not an abuse of process for it to call a witness whom it had previously declared unreliable, and therefore a conviction for unlawful wounding was not unsafe.

A judge had erred in imposing a sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum term of 30 years for murder where he had failed to make a discount in the sentence to reflect that the murder was not premeditated. The only enterprise premeditated by the offender had been robbery and he might have shared an intention to facilitate escape by inflicting grievous bodily harm as was necessary for that purpose.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection was appropriate in the case of an appellant who had pleaded guilty to causing grievous bodily harm with intent and false imprisonment after subjecting his wife to a terrifying ordeal in which she was repeatedly stabbed.

It had not been an abuse of process for the prosecution to accept a guilty plea from a co-defendant to an offence of unlawful wounding rather than wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm but to refuse to accept such a plea from the defendant.

The form of an indictment could properly be criticised as having been defective in that it did not spell out the mental element of the offence in the usual and desirable manner. However, it did not follow that it did not give reasonable information as to the nature of the charge, let alone that it charged an offence unknown to law.

In the circumstances, a custodial sentence of 18 months' imprisonment imposed on the appellant for inflicting serious injuries on the complainant in a nightclub was entirely appropriate; however, the extended sentence of three years that had been imposed was quashed in the light of additional material before the court to the effect that he no longer represented a risk of significant harm to the public as a result of further offending.

An error by the judge in applying the wrong statute when informing the defendant of the time he would be required to spend in custody was not enough to make the sentence of six years' imprisonment, for incitement to cause grievous bodily harm with intent and making threats to kill, wrong in principle or manifestly excessive.

A sentence of two years' imprisonment imposed after a trial for attempting to cause grievous bodily harm with intent was unduly lenient and outside the range of what could properly be imposed; it was appropriate to substitute a sentence of four years' imprisonment.

A youth court had erred in refusing to grant a stay of prosecution for an offence of grievous bodily harm in circumstances where a promise had been made by a police officer during interview that the matter would be dealt with by way of a final warning.

An extended sentence of four years for an offence of unlawful wounding was excessive in light of a defendant's substantial personal mitigation and her guilty plea entered at the earliest opportunity.

The appellant's conviction for affray was safe and his submissions about inconsistent verdicts and misdirections were rejected.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection was set aside where a judge had not followed the procedure identified in R. v Lang (Stephen Howard) [2005] EWCA Crim 2864, [2006] 1 W.L.R. 2509 and R. v Johnson (Paul Anthony) [2006] EWCA Crim 2486, [2007] 1 W.L.R. 585 when assessing the dangerousness of an offender for the purpose of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.229.

A sentence of detention for public protection with a specified minimum term of one year was not inappropriate in respect of an offence of wounding with intent where, although by the time of sentence the offender had stopped his drug use and was being treated for a previously untreated mental illness, he had a significant number of previous convictions for offences involving violence and danger to the public, and there was a significant risk of serious harm in the future.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of six years was unduly lenient where the offender, who had a long criminal record including violent offences, had attacked two victims with an iron bar, leaving one of the victims very severely brain damaged. A sentence of seven years was substituted as the minimum term.

A sentence of eight years' imprisonment imposed for two offences of incitement to cause grievous bodily harm with intent and incitement to solicit murder was not manifestly excessive.

An offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent committed against a former sexual partner following the discovery that he was HIV positive and which resulted in significant permanent disability was not so serious as to merit a life sentence; a sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of six years was substituted.

A district judge had erred in his decision to commit an offender for sentence at the Crown Court contrary to an indication given that the magistrates' court would retain its sentencing jurisdiction.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of seven years was neither wrong in principle nor manifestly excessive where the offender, who had many previous convictions, had severely beaten the victim with a scaffolding pole and left him for dead.

A sentence of six-and-a-half years' imprisonment for wounding with intent imposed on a guilty plea after the 20-year-old offender had attacked the victim without provocation, striking him in the eye with a glass so as to cause the loss of sight in the eye, was reduced to one of five years to give effect to the offender's plea of guilty, his youth and previous good character, and his evident remorse.

In the circumstances, the imposition of an extended sentence on a young offender with no previous convictions, who had been found guilty of grievous bodily harm, had been wrong in principle since there was no evidence that she posed a significant risk to the public. She was a highly damaged child and her needs were better met by a three-year supervision order.

A sentence of two years and six months imprisonment imposed on an offender who, with his brother, had carried out a life-threatening knife attack on a victim at his home late at night was unduly lenient and was increased to three years and six months.

A sentence of four years and nine months' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of a woman of previous good character who had been convicted of wounding with intent after twice stabbing her boyfriend in an unprovoked attack.

A sentence of two years and nine months' imprisonment imposed on an offender who had entered the house of his estranged wife and inflicted wounds on two innocent victims was unduly lenient and was increased to one of three years and nine months' imprisonment.

A sentence of 12 months' detention suspended for two years together with 150 hours' unpaid work, imposed following an 18-year-old offender's guilty plea to an offence of wounding with intent, was unduly lenient and was replaced with an immediate sentence of three years and three months' detention, in circumstances where the offender had armed himself with a knife and stabbed an innocent member of the public in the neck at night.

It was incorrect that an offender who had deliberately driven his car at a group of five young men, causing them all injuries, should receive consecutive sentences in respect of two of the resulting counts of grievous bodily harm but concurrent sentences in respect of the other three. The five counts were part and parcel of the same incident, and there were no exceptional circumstances to justify consecutive sentences.

A total sentence of three years and six months' imprisonment for offences arising out of illegal money lending activities which included kidnap, unlawful wounding, blackmail and carrying on a consumer credit business without a licence was unduly lenient. A total sentence of six years and nine months' imprisonment was substituted.

A sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum term of 32 years was appropriate in the case of the appellant, who had set fire to a home, killing the couple that occupied it and causing serious burns to their 17-year-old daughter.

In deciding whether pursuant to the Extradition Act 2003, conduct alleged on the indictment in respect of which an individual's extradition was sought disclosed dual criminality, the court was limited to the facts set out in the indictment together with any document which it incorporated by express reference, and could not take into account any narrative or explanation tendered by the requesting state.

Where an offender had been convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent contrary to the Offences against the Person Act 1861 on the basis that he had prior knowledge of an assault and had filmed it, the conviction was not unsafe despite the fact that the trial judge had failed to give the jury adequate direction in relation to the evidence as the real issue for the jury to decide was the reason for the offender's presence at the attack, and it was clear to the jury that the evidence went to disprove the offender's claim of innocent presence at the attack.

A judge had been correct not to order the Crown to add an alternative lesser offence to an indictment after all the evidence in the case had been presented since that would have resulted in a radical departure from the case initially presented and unfairness to the accused.

A conviction for unlawful wounding was quashed where there was fresh evidence that cast doubt on the reliability of identification evidence and the safety of the conviction.

A sentence of five years' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of a 20-year-old man who had been convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent after instigating and taking part in a sustained and serious assault on an innocent man.

A sentence of three years' imprisonment for wounding with intent using a knife was unduly lenient as it failed to reflect the gravity of the offence. A sentence of five-and-a-half years' imprisonment was substituted.

A sentence of six-and-a-half years' imprisonment was appropriate after a late guilty plea by an offender who had committed grievous bodily harm with intent by attacking his ex-partner with a hot clothes-iron.

A minimum term of 17 years was appropriate for an offender who had been 20 years old at the time he took part in a planned revenge attack on the occupants of a car, in which he and three or four others used axes and swords, killing one person and seriously wounding four others.

The appropriate minimum term was 27 years for an offender who, at the age of 19, had taken part in an armed revenge attack on the occupants of a car, killing one and seriously wounding the other four, and then a few months later as part of a gang had taken hostage a vulnerable youth, beaten him to death and burnt his body.

Although a judge had correctly ruled that a trial could proceed in the absence of a defendant, the conviction was unsafe as the judge had made a ruling curtailing the defendant's right through counsel to challenge the evidence against him and he was therefore denied a right to a fair trial.

A sentence of five years' imprisonment following a guilty plea to wounding with intent was not unduly lenient.

A two-year detention and training order had been unduly lenient for an offence of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm where the defendant, who was 17-and-a-half at the time, had armed himself in advance and had undertaken a pre-meditated revenge attack. The appropriate sentence was three-and-a-half years' detention.

A 12-month detention and training order had been unduly lenient for offences of false imprisonment, unlawful wounding and burglary since a judge had misunderstood the sentencing powers available to him.

A judge had erred in imposing an extended sentence on an offender who was of previous good character and who had been judged, in the pre-sentence report, not to pose a significant risk to the public in general.

A sentence of eight months' imprisonment, suspended for 18 months, following a guilty plea to an offence of wounding with intent, was unduly lenient and was increased to three years' imprisonment in circumstances where, although the offender was of previous good character, had shown real remorse and the victim had not sustained permanent injury, the offender had deliberately armed himself with a weapon, entered the victim's home at night as a trespasser and assaulted the victim whilst he was asleep.

Convictions for inflicting grievous bodily harm and using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour were unsafe where a judge had allowed the jury to consider alternative verdicts seven hours into their deliberations and had deprived the defendants of the opportunity to address the jury on that basis.

The imposition of two consecutive extended sentences totalling 10 years, consisting of an overall custodial term of five years' imprisonment and a total extended licence period of five years, for offences of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and unlawful wounding, was manifestly excessive, given the level of violence and injury. Two concurrent extended sentences, comprising an overall custodial term of four years and a total extended licence period of two years, adequately reflected the offender's overall criminality and the seriousness of his behaviour.

A minimum term of 15 years' imprisonment for murder was imposed on the offender under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 where there was no evidence of intention to kill as opposed to cause grievous bodily harm, and mitigating factors included a guilty plea.

A slip by a judge during his summing up in a murder trial had not been sufficient to affect the safety of the guilty verdict. The judge had also provided clear directions to the jury regarding inconsistent statements by a prosecution witness, had provided an appropriate Turnbull direction and had been correct to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to go before a properly directed jury.

A sentence of 20 months' detention was unduly lenient where the defendant had deliberately armed himself with a knife in advance of a confrontation and had caused serious injury to the victim; a term of four years was substituted.

An assessment of dangerousness and the resulting extended sentence were inappropriate where there had been a single blow to the head and the offender had no previous convictions for violence.

A judge had been correct to permit the Crown to adduce bad character evidence where he had provided the jury with an adequate direction concerning that evidence and had fairly reflected weaknesses in the Crown's case during his summing up.

A sentence of two years' imprisonment for causing grievous bodily harm with intent and assault occasioning actual bodily harm was unduly lenient where the offender had acted in an extraordinarily violent manner in what could be considered a revenge attack.

Although the overall management in the lead up to and during a trial had been inadequate, there had been an abundance of evidence against a defendant to the extent that the jury's verdicts could not be brought into question.

A minimum term of 15 years was appropriate where the offender had recruited several armed supporters to accompany him to a meeting at which a fight broke out resulting in the murder of a man he had quarrelled with and serious injury to several others.

A minimum term of 11 years was appropriate for the murder of a family friend where, although the offender had had prior possession of the weapon, the offence had lacked any substantial degree of premeditation and he had intended to cause grievous bodily harm rather than to commit murder.

In the circumstances, minimum terms of 13 and 11 years' imprisonment were set following convictions for murder and wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.

Although late disclosure of, and total failure to disclose, documents on the part of the prosecution could be regarded as serious errors, in the circumstances, they did not render unsafe the offenders' convictions for a series of offences which arose out of their violent clashes with a number of asylum seekers.

Where a defendant pleaded guilty to an offence of grievous bodily harm under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.20 and was convicted of an offence under s.18, there remained a conviction on the guilty plea to the s.20 offence when the s.18 conviction was subsequently quashed. The test was whether, if the defendant had been convicted of the s.20 offence, such a conviction would have been safe on the evidence.

A judge who had deferred for six months the sentencing of a young offender who had pleaded guilty to assault occasioning actual bodily harm and grievous bodily harm had failed to take into account the gravity of the offences and was mistaken in thinking that she was obliged to respect a supervision order imposed three days previously for a less severe offence.

Where a defendant had crossed the relevant age threshold between the commission of the offence and the date of conviction, the starting point for the court in sentencing was how that particular defendant would have been sentenced at the date of the offence. In the instant case, a supervision order of 12 months was appropriate in the case of a 14-year-old girl who had pleaded guilty to wounding with intent after stabbing a fellow pupil who had bullied her.

A conviction was quashed and a retrial ordered in circumstances where a judge had gone beyond the relevant propensity of a previous conviction and directed the jury as to its applicability in demonstrating characteristics that were irrelevant to the issues in the case.

A sentence of three-and-a-half years' detention imposed on a defendant following his conviction for wounding with intent was unduly lenient where the offence was set against a background of tribal conflict and the defendant had armed himself with a knife in a public place. The sentence was increased to one of five years' detention.

A sentence of 32 months' imprisonment imposed on an offender was not manifestly excessive for an offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm through the transmission of the HIV virus, where the offender had several opportunities to disclose her status over a substantial period of time but chose not to do so.

A conviction for inflicting grievous bodily harm was quashed where there were doubts as to whether the trial judge had made it sufficiently clear to the jury that the test of recklessness was not an objective one and the question of recklessness was very different depending on which version of events the jury accepted. There was therefore a very real danger of the jury convicting on a false basis.

It was not open to a criminal court to impose a detention and training order of a duration other than one of those specified in the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.101(1) . Section 101(8) of the 2000 Act required that the period of any remand in custody was to be taken into account in determining the term of the order; that period could not be taken into account in determining the effect of the order.

A sentence of two-and-a-half years' imprisonment imposed on a defendant for wounding with intent was unduly lenient as it failed to have sufficient regard to the serious and brutal nature of the attack, and a sentence of four years' imprisonment was substituted.

Convictions for causing grievous bodily harm with intent and inflicting grievous bodily harm were unsafe where the trial judge had refused to allow evidence that might reasonably have affected the verdicts of the jury.

The offender's conviction for unlawful wounding was safe despite the fact that he was absent and unrepresented at his trial. He had dispensed with the services of his legal representatives for no good reason and had made a fully-informed decision not to attend the trial.

The quality of CCTV video footage showing an attack was so poor as to cast doubt that the jury had been able to safely infer that the defendant had been at the scene of the attack.

Suspended sentences of six months' imprisonment for offences of unlawful wounding and use of a firearm were quashed and replaced by sentences of six months' immediate imprisonment for each of the wounding offences where the offender had fired his airgun into the street, injuring two people.

A young offender who posed a significant risk to members of the public of serious harm by committing further specified offences should have been sentenced to detention for public protection rather than custody for life for offences of robbery and wounding with intent.

The line established in both criminal and civil case-law drawing a clear distinction between recognisable psychiatric injury and other states of mind had been confirmed by the House of Lords, and any blurring of it or degree of elasticity introduced into it would create an element of uncertainty about the true ambit of the relevant legal principles to which the concept of "bodily harm" in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 applied.

A sentencing judge had been fully entitled to impose, concurrently with a life sentence, a determinate sentence for a further offence that had exceeded the specified minimum period imposed for the life sentence.

The scheme of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Sch.21 was that the trial judge had first to determine the starting point and then consider whether it was appropriate to adjust the sentence upwards or downwards to take account of aggravating or mitigating factors. That approach was not possible in respect of a whole life order. A whole life order should be imposed where the seriousness of the offending was so exceptionally high that just punishment required the offender to be kept in prison for the rest of his life.

A suspended sentence of two years' custody following a late guilty plea to wounding with intent was unduly lenient given the aggravating features that there had been no provocation, the defendant had lain in wait for his victim and had four previous convictions including one for unlawful wounding. Whatever the personal views of a judge, it was not for him to disregard the judgments of the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) or the advice of the Sentencing Guidelines Council in deciding the appropriate reduction in sentence for a late guilty plea.

Where a defendant had previously been convicted of wounding with intent and acquitted of attempted murder, a subsequent prosecution for murder following the death of the victim from her injuries was not in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights Protocol 7 Art.4 since the new fact of the death of the victim had emerged since the first trial.

Where an indictment had only included a count of wounding with intent contrary to the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.18 , it had been open to the judge to leave the lesser s.20 offence to the jury. However it was better practice for the s.20 count to be included on the face of the indictment where, as a matter of law, s.20 was available as an alternative to s.18, and where the application of the Criminal Law Act 1967 s.6(3) meant that the alternative would be available even if s.20 were not alleged.

Notwithstanding the apparent leniency of a non-custodial sentence imposed for an offence of wounding with intent which had resulted in the victim losing his right ear, the sentencing judge had been entitled to conclude that the circumstances of the offender, as highlighted in pre-sentence reports, had justified an exceptional departure from the imposition of a substantial custodial sentence.

A question of public importance was certified following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal against conviction for inflicting grievous bodily harm by infecting the complainant with HIV through unprotected consensual sexual intercourse.

A new hypothesis seeking to show that the conventional triad of intracranial injuries was not diagnostic of non-accidental head injury in infants was not credible. Four appeals heard together demonstrated that cases of alleged non-accidental head injury in infants were fact-specific and had to be determined on their individual facts.

The crown court erred in law in determining that the difference between the account of admissions given by an accused to his defence counsel at the magistrates' court and the prosecution allegations indicated that those admissions could not be taken as denoting a true intention, properly advised, to plead guilty to the charge.

A sentence of two years eight months' imprisonment for wounding with intent where the defendant bit the victim's ear, nose and arm was lenient, but was not interfered with as the principle of double jeopardy had to be taken into account and consideration was given to letters from the victim asking for the sentence not to be increased.

The offender's convictions for robbery and grievous bodily harm were safe as fresh evidence from an arboriculturalist, which suggested that a finger print lift relied upon by the Crown was not taken from a door of the crime scene, was not admissible as the arboriculturalist lacked the relevant experience or expertise, and the evidence would not have affected the jury's verdict.

A new trial was ordered for one of the appellants on the basis of fresh evidence where witness statements obtained following conviction satisfied the criteria outlined in the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 s.23(2) .

A sentence of 3 years' detention in a young offenders' institution in respect of an offence of grievous bodily harm consisting of a single blow from behind was not manifestly excessive given the devastating consequences for the victim and the defendant's prior criminal record.

Consent to the risk of contracting HIV could not be inferred from consent to unprotected sexual intercourse and was therefore not a valid defence to charges under the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.20 of passing on the infection. For a valid defence, there had to be a willing and informed consent to the specific risk of contracting HIV. A defendant's honest belief in consent would only assist him if the consent would have provided him with a defence.

On a "not guilty" plea a sentence of two to three years' detention was appropriate for manslaughter caused by one blow severe enough to cause the victim to fall over but the court would not interfere with a sentence of eighteen months' detention taking account of double jeopardy. A sentence of four months' detention was unduly lenient in respect of an attempt to cause grievous bodily harm with a kick to the head or armpit but the court would not interfere in the particular circumstances of the case.

Following a guilty plea to incitement to wound by a man of good character a sentence of four years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive in the light of the non-custodial sentence imposed on the offender who committed the act of wounding.

In circumstances where a judge reasonably and sensibly anticipated the real possibility of the jury arriving at an alternative factual scenario to that advanced by the parties, it was generally desirable for the judge to give guidance as to how the law ought to be applied if the jury found itself in such a situation.

The criminal prosecution of those who had inflicted injury on another in the course of a sporting event was reserved for those situations where the conduct was sufficiently grave to be properly categorised as criminal.

Whilst it was very rare for a court to impose an order under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.91 on an applicant aged only 10 years old, it was appropriate in the instant case given the circumstances of the offences.

Where the correct starting point had been recognised and the real dispute was whether an appropriate amount of the sentence had been deducted to reflect mitigation, references to refer cases should not be encouraged unless there was some peculiar feature of local outrage or some special feature that made it appropriate for the Attorney-General to seek leave.

The sentences imposed on the appellants, following their pleas of guilty to causing grievous bodily harm with intent, were significantly too long In light of the starting point for sentencing.

A sentence of 12 years' imprisonment should have been imposed on an offender for wounding with intent which had left the victim profoundly disabled for the rest of his life.

A sentence that was deferred for six months was unduly lenient for an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent and would be increased to two years' imprisonment. The defendant's conviction was safe as, looking at the summing up as a whole, the judge had not misdirected the jury on "serious harm".

Community punishment and rehabilitation orders were unduly lenient for causing grievous bodily harm with intent. Notwithstanding the defendants' youth and their pleas of guilty, and taking into account double jeopardy, the sentences would be increased to two-year detention and training orders for two of the defendants and a 12-month detention and training order in relation to the third to take into account the seven months he spent in custody prior to sentence.

A total sentence of five years' imprisonment for causing grievous bodily harm and cruelty to a person under 16 was manifestly excessive. The judge either had too high a starting point in mind or had given insufficient credit for the defendant's pleas and his intellectual inadequacies. The sentence would be reduced to three years six months.

Exceptional circumstances to justify departure from the proper sentence could include the possibility that greater public protection would be provided by a community sentence rather than a custodial sentence. Consideration could be given to subsequent reports as to the offenders' behaviour since sentencing, to justify the original sentence.

The defendant's convictions of causing grievous bodily harm and dangerous driving were unsafe as, when summing up, the judge had misrepresented his defence as duress of circumstances when the actual defence was accident.

Where a witness, in relation to an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent, made a statement favourable to the defendant but later gave evidence that she had no recollection of the incident, the defendant was entitled to cross-examine her on the previous written statement by virtue of Criminal Procedure Act 1865, s.5.

The judge was entitled to conclude that the written statement of a witness who was too frightened to give oral evidence should be read to the jury as permitted by the Criminal Justice Act 1988 s.23 since that was in the interests of justice under s.26 of the Act in the instant case. In general, judges should not be easily persuaded that it was in the interests of justice to permit such evidence to be read since that might jeopardise a fair trial.

In all the circumstances an 18 month detention and training order was unduly lenient for an offence of wounding with intent where the defendant had pushed a broken bottle at least six times into the victim's face.

A sentence of three years' imprisonment for causing grievous bodily harm with intent was unduly lenient in the circumstances of the case where the defendant had attacked his wife with a hammer in front of their 13 year old son.

A sentence of 30 months for wounding with intent, which involved the defendant pushing a bottle in the victim's face was unduly lenient. Following trial a sentence of at least four years could be expected. Taking into account double jeopardy the sentence would be increased to three years six months.

The appellant's conviction for causing grievous bodily harm contrary to the Offences against the Person Act 1861 s.20 was quashed and a re-trial ordered as the trial judge had been wrong to withdraw from the jury the issue of whether the complainants had consented to sexual intercourse with the appellant knowing that he was HIV positive.

A district judge was not disqualified under the Magistrates Court Act 1980, s.42 from trying an accused in respect of a violent offence where there was no evidence that a previous conviction had been aired in the context of a hearing to determine whether or not a warrant backed for bail should be issued.

A sentence of ten months' imprisonment for the offence of racially aggravated unlawful wounding was unduly lenient given the requirement that the sentencing judge impose an additional period of imprisonment to reflect the gravity of the racial element.

The defendant's convictions for wounding with intent and violent disorder were safe as there had been sufficient evidence to go before the jury and it had not been inconsistent to acquit him of another offence of wounding arising out of the same attack.

The defendant's conviction for causing grievous bodily harm with intent was safe as the trial advocate was right in deciding not to call evidence from an expert in facial mapping, as his evidence was likely to be undermined in cross-examination in a way that would cause severe damage to the defendant's case.

The first defendant's conviction for causing grievous bodily harm was unsafe and would be quashed as there had been no evidence that he had encouraged his co-defendant to commit the offence and the judge was wrong to refuse the submission of no case to answer.

A sentence of ten years' imprisonment for an offence of wounding with intent was manifestly excessive as insufficient credit had been given for the guilty plea.

Offences involving the use of a knife to inflict serious injury required strong deterrent sentences. Only limited credit would be given for a guilty plea where it was very late and on an untruthful basis which required the victim and another witness to the crime to relive the experience in court.

A total sentence of five years' imprisonment for wounding with intent and having an offensive weapon was unduly lenient and would be quashed. In the circumstances an automatic life sentence should have been imposed under Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.109 , the trigger offence being a previous conviction for rape and unlawful wounding.

A total sentence of eight years' imprisonment for indecent assault and inflicting grievous bodily harm on an 83-year-old victim was manifestly excessive. The judge failed to give the appropriate discount for the defendant's early pleas of guilty, and the indecent assault was not of the worst kind.

The sentence of three years and six months' imprisonment for unlawful wounding was appropriate where there was no mitigation and the victim's injuries were sufficiently serious to merit a sentence close to the maximum.

Following a series of violent offences where the defendant fled to Spain and fought extradition of his own volition, on the facts, the UK courts did not have to take into account the period spent in custody whilst awaiting extradition. The totality of a sentence of 18 years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive and would be reduced to 14 years.

Convictions for murder were safe as the evidence of the pathologist showed a sufficient causal link between the injury sustained by the victim and his eventual death from an infection whilst in a coma.

Where a victim jumped from a moving car as the defendant refused to let her out and then was put back into the car, by the defendant to go to hospital, a single count of false imprisonment could be split to reflect false imprisonment before and after the injuries, given the fact the victim wanted an ambulance and the length of time it took to get to the hospital. The count as originally drafted was capable of covering events before and after the injuries. The jury's decision was not perverse.

A total sentence of nine years was not too long for a campaign of sadistic bullying inflicted by the appellant on the woman with whom he was living.

Convictions for rape and grievous bodily harm were safe where the jury had reached their verdicts having heard all the evidence and having been sufficiently directed in the summing up.

Convictions for attempted murder and burglary with intent to inflict GBH were safe as, in the circumstances, the judge had been right to allow the indictment to be amended and to refuse a stay for abuse of process where the defendant had pleaded guilty to lesser offences of wounding with intent. The judge had correctly directed the jury on expert opinion and the summing up overall was fair and balanced.

Although the offender's sentence of two years' detention in a young offenders' institution had been unduly lenient, the sentence would not be disturbed having regard to the clear and open indication given by the trial judge to the offender on which he had relied to give a guilty plea.

Where police officers forced entry in order to take a defendant to hospital following a valid assessment under s.2 Mental Health Act 1983, they did not need a warrant under s.135, as on the facts they were not trespassing, accordingly the judge had correctly directed the jury and the conviction was safe.

A conviction for inflicting GBH was safe as there had been no error in refusing a submission of no case to answer and the judge had not misinterpreted expert medical evidence, however given the circumstances a sentence of two years was manifestly excessive and 12 months would be substituted.

In all the circumstances, particularly the level of violence, a total sentence of seven and a half years in a young offender institution for wounding with intent and inflicting grievous bodily harm was not manifestly excessive and could not be certified as a longer than commensurate sentence.

Where a jury inadvertently returned verdicts on two counts arising in the alternative, it was proper for the conviction for the lesser offence to be quashed. On the facts of the case, police had not acted in bad faith when interviewing witnesses for the defence on suspicion of conspiracy with the defendant to pervert the course of justice.

A conviction for wounding with intent was inconsistent with the appellant's acquittal on two counts of aggravated burglary and the fact that no verdict had been returned on a count of affray.

The police had proved that there were reasonable grounds to arrest the claimant on suspicion of murder in prevailing circumstances when arrest was effected and therefore the arrest was not unlawful.

Counsel was entitled, upon request, to see the notes sent from the jury to the judge. In the instant case, the judge had dealt adequately with the notes and the irregularities in relation to some of the notes did not begin to undermine the safety of the conviction.

A sentence of two years for causing grievous bodily harm with intent and violent disorder was unduly lenient given the defendant acted as part of a gang. A sentence of three and a half years would be substituted.

The Secretary of State for the Home Department was entitled to determine the release of prisoners sentenced to over 15 years' imprisonment.

A total sentence of 15 years in a Young Offender's Institution was manifestly excessive for two counts of grievous bodily harm and a sentence of 10 years would be substituted.

Where an indictment contained a single count of attempted murder, the judge was right to leave to the jury an alternate count of attempting to cause grievous bodily harm with intent, as a defendant could not intend to kill without also intending to cause grievous bodily harm.

A judge was right to impose a life sentence under s.109 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, where evidence showed the defendant posed a significant risk to children.

A sentence of 18 months for aggravated burglary with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm by a husband on his ex-wife was unduly lenient and a sentence of three and a half years would be substituted

The evidence that the Crown sought to adduce in this case was admissible as part of the res gestae, but the judge had a discretion to refuse to admit it on grounds of fairness if the defence was not given the opportunity to cross-examine the maker of the statement.

Sentences imposed for a dreadful and prolonged assault had been too long as the details of the attack on the victim had formed part of a single incident.

Where two witnesses gave evidence behind screens to protect their identity there was only a remote possibility of prejudice to the defendants and that had to be balanced against evidence that if the witnesses were identified they faced a real risk of danger. The convictions were therefore safe.

A community punishment and rehabilitation order was unduly lenient for an offence of wounding with intent. In the circumstances a four-year sentence would have been appropriate, however, the court had to take into account the fact that it was sentencing for a second time and had to make a reduction accordingly.

Appeal dismissed where black defendants had contended that their convictions were unsafe because they had been tried by an all-white jury.

Alleged admissions from a co-defendant's girlfriend after the trial constituted hearsay evidence and were therefore inadmissible under the rule in R v Melanie Myers (1997) 3 WLR 552.

Appeal against conviction allowed where the judge had misdirected the jury as to the appellant's "no comment" interview and evidence of a non-identification of the appellant had come out in an unfortunate way.

A total sentence of ten years' imprisonment for causing grievous bodily harm with intent and wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm was not excessive or wrong in principle in all the circumstances of this case as the crimes merited a severe sentence.

A 12-month custodial sentence imposed for an offence of inflicting grievous bodily harm with a pool cue was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.

A sentence for unlawful wounding was reduced from 30 to 21 months' imprisonment as it had not properly reflected either the atmosphere of violence in which the offence had been committed, or the defendant's guilty plea.

An offender convicted of s.20 wounding where a glass was used as a weapon to inflict not insignificant facial injuries could expect a custodial sentence of 12 to 18 months' imprisonment.

The use of a claw hammer in an attack was no less serious than the use of a glass to the face, and an unduly lenient sentence of 30 months' imprisonment was quashed and substituted with a term of four years.

To determine whether an automatic life sentence should be imposed on a convicted rapist, the court had to consider whether he was an unacceptable risk to the public. The mere fact there was a risk of him committing a more minor offence that had previously featured in his record did not justify an automatic life sentence.

If a defendant was party to a robbery that to his knowledge involved the possession of a firearm, or imitation firearm, by one or more of those involved, then he was convicted of a qualifying offence for the purposes of s.2 Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.

Where an offender was found to have been fit to plead and it was demonstrated at trial that at the material time he had the necessary mens rea for the offence but was found to have a mental illness within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983, then a sentence of life imprisonment imposed under s.109 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 did not infringe the appellant's rights under Art.3 or Art.5 European Convention on Human Rights. * Leave to appeal to the House of Lords granted.

Where the issue was the identity of the appellant as the offender, evidence of the appellant's previous conviction for unlawful wounding was admissible where victims had said that the blackmailer had warned of a previous stabbing he had committed.

A conviction for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm was quashed because the judge wrongly gave the impression to the jury that the burden of proof for the defence of automatism lay on the defendant upon the balance of the probabilities without giving a direction about the burden of proof for non-insane automatism.

The appropriate sentence for causing grievous bodily harm with intent by striking a victim around the head with a pool cue was a term of imprisonment of six years.

Where the judge had not given the specimen direction on s.34 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the relevant conviction was unsafe.

Concurrent sentences of four years' imprisonment on each of four offences of causing grievous bodily harm with intent were unduly lenient where the defendant had injured police officers by ramming their cars with his vehicle and were substituted with terms of five years.

Where the appellant had been sentenced to life imprisonment under s.2 Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 for wounding with intent, the fact that the qualifying offence was of a different nature was not to be regarded as an exceptional circumstance.

A sentence of eight months' imprisonment for an offence of assault inflicting grievous bodily harm committed during a rugby match was not manifestly excessive.

A sentence of four years' imprisonment for wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm where the respondent had attacked an unarmed man with a blade was unduly lenient and was quashed and substituted with a term of five-and-a-half years.

Although a non-custodial sentence for wounding with intent to cause serious bodily harm involving a deliberate glassing was unduly lenient, the sentence was not disturbed because of the unique progress made by the defendant subsequent to the conviction.

Where there was a long gap between the previous offence and the index offence, and the appellant had the benefit of a reliable psychological report, the appellant did not qualify as someone from whom the public needed protection in the future and a life sentence was inappropriate

In determining "exceptional circumstances" within the meaning of s.2 Crime (Sentencing) Act 1997 the court had to assess whether the offender presented a risk or continuing danger to the public in order to make mandatory indeterminate sentences under that provision.

Allowing for double jeopardy, sentences in the range of five to seven years' imprisonment would have been considered appropriate sentences after a contested trial for offences of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm where glasses, bottles, or knives had been used in the course of public disturbances. A small measure of distinction was allowed where there had been a private argument which had coincidentally ended in street violence.

A total sentence of ten years' imprisonment for offences of robbery and unlawful wounding, where the appellant had robbed a post office and injured the post master in the process, was manifestly excessive and was reduced to a total term of seven years and six months.

Sentences of three and four years' imprisonment imposed on two offenders for wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm where the offenders attacked a man in the street causing him near-fatal injuries, were unduly lenient and were substituted with terms of three years nine months, and six years accordingly.

A sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm where the defendant had bitten off the tip of the victim's nose was not unduly lenient.

A sentence of eight years' imprisonment for an offence of causing grievous bodily harm where the victim's ex-partner had carried out a premeditated attack after a campaign of threatening telephone calls and text messages was not manifestly excessive.

Although the offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent was grave, where the appellant had made a sustained attack on a two-year-old child using weapons and hitting her against the wall a sentence of ten years' imprisonment was too long and was substituted with a term of eight years.

Where the prosecution sought to replace a count of common assault with a count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and had offered no evidence in relation to common assault, the appellant was entitled to rely on the defence of autrefois acquit when faced with the charge of assault occasioning actual bodily harm based on the same facts.

A total sentence of eight years' imprisonment for offences of causing grievous bodily harm and affray, although long, was appropriate with regard to the facts of the offences.

A life sentence imposed on an offender who pleaded guilty to wounding with intent, and had a previous conviction for causing grievous bodily harm, but did not pose a danger to the public, was quashed and substituted with the determinative sentence of four-and-a-half years' imprisonment.

A discount was to be given for a guilty plea unless: (i) the imposition of a maximum term was necessary for the protection of the public; (ii) the plea was of a tactical nature; (iii) the plea was inevitable, practically speaking; or (iv) the count was a specimen count.

Where offenders had not answered questions in police interview on the advice of their solicitor, and the solicitor was not called to give evidence, then the trial judge had been entitled to have directed the jury's attention to the reasonableness or otherwise of the appellants acting upon the advice which they had received. The question for the jury was not whether the advice given was good advice but whether it provided an adequate reason for failing to answer questions.

An appellant who questioned a prosecution witness as to his previous bad character after his co-accused had adduced evidence of that witness' bad character in cross-examination, had lost his shield and could be cross-examined as to his previous convictions.

Whilst there were mitigating factors, a sentence of three years' imprisonment for an offence of assault occasioning grievous bodily harm with intent was unduly lenient in the circumstances and was substituted with a term of four years' imprisonment.

A defendant's appeal against convictions for wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm and an act tending to pervert the court of justice was allowed because the cumulative unfairness of commentary by the judge during his summing up rendered the convictions unsafe.

The "custodial term" to be considered when imposing an extended sentence under s.85 Powers of the Criminal Court (Sentencing) Act 2000 referred to the sentence for the new offence before the court and could not include a period of return to prison in breach of licence. There was no scope in the provisions for the imposition of an extended sentence based on the combination of two or more consecutive sentences for different offences, even when both or all of the offences were sexual or violent.

A automatic life sentence for the commission of two serious offences was justified, and no exceptional circumstances existed, when the two qualifying offences were of the same kind and were committed within a year of each other and it had been found that the appellant posed a continuing risk and danger to the public.

An admission made on a fact relied upon by the Crown could not be the subject of a direction under s.34 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 because a bare admission could not be said to be the assertion of a fact. A direction that left the jury at liberty to draw an adverse inference for a fact not mentioned in interview, notwithstanding that it might have been satisfied about the plausibility of the explanation, amounted to a breach of Art.6(1) European Convention on Human Rights.

Under the totality principle the correct total sentence for two offences sentenced at the same time, which sentenced in their own right would have attracted sentences of four years and five years and upwards, was one of six years' imprisonment.

Where an offender had been sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment, the scope available to the principle of double jeopardy in relation to the specified term was not as great as it would have been in a determinate sentence. However, the principle did still have a role to play in deciding whether the specified period was unduly lenient.

Legal privilege as to the substance of communications between a solicitor and a client was not waived by a defendant saying in evidence that he had been advised by his solicitor to give a no-comment interview. Where a defendant made an assertion, the truth of which was critical to his defence, there was no need for a Lucas direction.

A sentence of ten years' imprisonment was manifestly excessive for an offence of wounding with intent arising out of domestic violence where, in passing sentence, the judge had given insufficient credit for the appellant's previous good character and guilty plea.

The exceptional circumstances in s.2(2) Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 could include legal anomalies that contradicted any sensible legal or sentencing policies.

Communications made by a defendant after the commission of an offence which culminated in the altering of evidence was probative and relevant evidence of his involvement in the offence for the jury to evaluate, as was the evidence of the tampering itself. Evidence of a defendant's disappearance from the locality immediately after the offence was also probative and admissible if sufficiently linked in time and circumstance.

Where an offence was committed under s.18 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, public interest generally required a custodial sentence to be passed. A sentence of two to three years' imprisonment was appropriate where a defendant struck his victim with a bat and continued the attack after his victim had fallen to the ground.

The defendant successfully appealed against the imposition of a restriction order under s.41 Mental Health Act 1983 because s.37(2)(a) of the Act required a doctor giving evidence to provide the court with a reason to impose a restriction order.

The definition of the word "maliciously" in s.20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 from Stone's Justices' Manual had wrongly interchanged the word "might" with the word "would", resulting in the wrong test being applied.

A sentence of 30 months' imprisonment was unduly lenient for a series of attacks that displayed a repetition of criminal behaviour. A sentence of six to seven years' imprisonment was appropriate with a discount, where a defendant had provided a statement to the police implicating another man in a serious assault.

A sentence of five years' imprisonment was appropriate where a defendant with one previous conviction for violence had carried out an unprovoked attack using a glass and had left his victim blinded in one eye.

A sentence of between four and five years' imprisonment was appropriate for an isolated incident of causing grievous bodily harm with intent on a baby, by a person of previous good character, which gave rise to an offence under s.18 Offences Against the Person Act 1861.

Three years' detention for a 16-year-old defendant was unduly lenient for an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent where the victim was extremely vulnerable and had been attacked in his own home with weapons in a prolonged attack. An appropriate sentence was at least five years' detention.

Whilst the evidence against all three appellants was formidable, the Court of Appeal was bound by authority in considering whether a reasonable jury would have returned guilty verdicts had the material irregularities, of non-disclosure and a juror's unapproved visit to a crime scene, not occurred.

In a successful appeal against a conviction for one offence of unlawful wounding, the Court of Appeal held that a propensity direction was fundamental to the appellant's case. In the circumstances, the judge was wrong to have refused the appellant such a direction on the basis of a previous caution for shoplifting recorded when he was just 14 years old. Accordingly the conviction was deemed unsafe and was quashed.

A judge had been entitled to conclude that the prosecution had acted with due diligence and shown that there were good and sufficient reasons for extending the applicant's custody time limits, even though the forensic laboratory to whom exhibits had been sent had not been told for two weeks that the defendant was remanded in custody.

Appeal against a total sentence of four years and nine months' imprisonment. Whilst the offences of inflicting grievous bodily harm and wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm were serious assaults, in view of the appellant's previous good character and demonstration of remorse there was no need for him to serve as a long-term prisoner. Accordingly the sentence was quashed and substituted with a term of three years and nine months' imprisonment.

The youth court had erred in determining that the defendants' case should be tried summarily since the powers of sentencing to detention for a period in excess of two years under s.35 Children and Young Persons Act 1993 would not be available.

In an appeal against a sentence of 14 years' imprisonment for offences of attempted murder, wounding with intent and affray, in the absence of any substantial mitigating features, the Court of Appeal was of the opinion that the sentence could not be regarded as manifestly excessive, particularly in view of the fact that one of the appellant's victims was fortunate not to have died.

The sentence in this case of three years' imprisonment for an offence of assault causing grievous bodily harm with intent was unduly lenient. Having regard to the element of double jeopardy, the sentence was quashed and substituted with a term of five years' imprisonment.

There must be a proper factual basis before a direction under R v Sheehan & Anor(1960) 60 Cr App R 308, in respect of drunken intent, was required.

Evidence of the name of an accused person's companion was not identification evidence, but was in fact circumstantial evidence from which the jury was invited to infer that the attacker was, in truth, the accused.

The court gave guidance about the effect of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 on sentencing offenders under the age of 18.

A sentence of two years' imprisonment for an offence of wounding with intent on a contested case was regarded as unduly lenient in view of the fact that the offender had several similar previous convictions and had a poor long-term prognosis for behavioural improvement. Accordingly, the sentence was quashed and substituted with a term of three-and-a-half years' imprisonment.

A conviction for buggery pre-Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 did not equate to rape within the meaning of s.2(5)(e) Crime (Sentences) Act 1997; the defendant's appeal against his life sentence was allowed.

The defendant's conviction for grievous bodily harm with intent was unsafe because the judge had inadequately summed up the defendant's case to the jury at trial.

A sentence of six years extended by three years under s.58 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 was not manifestly excessive for an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent where the applicant had stabbed his wife twice, causing 13 separate wounds.

In an unsuccessful appeal against a conviction for one offence of grievous bodily harm, when tendering fresh evidence on appeal, it had to be accompanied by an affidavit from the appellant's solicitor which described the circumstances in which the new witness had come forward and made the statement.

A long interval between qualifying offences, where a mandatory life sentence was imposed, did not amount to exceptional circumstances under s.2 Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.

In an appeal against a total sentence of three years and ten months' imprisonment for offences of criminal damage, threatening behaviour, unlawful wounding and assault occasioning actual bodily harm, whilst the individual sentences for each offence were not manifestly excessive, the totality was too long and accordingly, by ordering concurrent sentences on specific offences, the total sentence was reduced, resulting in a term of two years and ten months' imprisonment.

The Court of Appeal expressed the view that prison officers did not fall directly within the requirements of s.67(9) Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and therefore the Codes of Practice were not directly applicable to them. However, where a prisoner had been invited to complete a written form giving his account of an incident and no warning was given that that account could be used against him as a confession in either disciplinary or criminal proceedings, then there was a potential argument that any confession should be excluded under s.78 of the 1984 Act, irrespective of whether it was positively induced by any other statement likely to render it unreliable.

In an appeal against a six-year sentence for an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent, whilst the injuries caused to the victim were grave, having regard to the fact that the appellant was only 21 years old and had a small child whom she had been separated from for a long period of time as a result of her imprisonment, the term would be quashed and substituted with a sentence of four years' imprisonment.

When imposing an automatic life sentence under s.2 Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 on a serving prisoner, the sentencing judge was correct to calculate the specified term to be served by reference to the sentence already being served and the appropriate determinate sentence for the offence.

A sentence of five years' imprisonment for an offence of wounding with intent would normally have been unappealable in usual circumstances. However, because nobody, including the appellant and the sentencing judge, was aware that the appellant was pregnant at the time of the trial, the Court of Appeal would exercise its spirit of mercy in the interests of the baby, and reduce the overall sentence to a term of three years and nine months' imprisonment, thereby enabling the appellant to be released after 18 months in order to continue looking after her baby.

The defendant's fresh evidence would not be adduced on appeal as it lacked credibility and there was no reasonable explanation as to why it had not been adduced at trial.

In view of the fact that the appellant received inadequate advice from his trial counsel, such actions would give rise to an exceptional circumstance and enable the Court of Appeal to revoke the mandatory life sentence imposed by the judge under s.2(5)(f) Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.

A jury could quite properly consider whether there was, or was not, a joint enterprise involving the use or possible use of a weapon where an individual assailant could not be identified.

Fresh evidence on identification would not be admissible on appeal as it was not credible and it was unlikely that the jury would have been significantly influenced by it, even if they had heard it at trial. R v Loughran (1999) Crim LR 404 distinguished.

A longer than commensurate sentence imposed under s.2(2)(b) Criminal Justice Act 1991 should operate from the day it was passed and it was generally undesirable that it should run consecutive to any existing sentence.

Unsuccessful appeal against conviction for grievous bodily harm with intent. The appellant could not have withdrawn from the joint enterprise because he had initiated a pre-planned attack which had then been concluded by other members of his party.

It had not been appropriate for the youth court to re-open a Newton hearing under s.142 Magistrates' Courts Act 1980.

The appellant had failed to establish evidence that he had acted in self-defence. However, the sentence of four years' detention for an offence of unlawful wounding was reduced to three years.

A four-and-a-half-year sentence for offences of aggravated burglary with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and attempted aggravated burglary with intent to cause grievous bodily harm was regarded as significantly too long, having had regard to related authorities, and was reduced to a term of two and a half years' imprisonment.

The trial judge summed up a case so confusedly, with unmerited commentary, a misplaced burden of proof, overly emphasised scientific evidence and an unnecessary R v Lucas (1981) 3 WLR 120 direction, that convictions for causing grievous bodily harm with intent and affray were quashed.

The trial judge's summing up to the jury had, when viewed as a whole, been correct and the appeal against a conviction under s.18 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 was therefore dismissed. However, the appellant's sentence would be reduced from six to five years' imprisonment.

An appeal against a conviction for unlawful wounding was allowed because the trial judge refused to leave the issue of self-defence to the jury when accident was the pleaded defence.

Where a charge of s.18 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 had been brought, it was standard practice in cases where the incident had occurred in a nightclub and people were drunk to leave a s.20 alternative to the jury. Where there was no legal basis for allowing a crime report to be put into evidence, the only way of adducing the evidence in the report would be for counsel to ask the officer in question if that statement had been made to him.

An administrative error by a court was capable of being a "good and sufficient cause" to justify an extension of custody time limits under s.22(3) Prosecution of Offenders Act 1985.

Where there was no issue on the evidence before the jury that the defendant was asserting self-induced intoxication in relation to an offence of specific intent, a fortiori where the defendant was running self-defence on a charge of wounding with intent, there was no necessity for the judge to give any direction as to drunkenness.

A sentence of ten years' imprisonment for causing grievous bodily harm with intent and wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm was not manifestly excessive as the crimes merited a severe sentence and had caused a permanent disability to one of the victims.

There could only be one effective plea to any count in respect of which a defendant was tried. If a defendant pleaded not guilty to the offence charged but guilty to a lesser offence and that plea was not accepted, the plea of guilty to the lesser offence was deemed to be withdrawn when the matter proceeded to trial.