Leading solicitor specialising in defending clients accused of rape

A conviction for offences of rape and indecent assault was not unsafe where, notwithstanding the judge's omission to carry out the procedure in the Police Law 2010 s.149(2), which exactly reproduced the provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s.35, the appellant had been advised not only that he could give evidence if he wished but also that he risked an adverse inference if he did not and was adjudged to have had no good reason for the omission.

The concept of abduction in harm category 2 of the sentencing guidelines for rape was not a matter of distance. A sentence of eight years' imprisonment following a guilty plea to a historic offence of rape was justified where the offender, who had previous convictions for indecent exposure with intent to assault a female, had raped the victim twice in an incident which had caused her lifelong harm.

A 30-year extended sentence comprising a 22-year custodial element and an eight-year licence period was appropriate in the case of a 61-year-old man who had pleaded guilty to 33 child sexual offences committed against three young girls over a 40-year period.

The police had been entitled not to refer an individual's historic rape allegations to the CPS where the relevant evidential test within the Director's Guidance on Charging 2013 had not been met.

Whilst the judge at the appellant's trial for rape had not conducted the correct judicial exercise in refusing to allow the appellant to adduce evidence of the victim's previous allegations of rape and to cross-examine her in relation to them, it was not possible to argue that there had been a clear evidential basis on which to mount a cross-examination and the judge had been right to refuse the application.

An Attorney General's Reference was allowed where an offender had been convicted of rape, assault, false imprisonment and criminal damage committed over a two-day period. It had been a brutal, prolonged, terrifying and degrading attack and the total sentence of four years' imprisonment was replaced by one of eight years.

An appeal against a rape conviction was allowed in light of fresh evidence concerning the complainant's sexual relationships with third parties. Their accounts of her sexual behaviour were arguably sufficiently similar to that alleged by the appellant as to come within the terms of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41(3)(c)(i). The situation was an example of a rare case where it was appropriate to allow forensic examination of a complainant's sexual history with third parties.

Concurrent sentences of seven years' imprisonment for five counts of sexual assault of a child under 13 and two counts of rape of the same child, committed by a young offender over a seven-year period, were not unduly lenient where he had stopped his offending as soon as the victim asked him to, and admitted his guilt as soon as the offending was disclosed. Such candour required recognition in the sentencing exercise. Consecutive sentencing would have been better so as to differentiate between the sexual assaults and the rapes.

The custodial period of an extended sentence imposed on a young offender following his conviction for rape should be reduced from seven-and-a-half to five years to take account of, among other things, his age and the possibility that he might be suffering from a personality disorder.

The admission of evidence of sexual violence used against a victim by an offender, but for which he had not been charged, did not render his convictions for rape unsafe where the offender had launched a strong attack on the victim's character and where the bad character evidence was important in giving the jury the full picture of the violent relationship between the pair.

A judge had been right to exclude hearsay evidence under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.126, as the evidence the defendant sought to admit concerning another man's confession and subsequent retraction to rapes that the defendant denied committing was already before the jury. The DNA evidence implicating the defendant was overwhelming and there was no doubt that his convictions were safe.

An extended sentence imposed for rape by way of vaginal penetration, rape by way of oral penetration, assault by penetration and false imprisonment, was inappropriate where the material relied on to conclude that the offender was dangerous within the meaning of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Pt 12 Ch 5 was too thin and the reasoning too speculative. A determinate 11-year sentence was imposed.

A determinate custodial sentence of seven years, comprising three-and-a-half years in custody and the same period on licence, was appropriate in the case of the appellant, who had been convicted of the rape and sexual assault of a 52-year-old woman.

Convictions for rape, assault by penetration and kidnap were not arguably unsafe where, despite inconsistencies in hearsay evidence and missing CCTV, the judge had given a measured assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the Crown's case and had directed the court's mind to disadvantages endured by the appellant. A sentence of 13 years' imprisonment was reduced to nine years where the judge had wrongly relied on an abuse of trust.

A sentence with a minimum term of nine years and three months' imprisonment imposed for nine counts of rape was quashed as the minimum term had been wrongly increased by six months to reflect a breach of a suspended sentence imposed for breach of a sexual offences prevention order. The offence for which the suspended sentence had been received was not a specified offence and therefore should not have been added to the minimum term.

The court determined that the failure to provide exceptions to the law in Northern Ireland prohibiting abortion in respect of fatal foetal abnormality at any time, and pregnancies due to sexual crime up to the date when a foetus became capable of an existence independent of its mother, was contrary to the ECHR art.8.

A conviction for sexual offences against a child was safe, as medical evidence adduced as fresh had not permitted confident review of a previous diagnosis so as to describe it as ill-founded; taken at its highest it neither supported nor refuted the allegations against the offender. The defence was still that any abuse was perpetrated by another and the jury had decided on the non-medical evidence.

After receiving a note indicating that a juror in a rape trial might not make a decision but just go with the majority, the judge should have told the jury that each member had to consider the evidence and reach a verdict according to his or her view of the material. The subsequent conviction by a majority was not, however, unsafe as the foreman had made it unequivocally clear that 10 jurors had agreed and two had disagreed.

The court considered the proper approach to the Victims' Right to Review Guidance of CPS decisions and to claims made in respect of decisions to charge where the original decision was not to charge.

An extended sentence comprising a 12-year custodial term and a five-year extension period was appropriate in the case of an offender who had vaginally and anally raped a friend, handcuffing her and pressing a pillow over her face. A discretionary life sentence was not justified.

When sentencing an offender who had been convicted of the rape and assault by penetration of a friend, the judge had erred in regarding the appellant's offences as demonstrating an abuse of trust such as to place it within Category 3A of the sentencing guidelines. The offences should have been placed in Category 3B. For the offence of rape, the appropriate sentence was an extended sentence of nine years, comprising a custodial term of six years and an extension period of three years; and for the assault by penetration, a sentence of two years' imprisonment, to run concurrently.

The fact that an intermediary had provided physical and emotional support to a vulnerable and distressed complainant during a rape trial did not result in a serious risk of unfairness to the defendant. Both counsel and the judge had warned the jury to approach the complainant's evidence untrammelled by sympathy.

An appellant's conviction for rape was safe where there was substantial evidence before the jury that the victim was intoxicated and incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse with him. There was no presumption that the conviction was unsafe because the judge did not give a good character direction.

When dismissing an appeal against conviction for sexual activity involving children, including rape and trafficking within the UK for sexual exploitation, the court considered the issue of consent. Where a vulnerable or immature individual had allegedly been subjected to grooming for sexual purposes, the question of whether real or proper consent had been given would usually be for the jury to decide, unless the evidence clearly indicated that proper consent had been given.

Sentences of nine years' imprisonment were neither unduly lenient nor manifestly excessive for two offenders who had raped an intoxicated young woman in an alleyway outside a nightclub. It had been appropriate not to impose a consecutive sentence for digital anal penetration by one of the offenders.

Undisclosed material from the police and social services which included information regarding previous sexual allegations made by a rape victim that had not been pursued because of concerns expressed by the relevant professionals at the time regarding her credibility, did not significantly undermine the victim's credibility so as to affect the safety of the conviction.

Fresh evidence which cast doubt on the credibility of a complainant's evidence had sufficient impact on the safety of a conviction for rape for it to be quashed. However, the evidence did not have the same impact on the complainant's credibility in respect of allegations of sexual assault, which were upheld.

A judge had erred in focusing on the risk an offender posed to the public, rather than the seriousness of the offences, when imposing what was in effect a whole life order for multiple counts of rape and further counts of kidnapping and causing grievous bodily harm with intent. The very high test of exceptionality for whole life orders had not been fulfilled but, given the aggravating features of the case, a notional determinate sentence beyond the sentencing guideline range was justified.

Two convictions for rape were safe where a judge had admitted evidence of an offender's single previous conviction for sexual assault. The offences all demonstrated sufficiently unusual behaviour, capable of demonstrating the offender's propensity to commit offences of the kind charged, to permit admission under the bad character provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

Although a judge had given a Watson direction without hearing submissions and that deviated from the approved wording, the direction did not render a comviction for rape unsafe. Provided the direction was given in a way that did not put pressure on jurors, whether and when to give a direction was a matter for the judge's discretion.

Consent to sex could take many forms, ranging from willing enthusiasm to reluctant acquiescence. It was possible for somebody who lacked neither the capacity nor the freedom to make a choice nevertheless to submit to a demand that she felt unable to resist. That was an example of reluctant consent.

A judge had not erred in permitting the prosecution to adduce evidence of an offender's bad character, relating to conduct forming the basis of a charge for sexual assault, of which he was acquitted, after it had closed its case as the defence had not yet opened its case. The judge had also directed the jury fairly on the similarities and dissimilarities between the previous incident and the index offence.

A judge had erred in refusing to allow cross-examination of a rape complainant regarding her previous convictions, as the evidence was of substantial probative value in respect of the question of whether her allegation was worthy of belief. However, the evidence would have had no significant impact on the jury's consideration of the specific issues of creditworthiness in the circumstances of the case and the conviction was safe.

An extended sentence of 39 years, with a custodial term of 33 years, imposed in respect of a very large number of serious sexual offences against young girls was manifestly excessive; the appropriate custodial term was 30 years. The judge had also erred in adding up the consecutive sentences to reach the overall custodial term before imposing an extension period on the total: it was the overall extended determinate sentences that had to be consecutive, not just the custodial terms.

A multiple-counts indictment under the Criminal Procedure Rules 2014 r.14.2(2), which allowed multiple instances of similar offences to be charged as a course of conduct, would not be properly drafted unless it specified a minimum number of occasions on which the offending was alleged to have happened. Otherwise, where a defendant was convicted on such an indictment, a sentencing judge could not know how many times the jury believed the offence to have been committed, and fairness would require him to sentence on the basis that it was more than once, but no more than twice.

A judge had not erred in stating that an appellant's bad character had been agreed during a rape trial in which both the appellant and victim had impugned each other in their evidence. The conviction was safe despite the fact that allegations of past violence by the appellant had been made. The judge's direction had been adequate to deal with the issue.

In a case involving two counts of rape committed when a complainant was asleep and thus unable to consent, the appropriate starting point was one of 15 years' imprisonment. It was increased by two years to take account of the aggravation of pornographic material which had been published on the internet by the defendant. A reduction of 20 per cent was applied to take account of the guilty pleas.

A judge had been right to refuse severance of a defendant's indictment for child abduction from his co-defendants' additional indictments for rape. The jury had not misunderstood the scope or nature of the case against the defendant, they had been directed carefully and the summing up had been clear.

A judge had not diluted a good character direction by directing a jury that to the extent that they accepted evidence of misconduct additional to that contained on the indictment, they would want to consider whether that evidence reduced the weight which they gave to the fact that the defendant had no previous convictions.

It was doubtful whether there was still a rule that prosecuting counsel could not make a closing speech where the defendant was unrepresented. It was preferable to approach the issue as a matter of balance and fairness: it was incumbent upon a trial judge, faced with an unrepresented defendant, to assess all the circumstances of a case and decide whether it would be fair to allow prosecuting counsel to make a speech.

An individual had been incorrectly convicted of a historic offence of rape against a family member because, at the relevant time, anal penetration did not constitute that offence under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.1. It was appropriate to substitute an alternative conviction for indecent assault, as the facts fell within the scope of s.14(1) of the 1956 Act, and the test set out in R. v Graham (Hemamali Krishna) [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 302 was satisfied.

Although a 13-year-old victim of rape, sexual assault and trafficking for sexual exploitation had given contradictory and inconsistent evidence, there had been a clear basis on which the jury could properly have convicted the defendants. Whether her evidence was so unreliable that it could not properly lead to guilty verdicts was a question for the jury.

An acquittal on counts of rape and assault by penetration would be quashed and a retrial ordered where the complainant had left the country after giving an achieving best evidence interview and the Crown had offered no evidence at trial. There was new and compelling evidence in the form of the complainant's evidence which was available when she returned to the country, and a retrial would be in the interests of justice.

A conviction for rape was not unsafe on the basis that the judge should have permitted cross-examination of the victim about the falsity of previous allegations of sexual abuse by other men. The fact that the victim had made but not pursued those allegations did not provide a proper evidential basis for showing the falsity of those complaints for the purposes of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.100.

The appellant's conviction for the rape of his wife was unsafe, given fresh evidence from witnesses which cast doubt on the testimony given by the complainant.

In a trial of charges of sexual offences against the defendant's daughter and granddaughter, the judge had been entitled to rule that the complainants' various complaints were mutually cross-admissible. Further, the complainants' evidence had not been contaminated.

Where there had been confusion during the jury's return of verdicts on four counts of an indictment against two co-defendants, and a verdict against a count of kidnap was not formally entered against one defendant, that defendant had not been convicted of kidnap. The court therefore ordered the Crown Court record to be amended accordingly and the defendant's sentence for kidnap was quashed.

A judge had not failed to direct a jury properly on the burden and standard of proof in relation to offences of false imprisonment, assault occasioning bodily harm and rape where he had effectively directed the jury that they had to make a choice whether to believe the evidence of the complainant or the defendants.

A sentence of 20 years' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of a senior police officer who had been convicted of a number of sexual offences against his wife and teenage boys. In a case of this nature, where the offending spanned a long period of time and where there had been significant changes in the legislation, Crown counsel should ensure that assistance was given to the judge in relation to his sentencing powers.

Guilty verdicts on two sample counts of rape relating to a six-year period were logically inconsistent with acquittals on four specific counts of rape against the same victim. A reasonable jury could not, on the paucity of the stand-alone evidence concerning the sample counts, be sure of guilt in relation to them if they rejected the specific events.

A medical expert's opinion that a 15-year-old girl's injury to her hymen was diagnostic of blunt force trauma from sexual penetration had not been materially inaccurate and had not misled the jury in the trial of the appellant for raping the girl.

A trial judge had correctly ruled that the contents of a conversation revealing details about a rape victim's previous sexual behaviour were not admissible under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41.

A rape victim's evidence that she had little memory of the events was not sufficient for the judge to remove the case from the jury. There had been sufficient evidence for the jury to decide whether the victim had consented.

On the facts of the case, the defendant's conviction for rape was not rendered unsafe by the judge's failure, after acceding to a request from the jury for the replaying of the complainant's ABE interview, to warn the jury not to place too much emphasis on what they had seen during the recording since they had not also viewed, at the same time, the evidence of any other witness, in particular the defendant.

A conviction for attempted rape was quashed following the admission of new DNA evidence taken from clothing worn by the victim at the time of the offence.

A judge had been correct in not permitting a defendant to cross-examine a complainant concerning a telephone recording where the complainant had allegedly confessed to murder, as it was not relevant to the issues in the case, namely whether the complainant had consented to intercourse, and fabricated evidence.

In the circumstances, the fact that a complainant had made an unfounded allegation of rape against an accused in a retrial did not cast doubt on the reliability of her evidence against him in an earlier trial so as to render unsafe his conviction for sexual assault in that earlier trial.

In a case in which the defendant failed to mention in interview a matter on which he later relied in his defence, but that matter was one which the jury might find to be a lie in any event, the judge was right to give a direction which combined elements of a Lucas direction and a direction under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s.34.

An extended sentence of 20 years' imprisonment was appropriate for manslaughter where the defendant had also raped the victim twice, displayed a callous disregard for her and then lied, painting a false picture of what had happened, and did not have the benefit of a guilty plea.

Following directions from the Lord Chief Justice on the disproportionate use of the judiciary's scarce resources on hearing sentencing appeals based on a failure to take into account time served on remand, it was clear that that issue should be raised at the sentencing hearing and time limits for such appeals would be applied strictly in future. In an exceptional case, an offender's sentence for rape was reduced to take account of time when he was subject to a qualified curfew, in fairness to him and where the error had arisen before the guidance, but the guidance would not be departed from in future.

An offender's convictions for historic offences of rape, buggery, attempted rape, indecent assault and murder were deemed safe, as the judge had given the jury adequate directions as to the dangers of delay and its effect on the evidence.

A jury's findings on the facts that a defendant with severe learning difficulties who was unfit to plead had committed two offences of rape were safe, notwithstanding the fact that an extract of the defendant's police interview had been wrongly admitted as evidence.

A jury had been given adequate directions in relation to the issue of consent before it found a defendant guilty of rape, assault by penetration and sexual assault following a sexual encounter at a party between the defendant and a woman who was heavily intoxicated. The judge had fully dealt with the elements of capacity and it had not been necessary for him to indicate that a drunken consent remained a consent.

A 30-year delay on the part of a complainant did not render an offender's convictions for indecent assault, indecency with a child, and rape unsafe as the judge had sufficiently dealt with any prejudice to the offender in his summing up and directions to the jury and there had been other evidence that supported the complainant's evidence.

A recorder had not erred in refusing a defence application to cross-examine a rape victim pursuant to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41 in order to question her regarding her sexual relationship with another man.

It had not been logically inconsistent for a jury to find a man accused of sexual activity with a child guilty of having intercourse with her but not guilty of digitally penetrating her as they were separate incidents and the surrounding circumstances of the latter might have led the jury to be not sure beyond a reasonable doubt.

An error on an indictment in respect of the date of the Act under which a charge of rape was made had been a precedural error that had caused no prejudice and had not rendered the indictment or the trial a nullity, as the offender had been aware of the case he had to meet and the trial had proceeded on the basis of the correct Act.

The acquittal of one of three men charged with multiple rapes of a woman over an evening had been explicable on the basis that he had joined the other two after the victim had ceased to show resistance. The judge had properly left the issue of reasonable belief in consent to the jury and had properly given a separate treatment direction.

The imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of four-and-a-half years following an offender's conviction for rape and kidnapping could not be faulted, notwithstanding the judge's failure to set out her reasons for rejecting an extended sentence in her sentencing remarks. An extended sentence had undoubtedly been discussed at the relevant time, and the offender, who posed a serious risk to vulnerable women, was unlikely to comply with the licence conditions under the extended sentence regime.

Although part of prosecuting counsel's cross-examination of a rape defendant, related to bad character and based on inadmissible hearsay evidence, had been misjudged and regrettable, it had not affected the overall fairness of the proceedings or the safety of the verdict.

Although the delay in the appellant's prosecution for historic sexual offences was extreme, the resulting missing evidence was not of a degree of cogency that could amount to a finding of serious prejudice in its absence. The trial judge had given the jury appropriate directions regarding the effect of the delay and the appellant's convictions were safe.

A nine-year term of imprisonment imposed on an offender for rape following a retrial in respect of allegations of rape and indecent assault of two young girls was reduced to eight years, as the sentence passed did not accurately reflect the fact that he had been acquitted of one of the rapes.

A trial judge had a wide discretion as to what warning, if any, he gave to a jury in relation to a witness's alleged unreliability. In the instant case, the judge had given an adequate and appropriate warning to the jury with regard to the inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and an admitted lie, and the offender's conviction for indecent assault and rape was safe.

Although a judge had erred in allowing evidence of a defendant's rape conviction to be adduced under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.101(c) in his trial for breaches of a sexual prevention order, the direction to the jury that the rape was of no relevance and that the sole issue for them was whether the breaches had occurred meant that his conviction for the breaches was safe.

Credit for a guilty plea was to reflect savings to the public purse and the avoidance of requiring complainants to give evidence and be cross-examined; it was not to be given solely for showing remorse.

A sentence of 12 years' imprisonment for rape was reduced to 10 and a half years where the sentencing judge had failed to have sufficient regard to the unusual circumstances of the offence, in particular the effect upon the offender and the complainant, his former partner, of the death of their child.

A man had known that the only basis on which a woman had consented to sexual intercourse with him was that he would wear a condom or not ejaculate within her vagina, but there was evidence that he had intended that the occasion would culminate in such ejaculation and had deliberately ignored the basis of her consent to penetration as a manifestation of his control over her. In law, that combination of circumstances fell within the statutory definition of rape.

A judge had not erred in refusing to discharge a jury where one of its members had complained of pressure from other jurors. The judge had given strongly worded directions to the jury on its duty to reach a true verdict according to the evidence, and there was nothing to suggest that a true verdict had not been reached.

In the course of deciding appeals in three cases in which victim impact statements had gone into evidence, the court surveyed their value and legal basis, gave guidance on the way they should be composed and used, and emphasised aspects of Practice Direction (Sup Ct: Criminal Proceedings: Substituted and Additional Provisions) [2009] 1 W.L.R. 1396.

A judge had applied the wrong test of the competence of a witness because she had considered the court's difficulties in communicating with the witness rather than the witness's ability to understand questions and give intelligible answers.

The decision in R. v Conway (David Patrick) (1980) 70 Cr. App. R. 4 was not to be regarded as binding authority on the procedure required to be adopted in applications or appeals based on evidence of alleged retractions or inconsistent statements. What constituted the best and fairest procedure had to be determined on a case-by-case basis.

The defendant's convictions for raping his partner were safe where there was expert evidence that his mental illness had not affected his ability to understand whether his partner had consented. Even if that were wrong, delusional beliefs that a victim was consenting could not render reasonable a belief that the victim was consenting when they were not.

Although the custodial term of five years and four months imposed on a dangerous young offender following his guilty pleas to robbery, rape and assault by penetration had not been unduly lenient, the extended sentence imposed had been inadequate and was replaced by a sentence of detention for public protection.

Although not all the pre-trial disclosures a three-year-old child had made alleging that his father had raped him were admissible under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.120(2), in the circumstances they were all admissible in the interests of justice under s.114(1)(d).

The safety of an offender's convictions had not been undermined where the case against him had been extremely strong and the judge had both refused to allow the questioning of a complainant's sexual behaviour and had placed limitations upon the permitted questioning of another complainant's unsubstantiated allegations against another.

A sentence of detention for public protection with a minimum term of four years imposed on an offender for attempted rape and assault by penetration was unduly lenient and a minimum term of six years was substituted.

Despite certain deficiencies in a judge's summing up on the issue of consent in relation to a rape charge, the subsequent conviction for rape was safe because it was clear that the jury were satisfied, to the requisite standard, that the accused had inflicted upon the victim such violence as clearly negated any question of consent on her part, or reasonable belief in her consent on his part.

Although the judge had erred by not applying current sentencing practice when sentencing the appellant for offences of rape and indecent assault committed in 1999, the sentence of 12 years' imprisonment which he had imposed could not be criticised.

A reference in the evidence of a medical expert to a research paper on the incidence of genital injury in rape cases was admissible, despite allegations by the defence that it was misleading for lack of clarity, where that evidence did not form the sole basis for the expert's opinion and where a note to the jury dictated by the judge made it clear that the article related to women who reported that they had been raped.

The imposition of whole life orders under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Sch.21 para.4 did not contravene the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 art.3.

A fresh scientific analysis of DNA evidence in a rape case did not make the conviction unsafe as the position on appeal was essentially the same as it was at trial.

Although a defendant's late application to adduce a photograph and Facebook messages during a rape trial was an unjustifiable breach of the rules of advance disclosure, the judge had erred in refusing to allow the evidence as it went to a relevant issue under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41, namely the complainant's alleged motive for lying.

Where an 16-year-old offender had committed an offence of rape on an elderly woman, who was his grandmother, alone in her home at night after a forced entry, the circumstances were of such gravity that a sentence of life imprisonment was inevitable.

The jury in the trial of a man charged with 18 sexual offences perpetrated against his step-daughter from when she was five years old until she was 25 were entitled, once they had found proved the charges relating to when she was a child, to find that her apparent consent when she was an adult was not real, given the abusive and controlling role her stepfather had established in her childhood.

A jury had not acted inconsistently in finding two young offenders guilty of oral rape but not guilty of sexual assault, even though the charges represented a sequence of events over the course of a 30-minute period and the central issue was consent. On the evidence, there was no logical inconsistency in the verdicts.

A conviction for rape was unsafe and a conviction for sexual assault was substituted, where there was an absence of any evidence or activity capable of justifying the conclusion which pointed to an intent to commit the specific offence of rape. There was ample evidence of an intent to commit a serious sexual assault and there was no doubt that the offender's actions had gone well beyond mere preparation.

There was a continuing obligation on a trial judge to review disclosure as the trial progressed and new issues emerged, which might sometimes require the recovery of records that had already been examined to see whether more material should be disclosed.

An indeterminate sentence was quashed and replaced with an extended sentence of 12 years' imprisonment, comprising a custodial term of seven-and-a-half years and an extended licence period of four-and-a-half years, following an offender's conviction for rape. A pre-sentence report had detailed a significant change in the offender's attitude towards the offence, in particular an acknowledgment of guilt.

The Secretary of State for Justice had wrongly applied an exceptionality test to the question of whether or not there should have been an oral hearing to review the Category A status of a sexual offender. Procedural fairness required that an oral hearing should be held to determine the prisoner's current level of risk.

An extended licence period which had been imposed on a young man who had committed a number of offences against prostitutes would be reduced from five to three years to take into account his progress in prison and his acceptance of guilt.

A sentence of 28 months' imprisonment for the rape of an 11-year-old girl by two young offenders, aged 12 and 14, was not manifestly excessive, and there was no error of law in the level of discount applied by the judge for the offenders' guilty pleas.

The confusing and complex way in which a judge had directed the jury to consider whether the three appellants and another man were guilty individually or by joint enterprise of rape did not make their convictions unsafe.

A conviction for rape was safe, as the judge had been correct to refuse to allow the defendant to cross-examine the victim about an earlier incident involving her former husband having sexual intercourse with her while she was asleep. That incident had no relevance to the question of whether the victim had consented to sexual intercourse with the defendant.

A sentence of eight years' imprisonment was the very minimum that the court could impose following a plea of guilty to the rape of a young boy, which had been committed in breach of trust and against a background of repeated and regular sexual abuse. The court would be sympathetic to those who had been abused themselves, but such abuse could not excuse a child victim turning adult predator. The sentence of four-and-a-half years' imprisonment was unduly lenient.

A judge could not be criticised for making a finding of dangerousness in respect of a man of previous good character who had repeatedly raped his wife. Imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of eight years was not excessive. The fact that the offender had been brought up in Pakistan to believe that he had a right to rape his wife was no basis for leniency.

A conviction for rape was unsafe where the judge omitted to discuss the need for a Lucas direction with counsel before speeches, had not discussed the proposed terms of his jury directions with counsel or produced any written drafts, and had failed to provide the jury with the clear assistance to which they were entitled in his summing-up, especially in relation to potential evidence of distress, corroboration and motive to lie.

The court set aside a sentence of imprisonment for public protection imposed on an offender who had been convicted of raping his two stepdaughters over a number of years. Although the offender was dangerous and posed a high risk of harm, the public could adequately be protected by the imposition of a 20-year extended sentence.

A judge had been entitled to conclude that it was appropriate to sentence a young offender to detention for public protection with a minimum term of two years, where he had raped his younger sister and cousins when he was aged between 11 and 12. However, it was important that his case should be reviewed by the Youth Justice Board immediately on the conclusion of the tariff period.

Where an offender had pleaded guilty to fourteen counts of various sexual offences committed against four separate victims including members of his own family dating back some 40 years, the Court of Appeal reduced the total sentence from 23 years' to 19 years' imprisonment.

Although a judge in a rape trial had erred in not permitting the defendant to cross-examine on or adduce evidence about the complainant's alleged production and joint consumption of cocaine on the night in question on the incorrect basis that it was bad character evidence, in the absence of expert evidence about the likely effect of such consumption in the particular circumstances of the case, the evidence added nothing to the central issue of consent, and therefore the safety of the conviction was unaffected.

Fresh evidence that a daughter was willing to lie did not add anything of significance to the evidence at trial about her credibility and did not render unsafe her father's convictions for sexual offences against her. The judge had been right to refuse cross-examination and evidence about a possible sexual relationship with another man as it was inadmissible evidence of the complainant's sexual history, and had not added anything to the evidence about her motive for leaving home.

Where offences in a case straddled different sentencing regimes, counsel for the prosecution and defence should inform the judge of the effect of those regimes.

Where a woman had been convicted of perverting the course of justice by retracting a truthful allegation of rape against her husband, the court was not entitled to interfere with the conviction. Whilst the woman had suffered domestic violence there was no evidence of duress and the prosecution had not been an abuse of process in light of the CPS policy in place at the time of the offence.

A mother and stepfather who had subjected their two young children to sustained, extensive and degrading sexual abuse over some 18 months, distributing images of the abuse over the internet and arranging for the children to be sexually abused by others, were sentenced to terms of eight years and to life imprisonment respectively.

There was no inconsistency or confusion in the verdicts of a jury which decided that the appellant had indecently assaulted, but not raped, his niece when she was a young girl.

A court should not take into account the effect of different regimes for automatic early release when passing sentence.

A judge had not erred in adopting a 30-year starting point for the minimum term when sentencing a young offender to detention for life following his conviction for the murder of a 16-year-old girl, on the basis that the murder involved sexual or sadistic conduct and fell within the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Sch.21 para.5(2)(e), notwithstanding the offender's limited intellectual ability and profound psychological and emotional difficulties.

In a trial for rape, there had been no exceptional circumstances which justified a jury having a transcript of the complainant's ABE interview and retiring with it. That, compounded with the fact the recorder gave no warnings as to the risk of giving disproportionate weight to the transcript, rendered the conviction unsafe.

A judge had erred when imposing an extended sentence for offences of rape and indecency with a child committed prior to the commencement of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.224 and s.227 and the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.85. The appropriate determinate sentence was one of 12 years' imprisonment with a direction that the provisions of s.86 of the 2000 Act should apply, with the effect that the offender would remain subject to supervision and recall until the expiry of the 12-year term.

A defendant's convictions for the anal rape of his wife were quashed where the judge had failed to give a modified good character direction based on the defendant's lack of previous convictions for sexual offences.

An expert, instructed by an offender to reconsider DNA evidence, had failed to discharge his duty to the court by not limiting his report to matters within his field of expertise and by making comments on the trial judge's summing up.

In a trial involving aggravated burglary and sexual offences a judge had fairly summed up the evidence and the convictions could not be said to be unsafe. However, the total sentence of 16 years was manifestly excessive and was reduced to 12 years' imprisonment.

If an application to change a plea of guilty was likely to involve a conflict of evidence between the defendant and his former counsel, it would be sensible to arrange for the application to be heard by a judge from outside the area who had no personal knowledge of counsel.

On a literal construction of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 (Commencement No. 6, Transitional Provisions and Savings) Order 2009 the courts had to continue making orders under the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 s.28 as well as informing the offender that he was barred from working with children under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. Judgment to the contrary in Attorney General's Reference (No.18 of 2011), Re [2011] EWCA Crim 1300, [2012] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 27 was incorrect.

Although cross-examination which had invited impermissible speculation by the defendant should not have been allowed, that was insufficient to support a conclusion that his conviction for rape, buggery and indecent assault was unsafe, there being no other basis on which to undermine the jury's acceptance of the significant DNA evidence.

The Independent Police Complaints Commission was wrong not to request that consideration be given to bringing disciplinary proceedings against a sexual offences investigative techniques police officer who repeatedly told the victim of an alleged rape and her mother in the months before the trial that important telephone call evidence was available, when in fact it was not.

A judge's decision to discharge a jury in a rape trial to enable the defendant to consider his position had been made for appropriate reasons and in the interests of justice where the defendant had the defence of insanity open to him but chose to rely on the defence of consent.

A judge had erred in permitting in a rape trial the admission of two previous convictions for rape and attempted rape where the lapse of time between the commission of the previous offences and the instant offence was 32 years and 18 years respectively. The previous convictions were too old to satisfy the requirements of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.101(4) and s.103(3).

The court quashed a conviction for rape and assault by penetration in light of several material deficiencies in the re-trial judge's directions to the jury concerning the defendant's case and her failure to remind them of the defence following her decision to allow them to replay the complainant's video evidence.

Evidence not immediately relevant to rape charges made against three young offenders had been properly admissible at their trial where it was relevant to assessing the truthfulness of the victim and where it demonstrated an attempt to corrupt witnesses. Regarding the latter, admissibility did not depend on there being a count of attempting to pervert the course of justice. The upper tariff for rape sentencing was not reserved purely for rapes committed over a course of time or involving multiple victims.

A sentence of six years' detention, imposed following a young offender's guilty plea to statutory rape of a child aged under 13 that had resulted in pregnancy, was quashed and replaced with two years and three months' detention where the majority of the sexual activity occurred after the complainant's thirteenth birthday, the activity had been instigated by the complainant and was consensual, and the offender had pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity and demonstrated remorse.

Taking part in sexually explicit quizzes on the internet amounted to "sexual behaviour" within the meaning of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.42(1)(c).

In a retrial of several charges, evidence of an acquittal on one or more of the charges at the first trial should not be put before the second jury unless there was a clear inference that the first jury had rejected the testimony of a witness because it did not believe him, as opposed to thinking he might have been mistaken, and his credibility was directly in issue in the retrial.

The cultural background of an offender of Pakistani origin who had raped his wife on numerous occasions was of no relevance for the purposes of mitigation.

Inconsistent jury verdicts on one count of vaginal rape and one count of oral rape, arising out of same incident and given following a direction sanctioned by R. v Watson (Darren Antonio) [1988] Q.B. 690, were an unacceptable compromise and consequently unsafe.

The appropriate sentence for a rape committed in the course of a burglary would rarely be less than 12 years' imprisonment, and aggravating features would raise the starting point to 15 years. The taking of photographs of the victim was always to be treated as an aggravating feature.

A total sentence of 12 years' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of an offender who had sexually abused two young boys on hundreds of occasions, causing them psychological damage and committing a gross breach of trust.

Concurrent sentences of six years' imprisonment for repeated rape offences when the victim was between the ages of seven and nine years old were manifestly excessive where the offender had been a youth at the time the offences were committed and they came to light years later. The judge should have applied the principles in R. v B [2009] EWCA Crim 1062.

A trial judge was right to refuse an application, by an offender facing charges of indecent assault and rape, for a stay for abuse of process as there was no serious prejudice to the offender by the passage of time between the offences and when the complainant made the allegations.

The court set out principles to be borne in mind when sentencing young offenders aged between 12 and 15.

Sentences of detention of six years and seven years imposed on two young offenders for the rape of a 13-year-old girl, and a sentence of three years' detention imposed on a third young offender for aiding and abetting those rapes, were too high given the offenders' ages. Sentences of five years, six years and 30 months respectively were substituted.

Convictions for child sex offences were unsafe where fresh evidence was presented that was based on new developments in medical understanding relating to the physical signs of child sexual abuse.

A district judge had not erred in concluding that there was a real prospect of a sentence of two years or more being imposed on a youth accused of attempted rape; the district judge had therefore been justified in upholding a decision that he should be committed for trial in the Crown Court.

An offender's conviction for the rape of a 15-year-old girl was safe, there being no proper basis for criticising the judge's decision to leave the case to the jury and an issue about the reliability of the victim's evidence having been brought to the jury's attention.

An offender failed to establish that the jury's verdicts were inconsistent where he was convicted of rape but his co-defendant was acquitted. The case against the offender was strong and did not depend on the jury's acceptance of the victim's evidence.

The early release provisions under the Criminal Justice Act 1991 s.33(1A) applied to an offender who, having served part of his sentence for attempted rape, was returned to prison under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.116 at the same time as being sentenced to imprisonment for an offence of burglary committed while released on licence.

It was open to the jury to conclude that a child witness who contradicted her original allegations during cross-examination was not actually agreeing in any meaningful way to what was being suggested to her when such questions were framed as direct suggestions with an indication of the answer sought.

The court underlined the need for promptness in bringing judicial review proceedings, in the context of a case where it had taken the CPS five weeks to decide whether to seek judicial review of a youth court's decision to retain jurisdiction in respect of an accused, resulting in prejudice to the accused.

Convictions for rape, kidnap and doing acts tending and intended to pervert the course of justice were safe despite a delay of several years between the allegations and the trial. The trial judge had been right to refuse a submission of no case to answer and had clearly directed the jury on the possible prejudice caused to the offenders by the delay.

A conviction for rape on a specimen count was unsafe on the instant particular facts and circumstances, where evidence rejected in relation to specific counts was therefore irrelevant to the specimen count.

In the trial of a husband for the rape of his estranged wife, the judge had correctly refused to allow the defence to cross-examine the complainant as to the date when consensual intercourse had last taken place as that was not so relevant to the issue of consent as to endanger the fairness of the trial.

The early release provisions introduced by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 s.26 applied to an offender who was returned to prison under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.116 at the same time as being sentenced to imprisonment for an offence of burglary committed while released on licence, having served part of his sentence for attempted rape.

There were no defects in a judge's summing up in a trial for rape and sexual activity with a child and the conviction was safe.

An extended sentence of 12 years, comprising a custodial term of nine years and an extension period of three years, was appropriate in the case of an offender who had committed a sustained and violent rape of another male.

The court gave guidance on procedure to be followed where a jury was given transcripts of video evidence.

In the circumstances, convictions for a series of familial sexual offences were safe notwithstanding the fact that no conventional bad-character direction had been given despite such evidence having been adduced.

The drafting of an indictment required close attention to the realities of the case and none at all to the theoretical legal possibilities which might arise, in order to avoid the inclusion of unnecessary counts and the consequent wasting of scarce and valuable resources.

Having considered fresh medical evidence as to an offender's state of mind at the time of his trial, the Court of Appeal quashed his convictions and substituted them with a finding that he had been unfit to plead but had done the acts alleged.

Taking into account the exceptional circumstances, a sentence of 30 months' detention imposed upon a 17-year-old offender for rape of a child under 13 was excessive where the offender had had consensual sexual intercourse with a 12-year-old girl, believing her to be nearly 15 years of age. The appropriate sentence was a 12 month detention and training order.

The court gave guidance on the matters to be taken into account by a district judge when considering the committal of a young offender to the Crown Court for trial, in particular when assessing whether there was a real prospect that the young offender would be sentenced to detention for more than two years.

A total sentence of 12 months' imprisonment suspended for 18 months imposed following guilty pleas to two specimen charges of rape and two of indecent assault committed against a 13-year-old girl in 1973 was unduly lenient. The sentencing judge had wrongly placed too much weight on the fact that, between the commission of the offences and conviction, the offender had made admissions and been sentenced for similar offences against other children. A total sentence of eight years' immediate imprisonment was substituted.

A conviction for rape of a young offender with learning difficulties had not been rendered unsafe by any omissions in the judge's summing up and the non-custodial sentence imposed, although arguably unduly lenient, was not amended as it was considered to be in the long-term public interest.

Sentences of life imprisonment with a minimum term of five years imposed on two offenders for multiple counts of rape were replaced by determinate sentences of 10 years, as a life sentence was to be reserved for those cases where the culpability of the offender was particularly high or the offence itself was particularly grave. Furthermore, on the information before the sentencing judge, the "dangerousness" test had not been met.

A sentence of two years' imprisonment suspended for two years imposed for rape was not unduly lenient due to the exceptional circumstances of the case.

Convictions for rape when the offender was under 14 years old were unsafe, as the jury had not been given a direction on the presumption that a child under 14 was presumed to be incapable of crime.

A judge had been correct to determine that an offender convicted of child rape was dangerous and to impose a sentence of life imprisonment, even though at the time of sentence the offender was effectively blind. The offender already had severely impaired vision at the time of the offending, and a sentence for public protection would not have properly reflected the public's revulsion nor the offender's depraved criminality.

A conviction for rape was safe where the judge had used the term "submission" in juxtaposition to, and in comparison with, the exercise of free choice in order to differentiate between the two concepts, and the jury could not have taken submission to mean anything other than the absence of free consent.

The court expressed its opinion as to the reliability, admissibility and evidential value of low template DNA, primarily that obtained using the low copy number (LCN) process. It concluded that such DNA could be used to obtain profiles capable of reliable interpretation if the quantity of DNA that could be analysed was above the stochastic threshold.

A jury had not reached inconsistent verdicts by acquitting an offender on one count of rape of his niece but finding him guilty on another as there were grounds on which it could have reached different views on the offences, including the age of the victim at the time of each alleged offence.

Where a defendant was convicted on one count of rape but acquitted of the remaining three counts of rape and indecent assault in a case which depended entirely on the evidence of the alleged victim, the inconsistency in verdicts rendered the conviction unsafe.

A total sentence of 10 years' imprisonment imposed on an offender following his convictions for inflicting grievous bodily harm, rape and assault by penetration was unduly lenient where he had raped and sexually assaulted his partner while she was paralysed as a result of actions. It was replaced with a sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of nine years.

In the context of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.100 , the word "substantial" meant that the evidence concerned had something more than trivial probative value but it was not necessarily of conclusive probative value. Where evidence showed that the complainant in a case of alleged rape had made false allegations of sexual misconduct against another person, that evidence would have substantial probative value in relation to the central issue of her credibility and therefore consent.

The Crown's closing speech in a trial for rape had been prejudicial in that it created a risk of the jury being emotionally swayed in favour of conviction and misled as to key pieces of evidence. The judge had failed to give directions to deal with the risk of unfairness.

Fresh evidence in a rape case led to the conclusion that the verdict was unsafe and should be quashed; fundamentally, the new evidence established that the victim and the offender were not strangers and the basis of the prosecution case that the victim was raped by a stranger was fatally undermined. The court commented about the importance of defence statements under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and the importance for the prosecution to respond promptly and fully to a respondent's notice under the Criminal Procedure Rules 2005 r.68.6 .

A defendant's conviction for rape was safe where there was no proper evidential basis for alleging that the complainant's allegations of an unrelated sexual assault were false. If evidence of that allegation had been before the jury it would not have been reasonably capable of leading to a different verdict as there had, in any event, been a strong case against the defendant.

A sentence of two years' imprisonment imposed on an offender following her conviction for an offence of perverting the course of justice by making a false allegation of rape against her boyfriend was appropriate in light of her not guilty plea and the impact of such allegations upon the minds of jurors trying rape cases.

A total sentence of 12 months' detention imposed on a young offender following early pleas of guilty to rape and a variety of sexual acts with a child family member was not unduly lenient due to the offender's age and lack of maturity when the offending began, the fact that he brought the offending to an end of his own volition, his frank interview and plea and his upcoming release date.

The trial judge had been entitled to rule out cross-examination of the complainant about an earlier allegation of rape against a third party pursuant to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41, where to have allowed such questioning would have resulted in the trial having been used as a vehicle for investigating the truth or falsity of the earlier allegation.

A total sentence of 11 years' imprisonment imposed on an offender for rape, sexual assault and causing a child to watch a sexual act was unduly lenient, and was replaced with a sentence of 16 years' imprisonment. The offender, a foster carer, had abused a vulnerable child in his care repeatedly over a two-year period.

A sentence of two years' detention was not appropriate in the case of a 14-year-old boy who had committed sexual offences against his eight-year-old cousin; the evidence showed that he did not pose a real risk to others and a custodial sentence would not be in the interests of his welfare. A supervision order for a term of three years was imposed instead.

Convictions on alternative counts of indecent assault, which depended on sexual intercourse being the indecent act and which were added to a rape indictment more than 12 months after the alleged offences had taken place, circumvented the effect of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 Sch.2 para.10(a) in relation to the time limits for commencement of proceedings under s.6 of the Act and were quashed as an abuse of process.

A sentence of eight years' detention for a 14-year-old offender who had raped his five-year-old sister and sexually assaulted two other young children was too high where the offender's IQ was below the learning disability range, and he had pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity. A sentence of six year's detention was substituted.

Sentences of five years' detention in a young offender institution imposed on each of two offenders following early pleas of guilty to vaginal and anal rape were unduly lenient and were increased to seven years' detention, as there were three specific features that took the offence into a category two rape in the Sentencing Guideline Council's Definitive Sentencing Guideline on the Sexual Offences Act 2003: the element of abduction or detention, the fact that the attack was sustained, and that there was more than one offender.

The presence of a serving police officer on a jury in a criminal trial had not compromised the fairness of that trial because, although the case involved allegations of improper police conduct in relation to offences admitted as evidence of propensity, it did not involve a dispute of evidence between defence and police witnesses, and the officer serving on the jury could not be said to have been biased.

The conviction of two men for the murder of a woman could not be impugned on appeal on the basis of the admission of bad character evidence or impeachable jury directions. The judge had been entitled to leave to the jury the question of whether one of the offenders had been more than a mere bystander but had encouraged the other to strangle the woman.

Where a judge had failed to give credit for time spent on remand when sentencing an offender for rape, it was appropriate to deduct such time from the imposed minimum term.

A notional determinate sentence that equated to 30 years' imprisonment before a one-third reduction for guilty pleas, which had formed the basis for calculating the specified minimum term of a life sentence imposed for 28 counts relating to the sexual abuse of five boys, was excessive and reduced to 20 years.

Sentences of nine and six years' detention for two young offenders convicted of rape and, in one case, grievous bodily harm were unduly lenient where the female victim, who was just 16, had been subjected to a group sex attack and had caustic soda thrown over her. The sentences were increased to 14 and 9 years' detention.

Where there were concurrent care and criminal proceedings relating to the same subject matter, it was essential that each court was kept fully informed of the other, and that the judge having the conduct of the care proceedings exercised his case management functions not only with a full knowledge of the situation in the criminal proceedings but with a view to ensuring that each hearing took place at an appropriate time.

The minimum term of a sentence of life imprisonment imposed for four counts of indecent assault and 25 counts of rape was reduced from 19-and-a-half years to 14-and-half years. A notional determinate sentence of over 40 years was manifestly excessive in comparison with the broad range of similar authorities.

It was important that the specimen directions on delay were tailored to the facts of the particular case and spelt out to the jury, though the judge should have emphasised and particularised the difficulties faced by the defendant, the directions given were sufficient to ensure a fair trial.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection imposed when the judge was satisfied that the defendant posed a significant risk of serious harm to the public was wholly compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 art.3 and art.5 . It was wrong to attempt to re-define "significant risk" in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.225(1)(b) in terms of numerical probability.

Convictions for five counts of rape and one count of indecent assault were safe, as there were no particular circumstances that required the judge to have given directions relating to the age of the victims, delay, an elaborated good character direction, or a recent complaint direction.

Convictions for child sex offences, including anal rape, were rendered unsafe where the jury had to have attached significance to medical evidence which was suggestive of abuse, and fresh medical evidence on the physical signs of child sex abuse later rendered that evidence entirely neutral. Whether or not the court considered a defendant guilty, convictions could only stand if they were founded upon properly reliable evidence.

Notwithstanding the fact that it had been imposed half-way through an eight-year sentence for rape, a 24-year extended sentence with a custodial term of 16 years was appropriate in the case of an offender who had, over some 20 years, regularly beaten, sexually assaulted and raped his partner and his two daughters.

Following the decision in R. v BR (Sentencing: Extended Licences) [2003] EWCA Crim 2199, [2004] 1 W.L.R. 490, the adding of an order extending a licence period to a sentence of imprisonment for an offence committed before October 1, 1991, did not amount to the imposition of a heavier penalty than was available when the offence was committed and therefore, there was no violation of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 art.7.

A total sentence of eight years' imprisonment imposed on an offender following his pleas of guilty to charges of false imprisonment, assault occasioning actual bodily harm, rape and assault by penetration was unduly lenient and was replaced with a sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of five years, as the offender had a very bad record and clearly posed a risk of serious physical and psychological harm to the public.

A conviction for rape was upheld, as the judge had not been wrong to refuse to allow a defence witness statement to be adduced as hearsay when the witness could have been called, nor had he been wrong to allow a prosecution witness to be called, as her evidence was capable of supporting the prosecution case.

Convictions for rape and indecent assault were quashed where the Crown's reliance on hearsay evidence of bad character in the form of statements containing allegations of rape had circumvented the restrictions on hearsay evidence in the Criminal Justice Act 2003.

A sentence of six years' imprisonment imposed on an offender who had been found guilty on two counts of rape against his ex-wife was unduly lenient having regard to the grave breach of trust involved in the attacks and the offender's enjoyment of his ex-wife's discomfort at trial, and was increased to a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment.

There was no right of appeal under the Extradition Act 2003 against a decision of a magistrates' court to give its consent under s.55(6) of the Act to a request from a requesting state that an extraditee serve a sentence of imprisonment imposed upon him in respect of a conviction that did not form the basis of his original extradition.

On an application for a retrial under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.76(1), the reference in s.78(1) to "new and compelling evidence ..... in relation to the qualifying offence" did not mean that the new and compelling evidence had to relate directly to the allegation for which the defendant had been acquitted. In the instant case, where the relevant offence was rape, what mattered was that the new evidence should be admissible to prove that, contrary to his evidence at trial, the defendant had raped the complainant.

Since the amendments made by the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 to Chapter 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Pt 12, which removed the statutory assumption in s.229(3) in relation to the risks in s.229(1), the court could make an assessment of an offender''''s dangerousness untrammelled by artificial constraints. However the sentencing option of imprisonment for public protection still remained an important sentencing alternative available to the court.

A conviction for indecent assault was quashed and a retrial was ordered as there was a chance that the conviction was unsafe as not all of the relevant admissible evidence had been before the jury.

A sentence of 10 years' imprisonment for rape, with an indefinite requirement to comply with the notification provisions under the Sexual Offences Act 2003, was not manifestly excessive given the aggravating features of the offence, despite exceeding the sentencing guidelines. The guidelines were to be treated as a guideline only, as a mechanistic approach could produce sentences that were inappropriate.

In a judge's summing up in a rape trial the fact that the trauma of rape could cause feelings of shame and guilt that might inhibit a woman from making a complaint about rape was sufficiently well known to justify a comment to that effect. A judge had made comments in excess of what had been necessary by emphasising in detail the effect of rape in a relationship, and had not given a balanced summing up on the issue of delay in making a complaint, but on the evidence convictions for rape had been safe.

A sentence of detention for public protection with a minimum term of two years imposed for attempted rape was manifestly excessive as the offender was only 16, was of previous good character and had pleaded guilty at the earliest point. The sentence was replaced with one of three years' detention.

A sentence of life imprisonment was justified in respect of an offender who had raped a woman a number of times at knifepoint in his home over a period of some two hours.

A conviction for offences of rape and indecent assault of a child was safe despite fresh evidence that questioned the basis for the expert medical evidence at trial, as it did not undermine the evidence and credibility of the victim.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of five years imposed for rape involving abduction was both correct in principle and in length.

Sentences of life imprisonment with minimum terms of 19 years and 13 years imposed on two offenders for murder were unduly lenient as the murder was intrinsically linked with sexual activity and therefore the judge should have followed the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Sch.21 para.5(2)(e) and taken a starting point of 30 years' imprisonment. The minimum terms were replaced with terms of 24 years and 18 years.

A three-year community order with a supervision requirement imposed on a 19-year-old man for meeting a child following sexual grooming, assaulting a child under 13 by penetration, and attempted rape of a child under 13 was unduly lenient and was replaced with a sentence of two years' imprisonment. Although the 11-year-old victim had consented to the offences, the law existed to protect children from themselves and a non-custodial sentence would be appropriate only in rare cases.

A judge had not erred, and there was no duplicity, in allowing an amendment to a count in an indictment that had initially alleged rape by vaginal penetration so as to allege that the defendant had raped the victim by penetration either vaginally or anally.

A 38-year-old's conviction for one count of rape and two counts of sexual assault with a child was unsafe where the fairness of the proceedings had been adversely affected by evidence of alleged sexual misconduct with an extended family member at the age of 14, introduced in order to show propensity to commit offences of the type charged.

A sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum term of five years imposed concurrently on each of three counts of rape of the offender's ex-wife was manifestly excessive and was replaced with a sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of five years.

A sentence of imprisonment for public protection with a minimum term of three years and 172 days, imposed for two counts of rape, was upheld but the minimum term was reduced to two years and 172 days because the judge had not made a satisfactory reduction for the offender's co-operation with the prosecution in an unconnected murder trial.

It was compatible with a child's rights under the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 art.8 to convict him of rape contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.5 in circumstances where the agreed basis of plea established that his offence also fell properly within the ambit of s.13.

Where a judge was passing sentences such as life imprisonment or imprisonment for public protection, which had such a significant effect on an individual, it was a matter of public interest that he should spell out what he was doing clearly so that the public and the defendant understood it.

Sentencing judges had a duty under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.174 to give reasons for a sentence. Where the guidelines indicated that a sentence of a particular kind or within a particular range would normally be appropriate, but the court imposed a sentence of a different kind or outside that range, the court must state its reasons for departing from the guidelines.

There were no grounds for finding that convictions of rape and indecent assault were unsafe where a statement given by the appellant's wife, implicating her husband, was admitted under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.114 after the trial judge had ruled that the wife was not a compellable witness against her husband under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.80.

A sentence of 20 years' imprisonment for 13 counts of sexual offences involving young children, including rape, was not manifestly excessive as although R. v Millberry (William Christopher) [2002] EWCA Crim 2891, [2003] 1 W.L.R. 546 indicated that the appropriate starting point for a campaign of rape was 15 years, that was a starting point and not a finishing point, and the definitive sentencing guidelines applied.

A defendant's failure to mention a number of facts before giving evidence at trial had not been capable of founding an adverse inference as they had not been in dispute, and therefore the jury should not have been given a direction under the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 s.34.

Appeals against convictions for numerous and various sexual offences were dismissed where the judge had correctly admitted evidence of the making of complaints under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.120(2) and evidence as to bad character, and had not misled the jury in his directions.

A sentence of life imprisonment with a minimum term of 35 years where a 21-year-old uncle had raped and strangled his two-year-old niece was not excessive. The sentencing judge had taken account of the defendant's age and guilty plea in deciding not to impose a whole life order, and so those features could not be factored into calculation of the minimum term because it would have provided the defendant with a second discount.

A sentence of life imprisonment for raping two young teenagers and for causing anal rape was appropriate in view of the gravity of the offences, the aggravating features, the offender's unstable character relating to sexual matters and the likelihood of his committing similar grave offences in the future.

Counts on an indictment had been misjoined where there was no nexus between three counts of rape and a fourth count of doing acts tending and intended to pervert the course of justice based on alleged pressure on the victim to withdraw previous allegations of rape made against the offender.

A sentence of three years' detention for public protection imposed on a 15-year-old boy who had pleaded guilty to nine counts of rape was not manifestly excessive taking into account the seriousness of the offences, the period over which they were committed, the vulnerability of the victims and the appellant's serious problems that needed addressing before it would be safe for him to be released into society.

A judge had erred in adopting a starting point of five years when applying sentencing guidelines for a rape case involving the use of violence over and above that which was necessary to commit the offence.

Convictions for indecent assault and rape were unsafe where fresh evidence relating to the psychological condition of the accused at the time of the incidents could account for his belief that the complainant was a willing participant.

A sentence of six years' imprisonment imposed for rape was replaced with a sentence of four years' imprisonment as the standard five year starting point identified in the sentencing guidelines had not been followed.

Evidence provided by a prosecution witness under cross-examination by defence counsel was not evidence to which the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41 was aimed when given its natural meaning and could not be extended to cover such evidence.

A judge's decision had not exceeded the bounds of a reasonable conclusion where he had determined not to discharge a jury that had learned during its deliberations of information that had not been in evidence during the trial, which was prejudicial to the defendant's case, and which might have influenced the jury's thinking.

Evidence from a witness recalling the diary entries of a complainant was not hearsay evidence but direct evidence and the judge had been correct to admit it.

A judge's directions on the issue of consent in the context of an alleged rape where the victim had been voluntarily intoxicated had been adequate and additional directions would only have served to confuse the jury further. The issue in the case came down to which individual had been telling the truth.

A judge had not erred in law in rejecting an offender's submission of no case to answer to four counts of rape and two counts of sexual assault, all of a child aged under 13, in circumstances where, despite inconsistencies in the victim's evidence, through the victim's various accounts the judge had a clear basis on which to form his conclusion that, applying the principles established in R. v Galbraith (George Charles) [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1039, it was for the jury and not for him to assess the victim's credibility.

The statutory restriction on evidence or questions about a complainant's previous sexual history contained in the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41 applied to the trial of the sexual offences which were committed before the Sexual Offences Act 2003 came into force.

A judge erred by failing to refer to a defendant's defence and failing to highlight various difficulties in the case when asked by a jury, deep into their deliberations and after a majority verdict direction, to remind them of certain parts of a complainant's evidence.

The court allowed fresh evidence to be adduced on a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission where the offender had withheld that evidence at trial for tactical reasons, since the evidence would have had a significant effect on those proceedings and demonstrated his innocence in relation to the counts charged.

The court considered the correct approach to sentencing where offences contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 had been committed by adults against children who had given ostensible consent and appeared much older than their actual age.

The circumstances of a case of indecent assault, attempted rape and attempted murder justified two concurrent sentences of life imprisonment but a minimum period should have been specified under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.82A as the punitive and retributive element of the sentence did not require detention for life. A minimum period of nine years was specified.

An offender's history of offending and the circumstances of a rape committed by him did not suggest that the criteria of dangerousness under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 were met and, therefore, it was not appropriate to impose on him a sentence of imprisonment for public protection.

In change of law cases it was not open to the Criminal Cases Review Commission lawfully to apply a policy that it was under no obligation to have regard to the practice of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division and accordingly just as the court would not normally extend time in such cases, a conviction should not normally be referred on the basis of a change of law.

In a rape case, the judge had correctly directed the jury on consent and reasonable belief in consent, and had given the jury full and fair directions on the burden and standard of proof.

The modification in R. v Hayter (Paul Ali) [2005] UKHL 6, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 605 to the absolute prohibition against the use of out of court admissions as evidence against co-defendants did apply in Trinidad and Tobago, but the circumstances of the instant case fell outside the ambit of the Hayter principle.

The conclusion that a sentence of imprisonment for public protection was appropriate on a necessary hypothesis that there was a significant risk of serious harm from future offending had to be founded upon evidence rather than speculation or mere apprehension of some risk of future harm.

In circumstances where an offender had deceived a complainant and pressured her into having sexual intercourse more frequently than she would have done otherwise, the conclusive presumption under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.76 had no application as the complainant had not been deceived as to the nature or purpose of sexual intercourse.

A judge had erred in ruling that there was no case to answer where there was sufficient evidence of rape to be left to the jury. Issues of consent and capacity to consent to intercourse on charges of alleged rape should normally be left to the jury to determine.

Where a Crown Court judge had mistakenly sentenced a convicted rapist under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.227 instead of under the serious offences provisions of the Act, and had refused to correct the situation under the slip rule, the High Court had no jurisdiction to deal with an application for judicial review of the sentencing decision.

A number of sexual offences committed against children, some of which had been carried out when the defendant had himself been very young and between which there had been a substantial time-gap, had been very grave but had not fallen into the category which merited life imprisonment.

In a case where two children had delayed in complaining of sexual abuse by their stepfather, the judge had not gone beyond the bounds of permissible comment when setting out a number of possible reasons for the delay in disclosure.

Where a case concerning allegations of rape and of aiding and abetting rape turned entirely on the credibility of the complainant as against the appellants, and evidence which went to that issue had been excluded, even though that had been done with the agreement of defence counsel, the convictions were quashed.

A judge had adequately highlighted the difficulties a defendant faced in relation to the antiquity of allegations made in a historical sexual abuse case and had correctly directed the jury to look for independent evidence in support of those allegations.

Convictions for rape and indecent assault were overturned as unsafe following the admission of fresh evidence.

An order under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.86 extending the licence period of a sentence until the end of the full length of the custodial term should not have been made where the psychiatric evidence was that the offender, who had been convicted several years after he committed the offence, was no longer a danger to the public.

The purpose of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41(3) was to strictly limit the ability of a defendant to question a complainant about her sexual behaviour; s.41(3)(c) made it clear that such cross-examination would only be permitted where there was evidence of sexual behaviour which was similar to that in question and where the similarity could not reasonably be explained as coincidence.

A prolonged and brutal sexual attack by a stranger during which he had twice raped his victim and threatened to kill her merited a life sentence.

A life sentence could be imposed without a minimum term if the seriousness of the offence, rather than the risk of reoffending, warranted it.

In imposing a longer term under the Criminal Justice Act 1991 s.2(2)(b) for offences of rape, indecent assault and robbery, a judge had not been justified in increasing a sentence by fifty per cent as he had failed to guard against the risk of imposing an element of imprisonment for protection of the public twice over.

On a consideration of whether a victim was not giving oral evidence through fear in accordance with the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.116, the victim's state of mind had to be assessed against the history of the case which had involved allegations of rape and domestic violence. Where the perpetrator had used threats against her and financial resources to try to stop her giving evidence, there was ample evidence of her continuing fear of giving evidence against him.

Although a complainant had delayed for over three years from the date of two offences of rape before bringing the matter to the attention of the police, there had not been prejudice to a defendant, since he had been well able to provide a defence to the allegations against him.

A total extended sentence of 11 years and six months' imprisonment following conviction for the buggery and rape of the appellant's long term partners on the basis that the sentence could not be criticised on the ground of totality or on the ground that the defendant had been sentenced under the regime prior to the Criminal Justice Act 2003

If, through drink, or for any other reason, a complainant had temporarily lost her capacity to choose whether to have sexual intercourse, she was not consenting, and subject to the defendant's state of mind, if intercourse took place, that would be rape. However, where a complainant had voluntarily consumed substantial quantities of alcohol, but nevertheless remained capable of choosing whether to have intercourse, and agreed to do so, that would not be rape.

A sentence of life imprisonment was justified in the case of the appellant, who had raped his wife after subjecting her to years of domestic abuse.

The power to increase a sentence had to be exercised sparingly and only in cases where the sentence imposed by the trial judge was manifestly inadequate. An applicant for leave to appeal or an appellant had to be given an indication by the appellate court of its intention to consider an increase in sentence and an opportunity to address the court on the increase or to ask for leave to withdraw.

Where a defendant had been indicted on two counts of rape, a judge had been entitled to direct that alternative verdicts of indecent assault could be returned where the jury was sure that sexual intercourse had occurred but the issue of consent could not be determined, as the statutory time limit did not apply.

A judge had erred when imposing a sentence by using too low a starting point, and had failed to take sufficient account of the aggravating features of an offence.

Fresh evidence did not render a conviction for rape unsafe as the evidence, which related to an alleged assault on the complainant when she was younger, would not have affected the complainant's credibility in the eyes of the jury. Further, there was no reasonable explanation for the defence not to have adduced the evidence at trial.

A judge had been correct to impose a community order on a defendant following an attempted rape as his early guilty plea, youth and remorse meant that the custodial term imposed would have been very short and far less than would have enabled any sort of assistance to be given to the defendant by way of education.

A chief constable was not liable for the tortious and criminal acts of an off-duty police officer since the officer had been on a "frolic of his own" when committing the acts.

A conviction was quashed and a retrial ordered in circumstances where a judge had gone beyond the relevant propensity of a previous conviction and directed the jury as to its applicability in demonstrating characteristics that were irrelevant to the issues in the case.

A judge had been correct to allow the Crown to adduce evidence of a defendant's bad character and propensity through authenticated evidence of previous convictions from another jurisdiction for offences of a similar type.

Offences of rape that occurred within a domestic marital context did not justify a reduction in sentence, and judges should have regard to a defendant's culpability, the perceived risk that he posed to society, the level of harm inflicted and the impact of the offences on the victim.

Convictions for rape, attempted rape and indecent assault were quashed where the judge had shown bias towards the Crown case, had given inadequate jury directions and had erred in ruling that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on two of the counts.

A defendant's failure to disclose his status as HIV positive did not affect the issue of consent in relation to a charge of rape and should have been excluded from a jury as unfairly prejudicial under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.78 .

A judge had been correct in imposing sentences of life imprisonment with a minimum term of six years on two 19 year old defendants, as the nature and levels of violence used to commit the offences warranted an assessment of dangerousness.

A sentence of two and a half years' imprisonment for rape by a husband of his estranged wife had not been unduly lenient where the wife had not been especially vulnerable within the guidelines set out in R v Millberry (2002) EWCA Crim 2891 , (2003) 1 W.L.R. 546 .

Detention and training orders of 24 months and 18 months imposed on the defendants for respective offences of rape and aiding and abetting that rape were unduly lenient and were replaced by sentences of four years' detention and three years and six months' detention.

A judge had been correct to impose an automatic life sentence for rape where the defendant presented a continuing significant risk to the public and the offence had been conducted against a violent background.

Although a judge had been wrong to refuse leave to cross examine a complainant in a sexual abuse case on her previous bad character in order to determine her propensity for truthfulness it could not be said that the conviction was unsafe.

A conviction for rape was not safe as fresh evidence might reasonably have affected the jury's decision to find a guilty verdict.

The object of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41 was to prevent anyone, prosecution or defence, from asking questions that might cause embarrassment or difficulty to a complainant, male or female, about matters that were entirely personal, interference with which would damage the complainant's autonomy. The protective effect of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s.78 was perfectly apt to be deployed in an appropriate case where it was thought by the judge that the impact of s.41 of the 1999 Act on a defendant might produce an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings.

The appellant, who had been charged with sexual offences against his daughter, should have been allowed to cross-examine her about a sexual allegation that she had previously made where there was evidence to show that it was false; however, that failing did not render his convictions unsafe.

Despite fresh evidence detailing the contamination of DNA samples, there was sufficient evidence linking a defendant to a violent rape attack for his conviction to be safe.

The sentencing judge had been entitled, pursuant to sentencing guidelines, to accord a reduction in sentence of one-third where the offenders had pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity. The minimum term to be served by one of the offenders for counts of rape of a baby was increased to reflect the fact that the starting point adopted by the sentencing judge was, in the circumstances, unduly lenient.

An extended sentence comprising three years' detention and an extended licence period of two years imposed on the offender in respect of an offence of attempted rape was unduly lenient. A sentence of detention for public protection was substituted.

A sentence of five years and six months' imprisonment imposed on a taxi driver who had followed a drunken passenger into her own home and had unprotected sexual intercourse with her whilst she was asleep on the sofa was found to be unduly lenient and increased to eight years.

A judge had been correct to allow as admissible a defendant's previous convictions as evidence of propensity to commit offences of the type alleged in circumstances where the complainant's evidence had established a case to answer.

There was no reason to interfere with the conviction and sentence of a teenage boy in relation to four counts of rape of a very young boy. Despite inconsistencies between the differing accounts of the victim and two young witnesses the trial judge had been entitled to conclude that it was for the jury to consider the victim's reliability as a witness.

The Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.5 , which created the offence of rape of a child under 13 even where a defendant reasonably believed that the child was 13 or over, was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 Art.6(2) .

Convictions for two counts of rape were safe where, in the circumstances, the admission of fresh evidence would not have affected the decision reached by the jury at trial.

In asylum proceedings, where it was the secretary of state's case that the asylum seeker had fabricated claims of rape, on the material available it was clear the secretary of state had made no concession to the effect that it was possible that the asylum seeker had been raped.

Discretionary life sentences for two counts of rape were replaced with imprisonment for public protection because the offences, although serious, were not such as to justify discretionary life sentences.

No undue pressure was placed on the jury in a criminal trial to reach its verdicts on charges of rape and assault by penetration against the appellant.

A determined minimum term of one year and three months' imprisonment following a life sentence for the rape of a girl aged fourteen years was unduly lenient given the age of the victim and the defendant's related antecedents. A minimum term of two years and six months' imprisonment was substituted.

A three-year sentence was substituted for a sentence of four years and three months' detention for five counts of rape of a child under the age of 13. The original sentence was manifestly excessive in light of the proximity in ages between the offender and the complainant and the offender's plea of guilty.

Youth courts had erred in deciding that, pursuant to the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 s.24 , the appropriate mode of trial for youths charged with robbery was the Crown Court as there was no real prospect of the imposition of a custodial sentence of over two years in length. A youth court was entitled to conclude that it was appropriate that a child charged with rape be tried in the Crown Court.

The appellant's conviction for capital murder was safe where it was clear that the jury had convicted on the basis that the appellant himself had killed the victim; therefore, the fact that the judge's directions on joint enterprise had been fundamentally flawed was not relevant and did not affect the safety of the conviction.

A judge's refusal to allow the defence to put a specific question to a rape victim's mother on the grounds that it was irrelevant was wrong as it was possible that an answer could have been given that was relevant to the issue in the case. However, the application had been rightly refused as the court was unable to envisage any answer which might have significantly helped the defendant's case.

In the circumstances fresh evidence that showed discrepancies between a victim's allegations of rape made to the NSPCC and her evidence at trial did not render the offender's conviction for rape unsafe.

Hearsay evidence adduced by the Crown satisfied the requirements of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.120 and was admissible under that provision, and alternatively the trial judge was entitled to exercise his discretion under s.114 of the Act to admit the evidence on the basis that it was in the interests of justice.

Where the case on similarity between two allegations of rape was weak, it was up to the trial judge to give a clear direction to focus the minds of the jury on the relevant issue and on whether there was a sufficient relationship between the facts and not mere coincidence.

Where a defendant had previously been convicted of wounding with intent and acquitted of attempted murder, a subsequent prosecution for murder following the death of the victim from her injuries was not in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights Protocol 7 Art.4 since the new fact of the death of the victim had emerged since the first trial.

A sentence of 4 years and 4 months' imprisonment was unduly lenient for two counts of rape where the offences had been carried out late at night and had involved the threat of the use of a knife, a degree of planning and the degradation of the victim.

A specified minimum term of 8 years' imprisonment following a life sentence for the attempted rape of a boy of 10 years of age was manifestly excessive given the defendant's previous good character, his early guilty plea and a failure by the trial judge to take account of the period of time he had spent on remand.

On the facts, a hospital order with an indefinite restriction order imposed under the Mental Health Act 1983 s.41 offered the public very great protection from the offender who had been convicted of repeat sexual offences against young boys and who suffered from mental impairment, which could not be treated through a term of life imprisonment.

The appellant had not been prejudiced by delay where he had faced trial on historic complaints of sexual abuse as he had had a number of ways of challenging the victim's evidence other than mere denial.

The observation in R v Millberry (2002) EWCA Crim 2891, (2003) 1 WLR 546, that a sentence should be significantly shorter for a young offender, was a general observation and was not designed to be of invariable application.

On the facts of the case the verdicts convicting the appellant on one count of rape and acquitting him on another were not logically inconsistent.

Where an appeal against conviction was based on the alleged incompetence of defence counsel and solicitors although an appellant might not have to show that the conduct at issue was flagrant or unreasonable there had to be conduct or a failure which could be criticised which led to the conclusion that the conviction was unsafe.

The judge had been entitled under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41 not to permit the offender, who had been charged with rape, to pursue certain lines of questioning concerning the complainant's sexual experience for the purpose impugning the credibility of the complainant as a witness.

A sentence of 8 years' imprisonment was the correct starting point for an offence of rape where there were aggravating features of the use of a knife, a degree of planning, a persistence of attack and previous convictions.

The judge had wrongly excluded video and photographic evidence relating to an adult relationship between an alleged victim of child abuse and the defendant under the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41 when such evidence was crucial to the issue that the jury had to decide.

There was no inflexible requirement for a judge to obtain psychiatric or psychological reports before imposing a life sentence. The fact that the appellant continued to rape or indecently assault each time he was in the company of young girls indicated that he would remain a danger for an unknown length of time.

Where a witness gave mistaken evidence regarding certain dates in a trial for indecent assault and rape, whilst it would have been preferable to allow the defence application to recall the witness, failure to do so did not render the convictions unsafe.

It was in the public interest that work was done with a 15-year-old appellant, who had committed a series of sexual offences against younger family members, to undo the harm he had suffered by way of a severely disadvantaged childhood and sexual abuse. Given that the appellant was receiving appropriate therapy whilst in custody, a sentence of 30 months' detention was not manifestly excessive.

In exceptional cases a non custodial sentence was appropriate for an offence of rape of a child under 13 years old. Digital penetration of the anus of a child under 13 years old, contrary to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.6, was a very serious offence that could justify a life sentence. The court gave preliminary non prescriptive guidance as to the approach to sentencing in relation to offences under the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

A term of imprisonment of three years was unduly lenient in respect of an attempted rape and other sexual offences where there had been a course of conduct over a number of years by the elderly grandfather of a young child. Taking into account the need for the defendant to look after his sick wife the appropriate sentence was one of four years and six months' imprisonment.

Where the evidence on charges of indecent assault and attempted rape was so weak that the case should not be left to the jury a judge should not speculate as to the jury's view of the evidence but rather should adopt an analytical appoach applying the correct legal test.

In circumstances where a lengthy sentence of 13 years' imprisonment had been imposed, which would ordinarily lead to a period on licence of four years, it was not appropriate to pass a lengthy extended sentence.

The appellant's conviction for rape was safe where he was not substantially prejudiced by the Crown's decision to prosecute after indicating to him that it was not going to continue with the proceedings, and the trial judge had given a full and careful direction to the jury in relation to a hostile witness and a complainant who had shown herself to be untruthful. Given the appellant's previous good character, a sentence of eight years' imprisonment was quashed and a sentence of five years substituted.

In a rape case, where a judge ought to have allowed re-examination as to the size of the appellant's penis but such evidence would not have had a significant effect on the verdict, the failure to do so did not render the conviction unsafe.

In a trial in respect of a number of sexual offences, an application to cross-examine the complainant about what she had said in the past concerning her previous relationships with men was rightly rejected as being contrary to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41 . There was nothing inconsistent with guilty verdicts where sexual acts had been admitted, and acquittals where the sexual act itself had been denied and the issue had been consent.

An extended sentence of 17 years' imprisonment and four years' extended licence period for a series of sexual offences was manifestly excessive given the significance of pleas of guilty. Whilst an extended sentence was not to be ordered to run consecutively with another extended sentence there was nothing wrong in principle, where some offences occurred before 1998 and some after, in ordering an extended sentence to run consecutively with a determinative sentence.

The exercise of the power of the magistrates' court to rule that proceedings before it were a nullity was dependent on the facts of each case and any error was required to be remedied immediately. On a true construction of the legislation, offences under s.6 and s.7 of the New Forest (Confirmation of the Byelaws of the Verderers of the New Forest) Order 1999 of depasturisation of animals without payment of fees were of a continuing nature and time began to run for limitation purposes from the date on which the animals were identified.

The defendant newspaper was guilty of contempt in circumstances where the publication of an article identifying two men as having answered bail in connection with gang rape allegations created a substantial risk at the time of publication that the course of justice would be seriously impeded or prejudiced, as the article would have been available to the complainant who would have been vulnerable in cross-examination on her identification evidence.

In the circumstances, a conviction was unsafe where the judge had failed when summing up to put the very core of the appellant's defence to charges of rape and indecent assault of his former girlfriend.

A sentence of detention for various sexual offences, for a young offender who had been sexually abused as a child, had not been wrong in principle but was substituted by an extended sentence including an extended period on licence to enable assessment for treatment on a sex offender programme, as such a programme was unavailable to young offenders in custody.

Where an appellant was tried for rape, and the case depended on the credibility of the victim as opposed to the credibility of the appellant, failure to direct the jury on the relevance of recent complaint rendered the conviction unsafe.

In the circumstances evidence of distress was admissible to explain an inconsistent statement made by a victim of rape. The exercise of discretion not to warn the jury of the need for caution when considering the victim's evidence was not Wednesbury unreasonable.

On the balance of advantage proceedings in a criminal trial should not be stayed while the legality of the proceedings was determined in circumstances where it would be unjust to delay the trials and where the petitioners had been granted special leave to appeal.

Sentencing guidelines were given for rape and assault by penetration under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s.1 and s.2. The appropriate starting point for rape would be five years' imprisonment, while that for assault by penetration would be in the region of four years' imprisonment.

The making of some discount in the fixing of a notional determinate sentence was not a precise mathematical exercise. Judges were required to be alive to the risk of double counting and should perform a mental balancing exercise in arriving at an appropriate discount. They must make an allowance in relation to the public risk element of the term and ensure that it was not reflected in fixing the notional determinate sentence.

A judge had erred in refusing an application under the Criminal Justice Act 1988 s.23 for a witness statement to be admitted in evidence where the witness was abroad. The statement was capable of corroborating the defendant's alibi in a case of rape and the judge ought to have exercised his discretion in the defendant's favour.

Convictions for rape and indecent assault were safe despite considerable delay between the offences and trial. The trial judge had been right to refuse an application for a stay for abuse of process and a submission of no case to answer. He had correctly concluded that the matter was one for the jury with the assistance of directions on prejudice and delay.

The appellant had failed to follow the correct procedure in seeking to cross-examine the complainant in a prosecution for rape either on the ground of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41(3) and (5) or as a result of falling outside the restriction imposed by s.41 of the Act in relation to questioning about a complainant's sexual history.

The judge had given an inadequate direction in relation to evidence of recent complaint in failing to draw the jury's attention to inconsistencies in that evidence. In the light of the importance of that evidence on the respective credibility of the complainant and the appellant, it could not be said that the appellant's conviction was safe.

Where the only evidence as to an indecent assault by forced oral sex was a defendant's own evidence that a complainant had voluntarily kissed his penis such evidence was not material that could enable a jury to convict.

A judge had rightly recognised that the admission of evidence in relation to the appellant's previous conviction would cause undue prejudice to him. However, he had failed in removing the prejudice to the appellant by not discharging the jury from considering the charges against him or by giving a strong and consistent direction that the previous conviction was irrelevant to matters of propensity.

Where a defendant was standing trial for rape and a juror disclosed she had on an earlier occasion been raped, and the man accused had been acquitted, there was no reason for the juror to be disqualified. The judge had failed to give a proper good character direction and in the circumstances that rendered the conviction unsafe.

Where defendants were sentenced for a number of offences and where part of those sentences were unlawful but to quash them would reduce the overall sentences to less than the offences merited, the Court of Appeal had the power under Criminal Appeals Act 1968 s.11(3) to change the sentences to ensure justice was met.

The appellant's conviction in 2002 of the rape of his wife in 1970 was not an abuse of process as a man could be properly convicted of raping his wife when the incident occurred before the decision of R v R (1992) 1 AC 599.

An extended sentence of 14 years, consisting of a 12-year custodial element, was undoubtedly at the upper end of the bracket and severe. However, it was not manifestly excessive given this had been the defendant's fourth victim and he had committed the offences whilst on licence following release from a sentence for a similar offence. Given the danger the defendant posed to women the judge was right to pass a longer than commensurate sentence.

The defendant's conviction for rape was safe as the judge had been correct to refuse to allow cross-examination, under s.41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, on the victim's past activity as a prostitute. There had been no breach of the defendant's right to a fair trial by refusing to allow cross-examination.

The defendant's conviction was unsafe as the judge had wrongly refused an application for leave to cross-examine the victim, and had put to the defendant, evidence of previous sexual acts of a similar nature. The judge's attention had wrongly been drawn to s.41(3)(c)(ii) Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 when the matter should have been considered under s.41(3)(c)(i).

A judge had been entitled to allow a trial for counts of indecent assault, rape and assault occasioning actual bodily harm to proceed although an investigation into complaints regarding the appellant carried out over ten years earlier had concluded with a decision not to prosecute. Given the alleged sequence of events and the nature of the allegations made, the judge had been entitled to give a direction that the evidence of each of the complainants was capable of mutually supporting each other.

Investigations discontinued prior to April 1 1997 did not amount to a criminal investigation invoking the committal regime under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 Part I . However a hybrid committal could take place if previous investigations had been put on hold and resurrected following the 1996 Act coming into force.

The defendant's conviction for rape, robbery, indecent assault and attempted robbery was safe as there had been no application made to sever the indictment at trial and had it been made it would have been refused. Witness evidence was rightly admitted as it was relevant to the consistency of one of the victims and was not evidence of recent complaint. The direction on lies had been full and covered everything.

Fresh evidence from a new witness was incapable of belief by any jury and therefore the appellant's conviction for rape was safe. However he had insufficient means to pay the costs orders imposed upon him which would be quashed.

A conviction for rape was unsafe where a medical expert who had given evidence had been discredited and new medical evidence indicated that the victim's anal injury was capable of a number of explanations other than penile penetration.

A total sentence of four years' imprisonment for indecent assault, indecency with a child and attempted rape was unduly lenient, having regard to the guidelines in R v Millberry (2003) and the principle of double jeopardy, a sentence of seven years would be substituted. It was prosecuting counsel's duty to bring to a trial judge's attention any guideline cases before sentence was passed and to provide copies of the cases.

New information given by a complainant at her post trial interview cast such doubt upon her credibility that convictions based upon her evidence were set aside. A re-trial was not appropriate because of the lengthy periods already spent in prison.

A conviction for various sexual offences was unsafe where the two victims gave mutually corroborative evidence, as the judge's direction on collusion and possible contamination was somewhat garbled and no guidance was given as to the approach the jury should take.

This case is reported at (2004) Crim. L.R. 373. A full Lawtel Case Report will be published shortly and the official transcript may be ordered from Trancripts Express on 020 7025 2775.

Convictions for rape and grievous bodily harm were safe where the jury had reached their verdicts having heard all the evidence and having been sufficiently directed in the summing up.

A conviction for rape was unsafe as there was no possible explanation for the inconsistent verdicts of the jury. The court gave general advice as to when expert evidence of false memory syndrome should be admitted.

A sentence of 18 months detention and training order for an offence of indecent assault on a female was not manifestly excessive. A sentence different from that recommended in a pre sentence report was not wrong in principle and the judge had taken into account all relevant mitigating factors.

Where a defendant gave a no comment interview a judge should only give the jury a s.34 Criminal Justice and Public Order 1994 direction on adverse inferences if facts relied on at trial were in issue, to avoid mistakes the judge should discuss the proposed direction with counsel and specify facts relied on.

The Court of Appeal gave sentencing guidelines for sexual offences. Eleven out of the twelve cases referred by the Attorney-General were held to be unduly lenient and accordingly those sentences were increased.

A rape conviction was unsafe where the trial judge had refused the appellant's counsel leave, under s.41 Youth Justice And Criminal Evidence Act 1999, to cross-examine the complainant in relation to occasions before and after the rape complaint when she was alleged to have had consensual sexual intercourse with the appellant. The evidence was relevant to the issue of consent and its exclusion deprived the appellant of a fair trial.

A total sentence of five years' imprisonment for indecent assault and attempted rape on the defendant's grandchildren was not manifestly excessive, the judge could have passed consecutive sentences for the indecent assaults but had had in mind the principle of totality.

The defendant's appeal against her conviction for murder failed as the substance of the material on which fresh medical evidence was based was known at trial and the defendant had a full opportunity to put forward her defence at trial.

In all the circumstances of the case a total sentence of five years imprisonment was unduly lenient for six counts of rape, taking into account double jeopardy a total sentence of 10 years would be substituted.

Successful appeal against conviction for rape, attempted rape and indecent assault where the judge failed to adequately direct the jury on the proper approach to the separate treatment of counts in two sets of joined charges arising from the allegations of two complainants, who were stepdaughters of the appellant.

Where the appellant had convinced the complainant that she was going to be raped and had overcome her resistance, there was ample evidence to justify the conclusion that he had taken steps beyond the merely preparatory stage and was guilty of attempted rape.

The appellant's conviction for murder was unsafe and had to be quashed where it was highly probable that the victim had been attacked by one man, and where the DNA evidence had excluded the appellant as the attacker.

Where the defendant was a psychiatrist who abused his position of trust to rape and indecently assault vulnerable women patients a total sentence of eight years was unduly lenient and would be quashed. A total sentence of ten years was appropriate.

Where a defendant was on trial for sexual offences and the complainant had made previous allegations of rape, the defendant could not question the complainant about the previous allegations unless there was evidence to show the previous allegations were false.

A sentence of two years for the rape of a 15 year old virgin was unduly lenient. Following the guideline case of R v Millberry (2002) a sentence of four years would be substituted.

The Parole Board had not erred by admitting hearsay evidence of an allegation of rape at a hearing at which it concluded that the claimant should not be released on licence.

Life sentences were appropriate for grave offences of aggravated burglary, rape and buggery, however, a specified period ought to have been decided. In all the circumstances the recommendation of the Lord Chief Justice of a term of 11 years would be the correct specified period.

Where a sentence was referred by the Attorney-General, the reference should accurately reflect what happened at trial and prosecuting counsel should be consulted. The sentence of 18 months for conspiracy to rape was not unduly lenient.

Where the victim's character had been put in issue the judge was entitled to allow cross-examination on the defendant's previous convictions. The judge's summing up was fair and made clear that the relevance of previous convictions went to credibility only.

A custodial sentence of nine years and an extended period of five years for the rape of a 14 year old girl was too long. A sentence of eight years was appropriate with an extended period of two years.

The requirement for a court to be satisfied that "exceptional circumstances" existed before granting bail to an alleged offender, to whom s.25 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 applied, did not violate the right to liberty enshrined in Art.5(3) European Convention on Human Rights.

Where counsel had conducted two separate trials simultaneously and at the time was being investigated for allegations of rape, the court had to decide whether his conduct was so unreasonable so as to affect the fairness of the trial. The convictions were safe as there had been overwhelming evidence.

Where a defendant had been assessed as fit to be interviewed by a psychiatrist and had his interests protected by an appropriate adult and solicitor there was no unfairness in allowing evidence of the interview to go before the jury. His conviction was therefore safe.

Although the judge's interventions in the course of the defendant's trial on counts of indecent assault and rape had not bolstered the complainant or belittled the defendant in the eyes of the jury to such an extent as to render the defendant's conviction unsafe, his summing-up not only failed the same test but also contained serious misdirections.

A sentence of three years and ten months' imprisonment on one count of rape and two counts of indecent assault, which represented a course of conduct of abuse by a father against a daughter, was unduly lenient.

The judge had been correct to allow the jury to decide on the credibility of a 5 year old child in relation to alleged sexual offences by her step father, but the judge should have treated the case of the child's uncle differently because the allegations and evidence against him were much weaker.

Where a defendant stated that allegations of sexual abuse were untrue the prosecution were entitled to cross examine on whether the defendant could give any explanation why the victim would make up the allegations.

The defendant was rightly refused permission to adduce evidence that the complainant had lied at an earlier trial where the effect of such permission would be to circumvent the prohibition contained in s.41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.

A conviction for rape was overturned where the judge's summing-up had failed to provide the jury, which was faced with a somewhat complex evidential situation, with sufficient guidance as to the evidence capable of supporting the prosecution or the defence on the issues that arose. Suspicion that the jury may not properly have understood or performed their duty was reinforced by the verdicts they had returned in relation to the defendant's co-accused.

The prohibition of cross examination on previous sexual behaviour by s.41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 meant that in allegations of rape a defendant could not cross examine a complainant to show that a previous allegation of rape had been false. The defendants conviction was therefore safe.

An eight-year sentence was unduly lenient for two offences of rape where the victim was a child who had been in a position of trust vis-à-vis the offender. A three-year community rehabilitation order was unduly lenient for offences of indecent assault and indecency with a child. A six-month sentence coupled with an extended licence period of two years was unduly lenient for three counts of indecent assault against a child.

The length of a custodial sentence imposed on an offender was unduly lenient given the gravity of the offences that he had committed.

A conviction of rape was quashed where pre-trial evidence that would have cast doubt on the reliability of prosecution witnesses had not been disclosed.

A lies direction was only necessary in relation to a defendant when there was a risk of a jury concluding that a defendant had lied and might wrongly draw an adverse inference of guilt from the mere fact he had done so. It was unnecessary for a judge to give a further specific direction as to a complainant's lies where the inconsistency had been set out. Further there was no basis for considering the verdict unsafe because no such direction in relation to a complainant was given.

Revised sentencing guidelines for rape offences.

The imposition of an extended period of licence under s.85 Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 on a defendant convicted of rape was neither wrong in principle nor excessive.

The late disclosure of material relating to the complainant's credibility amounted to unfairness in the proceedings. In the circumstances the court could not be confident that if explored the jury might not have been affected by the unfairness.

Evidence was not fresh or new evidence where an accused had known of its existence but had chosen not to tell his legal team about it.

There was insufficient proximity to found a negligence claim between the victim of a rape, committed by a man due to be deported but released by the Secretary of State for the Home Department pending an application for the writ of habeas corpus, and the secretary of state.

Evidence relating to a specific unrelated allegation that was proposed to be used to undermine the credibility of a witness was not evidence that the witness had a general reputation for untruthfulness. It was therefore not an exemption to the rule of the finality requirement of questions put on issues of credibility and collateral matters. Consequently, it was inadmissible evidence.

A failure by a judge to inform a defendant of his right to seek an adjournment while legal advice was sought did not amount to a miscarriage of justice.

The conviction of James Hanratty for capital murder in 1962 was not unsafe and fresh prosecution DNA evidence linking him to the offence was admissible. * Application for leave to appeal to the House of Lords pending.

The Court of Appeal of Grenada's dismissal of the appellant's conviction for attempted rape was quashed and the case remitted for the appellant to seek leave to appeal on fresh grounds.

The conviction of a defendant, who had alleged police fabrication of interview records containing admissions, yet at trial had accepted the accuracy of the records, stating that his statements at interview were false, was considered safe after consideration of the material before the trial jury and the inconclusive expert evidence obtained after the trial.

The Immigration Appeal Tribunal had erred in its refusal of an Albanian woman's application for asylum, in part because it had failed to recognise her fear of being raped.

To determine whether an automatic life sentence should be imposed on a convicted rapist, the court had to consider whether he was an unacceptable risk to the public. The mere fact there was a risk of him committing a more minor offence that had previously featured in his record did not justify an automatic life sentence.

The absence of the Judicial Studies Board specimen directions four and five in relation to an accused's silence at trial did not, in the circumstances, render his conviction for rape unsafe. There had been a sufficiently compelling case for the accused to answer at the close of the prosecution case.

Where the respondent had aided and abetted the rape of a five-month old baby, a sentence of four years' imprisonment was not unduly lenient.

A sentence of eight years' imprisonment for raping a victim during a two-hour attack in her own home was lenient but not unduly so.

Verdicts were inconsistent as a set of facts could not be suggested that was consistent with both the verdicts given on each count and the Crown's case.

Although a trial judge should have exercised his discretion and allowed the defence to cross-examine the complainant, who had made allegations of rape and indecent assault, in relation to a matter pursuant to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 s.41(5), that error did not render the trial unfair because the matter was not central to the defence case.

Judges would do well to reflect before incautiously refusing applications for adjournments so that expert advice could be available to the defence. Whilst each case would turn on its own facts, the interests of defendants and the need for vigilance in complying with Art.6 European Convention on Human Rights called for careful analysis of the implications before a ruling was given.

Although two jurors had been overheard discussing the case on a bus, in particular the alleged prejudice against the defendant by a member of the jury, the convictions were safe because of the judge's direction to consider the verdicts only on the evidence.

There was a common sting between imputations of rape, sexual assaults and attacks in one part of an allegedly libellous article and an imputation that the claimant psychiatrist had had an exploitative sexual relationship with a female patient in a part of the article not complained of.

Where the appellant had kidnapped and raped his victim, a notional determinate sentence of 24 years was manifestly excessive and was substituted with a term of 13 years.

Questions or evidence about false statements in the past by a complainant about sexual assaults or a failure to complain about the alleged sexual assault that was the subject matter of the charge, while complaining about other sexual assaults, were not ones "about" any sexual behaviour of the complainant for the purposes of s.41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.

Section 58 Crime and Disorder Act 1998 did not have retrospective effect; therefore licence periods could not extended under that provision for offences which occurred before 30 September 1998.

A sentence of five years' imprisonment for an offence of rape, where the rape of a young Muslim girl had affected her marriage prospects and her position in the community, was unduly lenient. The sentence was quashed and substituted with a term of eight years.

Where the appellant, who had been convicted of indecent assault and attempted rape, did not pose a significant risk to the public, the appropriate sentences were three years and six years' imprisonment respectively.

Cross-examination of a rape victim on prior consensual sexual intercourse with the defendant's brother was not allowed under s.41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 where the defendant's position would not be improved by allowing the cross-examination and the questioning proposed would have been inconsistent with the policy of s.41 of the 1999 Act.

Where the judge had properly directed the jury on the relevance of the appellant's deception in order to facilitate sexual intercourse to the issue of consent, the conviction for rape was safe. However, the nine-year sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and was substituted with a term of eight years.

A sentence of eight years' imprisonment for rape and assault occasioning actual bodily harm where a husband had brutally raped his wife, who had consented to such activity in the past, was not excessive.

Whether the defendant appreciated the complainant's inability to consent to sexual intercourse was a matter for the jury and should not have been addressed by an expert giving evidence on the effect of alcohol on the complainant.

The test of admissibility of evidence of previous sexual relations between a complainant and an accused in a rape trial was whether the evidence and questioning concerning it was so relevant to the issue of consent that to exclude it would endanger the fairness of the trial under Art.6 European Convention of Human Rights.

A sentence of three years' imprisonment for the rape of a babysitter was unduly lenient and was substituted with a term of four years. Anticipation that a complainant would be an easy touch could not give rise to mitigating circumstances in relation to rape.

A nine-year sentence for making obscene and malicious telephone calls was not manifestly excessive.

The absence of any indication of the period of time after which the appellant could be considered no longer to pose a risk of future offending meant that an indeterminate sentence was required.

The trial judge was right to make orders allowing the complainant in a rape trial to give evidence in chief via a video link and to be cross-examined via a live television link. The appellant's sentence of three years nine months' imprisonment was quashed and substituted with a term of three years taking into account the 15-month delay in bringing the matter to trial and the appellant's age.

An appellate court had to approach complaints about counsel's incompetence and its effect with a healthy scepticism. However, where the breaches of duty were fundamental the conclusion had to be that the defendant was deprived of due process.

Where there was a previous account by a complainant before a jury which did not of itself constitute evidence, but to which the jury was likely to have regard in reaching a verdict, the jury had to be directed that recent complaints were not evidence of what happened but could at best be treated as admissible to establish consistency with the evidence of the complainant given at trial.

A judge was entitled to question a child complainant in a rape case where she had refused to undergo further cross-examination by defence counsel in order to ensure a fair trial.

The Crown and the Secretary of State for the Home Department were given leave to be joined as parties to an appeal that turned on the compatibility of s.41 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 with the European Convention on Human Rights.

Unless a solicitor had given evidence concerning the reasons for advising a no comment interview, a court could assume that a defendant so advised would additionally have been advised of the adverse inferences rule under s.34 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994.

A conviction for an offence of rape was regarded by the Court of Appeal as unsafe in the exceptional circumstances where comments made to the jury by defence counsel at the trial damaged the appellant's case. Accordingly, following receipt of a letter from prosecuting counsel detailing the contents of defence counsel's comments, the Court of Appeal was left with the view that the conviction had to be quashed.

The 23-month delay between juveniles being charged with rape and the date fixed for their trial, which meant the hearing would not take place within a reasonable time under Art.6(1) European Convention on Human Rights, contained many unaccountable periods of inactivity by the prosecution such that the defendants' plea in bar of trial was sustained.

A judge was entitled to take the view that any exercise of discretion to allow the Crown to cross-examine a defendant on his previous convictions should only be made if it became necessary after hearing the defendant's evidence.

A judge had not acted wrongly in refusing to stay proceedings where there had been a considerable lapse of time between the initial offences and the trial because he had dealt with the consequential problems adequately in his summing-up.

The House of Lords overruled the decision of the Court of Appeal that DNA samples that should have been destroyed under s.61 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 were not admissible in a trial for a separate matter. DNA evidence obtained as a result of the prohibited investigation was admissible, but s.64(3B)(b) of the Act had to be read in conjunction with s.78 of the Act, and under s.78 there was a discretionary power to exclude that evidence if it was unfair to admit it.

In a rape trial the Crown did not have to chose whether it was proceeding on the basis of the "knowing" or "reckless" elements of mens rea, and even if it had not put recklessness in cross-examination it was proper and indeed necessary for the issue to be left to the jury.

An appeal against a rape conviction was allowed because the judge failed to direct the jury on genuine mistaken belief in respect of the issue of consent.

Where an allegation of rape was non-justiciable, the judge had a discretion to admit the evidence as similar fact or background evidence in relation to other sexual offence charges. Careful consideration was required however and, if admitted, careful directions would be required from the judge.

Where a guilty plea had been entered unequivocally after consideration of legal advice and where there was no suggestion of any mental deficit, suggestibility, pressure or inducement, a judge was correct in not exercising his discretion to allow that plea to be vacated and plea of not guilty entered.

A sentence of between seven and eight years' imprisonment was appropriate where an offender had pleaded guilty to 13 counts of indecent assault, encompassing every form of sexual activity, on his daughter.

In an appeal against a sentence of three years' imprisonment for one offence of indecent assault, the judge was wrong to have made reference to an unsubstantiated allegation whilst sentencing and therefore should not have sentenced the appellant on the basis that he was a danger to women. Accordingly, the sentence was quashed and substituted with a term of 18 months' imprisonment.

In a successful appeal against conviction for rape, the conviction was quashed because the defence was not properly presented to the jury with the result that the defendant did not have the fair trial to which he was entitled.

It was not desirable to require the Secretary of State for the Home Department to give pre-action disclosure in circumstances where he was never likely to come under a duty to make such disclosure during the proceedings because the proposed claim had poor prospects of success and was liable to be struck out.

Provided that a defendant was not placed in double jeopardy, evidence that was relevant on a subsequent prosecution was not inadmissible because it showed or tended to show that the defendant was, in fact, guilty of an offence of which he had earlier been acquitted. Previous acquittals could be admitted as similar fact evidence in a current trial

A conviction for attempted rape was dismissed on appeal because the judge had failed to direct the jury that evidence of a victim's complaint had limited status and could not be evidence of the facts contained in the complaint.

In an appeal against a sentence of 30 months' imprisonment for one offence of rape, whilst the sentence would, under usual circumstances, be regarded as unduly lenient for such an offence, having regard to the powerful and exceptional mitigating features, the sentence would be quashed and substituted with a term of 12 months' imprisonment.

In an unsuccessful appeal against conviction and sentence for offences of supplying Class A drugs, false imprisonment and rape, the fresh evidence presented before the Court of Appeal failed to render the conviction unsafe. Having had regard to the circumstances surrounding the offences, a total sentence of 13 years' imprisonment was neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle, and accordingly, that appeal also failed.

A three-year probation order was an unduly lenient sentence for an offence of rape having regard to both the facts of the case and the remarks made in Attorney-General's Reference (No.24 of 1999) (2000) CAR(S) 275. Accordingly, the sentence would be quashed and substituted with a term of two-and-a-half years' imprisonment.

Defendant's appeal against his convictions for rape were dismissed because his fresh evidence did not reveal any grounds of appeal.

A conviction for buggery pre-Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 did not equate to rape within the meaning of s.2(5)(e) Crime (Sentences) Act 1997; the defendant's appeal against his life sentence was allowed.

It was a procedural irregularity for the trial judge not to have summed-up the evidence. Counsels' closing speeches were no substitute for a judicial and impartial review of the facts from the trial judge who was responsible for ensuring that an accused had a fair trial.

The defendant's appeal against a conviction for one offence of rape was dismissed because the trial judge correctly directed the jury that they could draw adverse inferences: (i) from facts relied upon in defence not mentioned to the police; and (ii) from the "Lucas direction" on lies, with respect to a single response made by the defendant.

A judge had not been wrong to impose on a life-long paedophile a long determinate sentence rather than a sentence of life imprisonment for 22 sexual offences including buggery and rape committed against a number of children over an eight-year period, as psychiatric evidence offered some prospect of his being cured of his deviant predilections.

The Crown Prosecution Service had not been under a duty to consult with the alleged victim of sexual offences before determining whether to discontinue the prosecution of those offences.

Where there was no special features in a rape trial, the judge was not obliged to give a cautionary warning on the need for corroboration of the complainant's evidence such as that contemplated in R v Makanjuola (1995) 2 Cr App R 469.

In an appeal against conviction for offences of attempted rape and threats to kill, there was no good reason to admit, at trial, the transcript of another suspect's police interview in that the evidence contained within it amounted to hearsay and was accordingly inadmissible. For those reasons, the conviction would not be regarded as unsafe and was dismissed.

Fresh evidence had to provide a basis for a conclusion that the conviction was unsafe. Credible evidence of a credible admission that a witness had committed perjury at trial may be a good ground for allowing an appeal.

In an appeal against conviction for one offence of rape, in the absence of the judge's direction to the jury not to speculate on the fact that the defence had not called a certain witness, it was apparent that an adverse inference had been drawn by the jury which was capable of rendering the conviction unsafe and it was accordingly quashed.

A three-year probation order for offences of attempted rape, indecent assault and indecency with a child was clearly regarded as an unduly lenient use of the judge's sentencing discretion and was accordingly substituted with a sentence of 18 months' detention in a young offender institution.

Guidelines on directing the jury where there was a long delay in charges being brought.

Whilst the requirement for corroboration in rape cases had been abrogated, where there were numerous inconsistencies in a complainant's evidence a warning against convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant should be given.

It was not safe for a jury to convict a defendant of rape on the evidence of a complainant when medical evidence concluded that the account given was anatomically impossible.

In an unsuccessful appeal against conviction for rape, the complainant's inconsistent evidence had been properly left to the jury and the verdict was not unsafe even though the appellant had been acquitted of another count of rape.

Whether challenging issues of guilt in civil proceedings was an abuse of process.