Leading criminal solicitor who successfully defends clients falsely accused of historic sex abuse

A two-year community order imposed on an offender following his guilty plea to historic offences of indecent assault on a girl under 14 and making indecent photographs of a child was unduly lenient. Although the sentencing judge had been entitled to look for assistance from the sentencing guideline for sexual assault of a child under 13, applying that guideline had led him to select a starting point which did not reflect the seriousness of the offending. The appropriate sentence was a custodial sentence of 32 months and an extended licence period of 12 months.

The extradition of a suspect accused of historic sexual offences would have been oppressive and unjust within the Extradition Act 2003 s.82 where the authorities of the requesting state had made a decision not to prosecute in 2001 and that decision had been overturned in 2017 without any reasoned explanation. The appeal also succeeded on the ground of ECHR art.8 because the strong public interest in honouring extradition arrangements was outweighed by the 2001 decision and its unexplained reversal, the passage of time and the significant impact extradition would have on the appellant and his partner, for whom he was a full-time carer.

A 77-year-old offender's reduced life expectancy due to cancer was not in itself a justification for reducing his sentence for historic sexual offences even as an act of mercy.

The court upheld an offender's convictions for three counts of indecent assault and two counts of sexual intercourse with a girl under 13. The judge had not erred in directing the jury that the offender's previous conviction for theft could be held against him when considering his credibility. Nor had she erred in her directions to the jury or in relation to the admission of complaint evidence.

A conviction for a historic count of rape was not unsafe despite serious shortcomings with disclosure of unused material. The judge had been entitled to find that the trial process could compensate for any prejudice arising.

An appeal brought, following a referral by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, on behalf of a deceased husband against his 2005 conviction for the "Lady in the lake" murder of his wife in 1976 was dismissed. Notwithstanding the non-disclosure of relevant prosecution evidence, the strength of the circumstantial case against the husband had been very strong.

In an indecent assault trial which turned on the comparative credibility of the complainant and the defendant, the judge should have given a full good-character direction in respect of the defendant. His failure to do so, coupled with his direction that the jury should treat the unchallenged evidence of the defendant's character witnesses with caution, simply because they knew him well, rendered the defendant's conviction unsafe.

A sentence of eight years and eight months' imprisonment was just and proportionate following guilty pleas to 13 historic offences of indecent assault of a girl under 16 years where the victims were the offender's step-daughter and adopted daughter who had been abused in their beds at night.

Convictions for rape and indecent assault were deemed unsafe where a judge had failed to give a jury clear directions as to whether, and if so how, they could rely on the evidence of each victim when considering the allegations made by the other.

A defendant had received a fair trial in a case concerning historical child sex offences where various pieces of contemporaneous evidence had been lost or destroyed. There was a substantial amount of additional material that could be used to test the reliability and credibility of the complainant, and the judge had given an impeccable direction to the jury to consider whether the defendant had been placed at a real disadvantage when they decided whether the prosecution had satisfied them of his guilt.

A custodial sentence of 9 years and 6 months and a further probation period of one year imposed on a 91-year-old former monk for historical offences of indecent assault, buggery and attempted buggery was unduly lenient, and was replaced with a custodial term of 12 years.

A fresh inquest was ordered under the Coroners Act 1988 s.13(1)(b) into the death of a 14-year-old child in 1966, as new evidence was available which rendered a further inquest necessary and desirable in the interests of justice.

The jury directions given at the trial of a well-known publicist for historical sexual offences had not been inadequate or unfair, and his conviction for indecent assault was safe.

A judge had been entitled to refuse severance of an indictment, meaning that an offender was tried for historic and recent counts of child sexual offences at the same time. The Criminal Procedure Rules 2015 r.3.21(4)(a) had removed the technical barriers to joinder in appropriate cases: where evidence on one count would be properly admissible on the other as evidence of bad character it was hard to argue that the offender would be prejudiced in his defence by having both counts on the same indictment. In the instant case, the recent counts would have been admissible as bad character evidence at the offender's trial on the historic counts and vice versa.

A judge's summing up had not been so unbalanced as to render a defendant's conviction for buggery unsafe.

A total extended sentence of seven years and six months' imprisonment for historic offences of attempted buggery, indecency with a child and indecent assault on a man committed by an individual aged 20-25 against his neighbour aged 10-14, whilst lenient, was not unduly so. Although aspects of the judge's reasoning had been flawed, the offences had very unpleasant features and there had been an element of grooming, no violence had been used.

Convictions for child cruelty and assault occasioning actual bodily harm were unsafe where a judge had failed to properly instruct the jury in terms of the particulars of the offence of cruelty which alleged cruelty and humiliation conjunctively, and had allowed evidence to be cross-admissible in respect of the offence of assault without giving a tailored and qualified direction in that respect.

A sentence of three-and-a-half years' imprisonment imposed on an offender for historic offences of buggery and indecent assault on a fellow resident at a children's home was unduly lenient. The offender satisfied the dangerousness criteria and a sentence of five years and ten months' imprisonment with a three-year extension period was appropriate.

Concurrent sentences of two years' imprisonment for historic offences of indecent assault and indecency with a child committed against the offender's sister when he was aged 14-16 were reduced to concurrent one-year sentences. The offender, now over 70, was gravely ill and nearing the end of his life, and the original sentence was, in justice and in mercy, longer than necessary.

A total sentence of 13 years and two months' imprisonment imposed following a trial of a step-father for four historic sexual offences against his step-daughter was manifestly excessive where the judge had both ordered all sentences to run consecutively, as well as imposing sentences at the higher end of the scale. It was replaced with a sentence of 11 years and two months' imprisonment.

A 78-year-old man whose extradition to the Falkland Islands was sought in order to prosecute him for 12 alleged historic sexual abuse offences from the mid-1980s was bailed. The unusual features of the case, including the individual's ill-health and his caring responsibilities, and the fact that he had not offended since completing a sex offenders' treatment programme in 2002, meant that the risks of him absconding or committing further offences were minimal.

A sentence of 11 years and 10 months' imprisonment imposed in 2016 following a guilty plea to a manslaughter offence committed in 2008 was not manifestly excessive. Although sentences for manslaughter offences such as the instant offender's which involved a knife and gang violence had substantially increased since 2008, there was no untoward effect where the sentencing judge had approached her task in a measured and reflective manner and had correctly applied the current guidelines while staying within the maximum sentence applicable in 2008.

A well-known celebrity had his conviction for a historic offence of indecent assault quashed where fresh evidence undermined the credibility of one of the key prosecution witnesses. However, the court upheld the offender's convictions for another 11 counts of indecent assault.

Although it was not necessary to decide in the instant case, in terms of decisions made by the CPS under the Victim's Right to Review scheme, the court was prepared to assume that a mistake of fact giving rise to unfairness, if made out, was capable of founding a claim for judicial review of a decision not to prosecute a suspect.

A minimum term of 10 years' imprisonment, equating to a determinate sentence of 20 years, imposed in respect of a life sentence following an offender's conviction for historical offences of rape and indecent assault, was reduced to six years to reflect the principle of totality of sentence. The offender had previously been sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment for similar sexual offences committed close in time to the index offences, which effectively equated to a total sentence before reduction of 32 years.

A 17-year extended sentence imposed on an offender who had grossly abused his position of trust as deputy principal of a children's home in subjecting young boys in his care to repeated sexual abuse was unduly lenient. Given the scale and frequency of the offending, which was akin to a campaign of rape, an extended sentence of 22 years was appropriate.

In appeals against the sentences imposed on two offenders, aged 101 and 96 respectively, in respect of historical sexual offences the Court of Appeal considered the issue of the appropriate allowance to be made for extreme old age in the sentencing process.

In a trial relating to historic offences of indecent assault, the judge had rightly allowed a witness, who had witnessed the alleged offences, to give evidence that she has also been inappropriately sexually touched by the appellant. The judge correctly directed the jury that her evidence did not go to propensity, but that it was potentially relevant to an important matter in issue.

A total sentence of 12 years' imprisonment was appropriate in respect of 29 historical sex offences where an offender had carried out a sustained campaign of very serious abuse against his younger stepbrothers for about seven years, starting when the victims were only 9 years old, and involving a gross abuse of trust.

The court reiterated the proper approach to sentencing an adult for sexual offences committed as a teenager.

A conviction on 15 historic counts of indecent assault was safe despite some unsatisfactory features of the judge's summing up. The total sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment was reduced to eight years, to take account of the offender's advanced age and poor health.

A total sentence of 15 years' imprisonment together with an extended licence period of one year was appropriate for historic sex offences committed by a 71-year-old man against his three step-grandchildren.

A sentence of 12 years' imprisonment imposed following guilty pleas to 24 charges of indecent assault on a male, two charges of indecency with a child under 14, one charge of indecent assault on a female under 13 and two charges of perjury, was increased to 18 years where the offender, a priest and former social worker, had committed a catalogue of offences against 11 victims over decades and where his behaviour resulted in one victim giving evidence at two trials.

A sentence of 21 months' imprisonment imposed on a teacher following his conviction for six counts of engaging in sexual activity while in a position of trust was not excessive where he had groomed a 16-year old pupil and, on six separate occasions, engineered time alone with her in a classroom. Although some of the lasting harm suffered by the complainant might have been attributable to the full consensual relationship which developed after she left school, that relationship arose directly from the teacher's serious criminality while she was in his care at school.

The Court of Appeal gave additional guidance on the principles to be applied when offenders were sentenced for historic sexual offences.

A sentence of three years' conditional discharge imposed on a police officer for eight counts of indecent assault committed against his sisters-in-law was not unduly lenient. The offending properly fell within category 3B of the relevant sentencing guidelines as to culpability, as it had not involved an abuse of trust in the sense used in the guidelines.

The concept of abduction in harm category 2 of the sentencing guidelines for rape was not a matter of distance. A sentence of eight years' imprisonment following a guilty plea to a historic offence of rape was justified where the offender, who had previous convictions for indecent exposure with intent to assault a female, had raped the victim twice in an incident which had caused her lifelong harm.

A 30-year extended sentence comprising a 22-year custodial element and an eight-year licence period was appropriate in the case of a 61-year-old man who had pleaded guilty to 33 child sexual offences committed against three young girls over a 40-year period.

A two-year suspended sentence which had been imposed on the offender following his conviction for two offences of indecent assault on young boys, committed when he was 11 and 14, was not unduly lenient.

A sentence of eight years' imprisonment was appropriate in the case of a man who had been convicted of indecently assaulting two young girls in the early 1980s.

A total sentence of eight years' imprisonment was appropriate for an individual convicted of four counts of historic sexual offences involving a young child. Two of the counts had been part of the same incident and course of conduct and the sentences on those counts were made concurrent rather than consecutive in order to reduce the total sentence.

ECHR art.7 had not been breached where an offender, sentenced in 2014 to life imprisonment for a manslaughter committed 14 years previously, had had his minimum term determined on current sentencing practice rather than the practice of the courts at the time of the offence. Unlike the minimum term for mandatory life sentences for murder which were subject to the statutory regime in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the calculation of the minimum term in discretionary life sentences for manslaughter was an exercise in judicial discretion.

An immediate 15-month custodial sentence imposed on a 68-year-old man in respect of offences of incest and indecent assault which he had committed against his younger sister when aged 15 was replaced with a community penalty. The judge had been misled by not being referred to the relevant guidelines for sentencing youths, and he had not been justified in imposing a far harsher sentence than would have been imposed if the offender had been a 15-year-old boy at the time of sentencing.

A total sentence of 16 years' imprisonment was increased to 20 years where a judge had been wrongly advised that his sentencing powers in relation to offences of buggery committed when the offender was under 18 were limited to 12 months' imprisonment.

In a criminal case concerning historical sexual offences, the judge had not favoured the prosecution in his directions to the jury, and the appellate court was not left with any sense of unease about the safety of the convictions.

A sentencing judge had erred in passing sentence for historic offences of indecent assault by referring to a notional sentencing guideline with a starting point midway in the statutory range at the time of the offence rather than adopting the current starting points and the relevant sentencing ranges, subject to the earlier statutory maximum.

It had not been an abuse of process to prosecute an elderly man for an historic offence of sexual assault which had been committed against a seven-year-old family member. The 23-year delay between the offence and trial did not of itself justify a stay of prosecution, and the judge had been entitled to determine that the offender, who suffered from dementia and other physical ailments, was fit to plead and stand trial.

An individual had been incorrectly convicted of a historic offence of rape against a family member because, at the relevant time, anal penetration did not constitute that offence under the Sexual Offences Act 1956 s.1. It was appropriate to substitute an alternative conviction for indecent assault, as the facts fell within the scope of s.14(1) of the 1956 Act, and the test set out in R. v Graham (Hemamali Krishna) [1997] 1 Cr. App. R. 302 was satisfied.

Not guilty verdicts returned by a jury in respect of two of five counts of historic indecent assault did not demonstrate that the judge's refusal to stay the prosecution on the ground of abuse of process due to delay and the consequent loss of evidence was mistaken, or that the verdicts were illogical or in any other way unsafe.

The court granted leave to prefer a voluntary bill of indictment under the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1933 s.2(2)(b) against the defendant, Gary Glitter, on counts of alleged historic sex abuse. Acknowledging the exceptional nature of its decision, the court held that it was in the interests of justice, and the defendant would not be denied a fair trial by reason of delay.

A suspended sentence for seven offences of indecent assault on step-siblings of a very young age, carried out over a protracted period some twenty years earlier, had not been unduly lenient. The interruption to the offender's treatment programme that an immediate custodial sentence would cause, and the potential resulting exacerbation of the situation, amounted to an exceptional circumstance justifying the suspended sentence under the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.118.

A sentence of 10 years' imprisonment imposed for 23 counts of child cruelty contrary to the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 s.1(1) between 1982 and 2000 could not stand in relation to offences committed prior to September 29, 1988 when the maximum sentence was two years' imprisonment.

New evidence as to a complainant's reliability and truthfulness, which was not disclosed at the trial in 2001 of a man charged with indecently assaulting under-age children and attempted buggery of an under-age boy when he worked at children's homes in the 1970s, would not have affected the safety of his convictions even if it had been admissible.

A confession which had been relied upon to secure a murder conviction 37 years earlier had been reliably obtained in accordance with police investigation procedures in force at the time. The fact that the police officers involved in the investigation had since acquired bad character did not affect the safety of the conviction either; it was not an invariable rule that evidence of misconduct post-trial in which the integrity of the officer was impugned inevitably led to a successful appeal.

An offender's convictions for historic offences of rape, buggery, attempted rape, indecent assault and murder were deemed safe, as the judge had given the jury adequate directions as to the dangers of delay and its effect on the evidence.

A 30-year delay on the part of a complainant did not render an offender's convictions for indecent assault, indecency with a child, and rape unsafe as the judge had sufficiently dealt with any prejudice to the offender in his summing up and directions to the jury and there had been other evidence that supported the complainant's evidence.

The court declined to re-open a Court of Appeal decision that a judge had erred in granting, pre-trial, a stay of criminal proceedings relating to historic sexual abuse charges. The defendant had not appealed against the decision but sought to challenge it on the basis that it had been overtaken by subsequent authority. The court had difficulty in accepting that such a challenge could properly be brought, and did not wish to encourage similar challenges in comparable situations.

A sentencing judge had been entitled to refuse to adjust a sentence for newly discovered offences of indecency with a child by reference to what the overall sentence would have been had all the circumstances been known during an earlier sentencing exercise for similar offences where the offender had chosen not to disclose the extent of his offending.

Although the delay in the appellant's prosecution for historic sexual offences was extreme, the resulting missing evidence was not of a degree of cogency that could amount to a finding of serious prejudice in its absence. The trial judge had given the jury appropriate directions regarding the effect of the delay and the appellant's convictions were safe.

A sentence of 15 months' imprisonment imposed for 14 historic indecent assaults was unduly lenient and was increased to one of 30 months. Even though the offender, a highly regarded television and radio presenter with no previous convictions, was 83 years old, in poor health, and had not offended for over 25 years, the original sentence did not reflect the offences' criminality given their lifelong impact on the victims and public concern over sexual crimes against children and young victims.

In the course of a trial for the indecent assault of a young girl, evidence of the complainant's demeanour had been admitted without it having been established that it was linked to the abuse she alleged. While the jury should have been clearly directed that that evidence did not confirm what she alleged, the absence of such a direction did not render the conviction unsafe.

A judge had correctly directed a jury on the issue of doli incapax that they could look at the circumstances surrounding historic sex offences to assist them in their assessment of whether a 13-year-old boy had been aware that his acts were seriously wrong.

Whilst some elements of a total sentence of eight years' imprisonment for 11 historic sex offences were unlawful, because they exceeded the maximum sentence at the date when the offences were committed, the total sentence was appropriate. The unlawful elements were reduced but others were extended to maintain the eight-year total, pursuant to court's power under the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 s.11(3), since the offender was not, overall, dealt with more severely.

It had been open to a jury to be satisfied on the evidence that alleged historic child sexual abuse had continued into the period on the indictment. It was not open to the Court of Appeal to review the evidence and come to a different conclusion.

In a case involving historical allegations of sexual offending, the judge had not been obliged to warn the jury that they should exercise caution before acting on the evidence of the complainant alone.

Although the judge had erred by not applying current sentencing practice when sentencing the appellant for offences of rape and indecent assault committed in 1999, the sentence of 12 years' imprisonment which he had imposed could not be criticised.

A sentence of 15 years' imprisonment imposed for 12 counts of committing indecent assault was reduced to 12 years in the light of the maximum sentence for each offence, the sentencing guidelines, the offender's age and disability, and the fact that for a historic offence he would serve two-thirds of his sentence in custody.

A sentence of two years' imprisonment for an offence of wounding with intent where the victim was slashed in the face with a knife was unduly lenient and a sentence of three years' imprisonment was substituted.

A conviction for murder following a trial 15 years after the victim's death was not unsafe where the outcome of the case depended on a careful assessment of the reliability and credibility of three main witnesses' evidence which was a task for the jury who had received the appropriate directions from the judge.

A judge had erred when imposing an extended sentence for offences of rape and indecency with a child committed prior to the commencement of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.224 and s.227 and the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.85. The appropriate determinate sentence was one of 12 years' imprisonment with a direction that the provisions of s.86 of the 2000 Act should apply, with the effect that the offender would remain subject to supervision and recall until the expiry of the 12-year term.

A decision to admit historical evidence of sexual offences in a trial for buggery and indecent assault, concerning the same offender, given the considerable passage of time since the earlier incidents, was not unjust or unfair as the offender had provided a detailed response to the historic evidence.

Although cross-examination which had invited impermissible speculation by the defendant should not have been allowed, that was insufficient to support a conclusion that his conviction for rape, buggery and indecent assault was unsafe, there being no other basis on which to undermine the jury's acceptance of the significant DNA evidence.

There was no logical inconsistency between an offender's conviction on two counts of indecent assault upon a girl, and the jury's acquittal in relation to the remaining 16 counts on the indictment.

Deficiencies in a judge's summing up were such as to render a conviction for historic child sex offences unsafe.

A finding of guilt on one count could not be inconsistent with a failure to reach a verdict on another count as no verdict had been reached on that count.

A judge had erred in ruling at the outset of a trial for offences of historic sexual abuse that a fair trial would not be realistically possible. He should have heard some, if not all, of the evidence before assessing whether the defendant would receive a fair trial.

A total sentence of 12 months' imprisonment suspended for 18 months imposed following guilty pleas to two specimen charges of rape and two of indecent assault committed against a 13-year-old girl in 1973 was unduly lenient. The sentencing judge had wrongly placed too much weight on the fact that, between the commission of the offences and conviction, the offender had made admissions and been sentenced for similar offences against other children. A total sentence of eight years' immediate imprisonment was substituted.

A judge had adequately highlighted the difficulties a defendant faced in relation to the antiquity of allegations made in a historical sexual abuse case and had correctly directed the jury to look for independent evidence in support of those allegations.

A judge had erred when imposing a sentence by using too low a starting point, and had failed to take sufficient account of the aggravating features of an offence.

In light of a number of propositions derived from authority that should be considered on an application for a stay of proceedings, on the ground of abuse of process due to delay, there was in the circumstances no ground for regarding a conviction as unsafe by reason of the judge's refusal to grant a stay of proceedings.

The appellant had not been prejudiced by delay where he had faced trial on historic complaints of sexual abuse as he had had a number of ways of challenging the victim's evidence other than mere denial.

The absolute discharge of a mentally-impaired defendant following convictions for indecent assault committed many years in the past was unduly lenient in that it failed sufficiently to take into account the interests of the victims.

Where the defendant abused his position of trust, groomed three young boys and indecently assaulted them over a five-year period, a sentence of five years was unduly lenient, despite his pleas of guilty. Taking into account double jeopardy the sentence would be increased to six years.

The Court of Appeal gave sentencing guidelines for sexual offences. Eleven out of the twelve cases referred by the Attorney-General were held to be unduly lenient and accordingly those sentences were increased.

In all the circumstances, sentences of 15 months for dangerous driving and three months for contempt of court were manifestly excessive and would be quashed with 12 months substituted for dangerous driving and one month substituted for contempt of court.

An eight-year sentence was unduly lenient for two offences of rape where the victim was a child who had been in a position of trust vis-à-vis the offender. A three-year community rehabilitation order was unduly lenient for offences of indecent assault and indecency with a child. A six-month sentence coupled with an extended licence period of two years was unduly lenient for three counts of indecent assault against a child.

It was perfectly proper to use the same material as a base for a criminal conviction and then in civil proceedings to support an anti-social behaviour order, which was akin to an injunction.

Where defendants had absconded between conviction and sentence and were subsequently arrested abroad, they were entitled to some credit for the time spent in custody abroad.