Where a defendant was protected by the principle of doli incapax and where as a matter of law at that time, the defendant was deemed incapable of committing an offence of buggery, that protection did not extend to make the evidence inadmissible as background evidence to similar offences.
Once a defendant had given evidence against a co-defendant a judge had no discretion to prevent the cross-examination of the defendant regarding his bad character. Foresight that death might result or foresight that serious injury might be inflicted was sufficient for a conviction of murder where the accused was party to a joint enterprise.
As a general rule the Crown was entitled to adduce evidence that was sufficiently relevant to an issue in the case as advanced by the Crown, but all that was irrelevant or not sufficiently relevant to the case as put should, generally speaking, be excluded, especially if it was likely to prejudice a defendant.
Under the scheme of the Interception of Communications Act 1985 no use of an intercept should be permissible irrespective of the question of whether it was lawful or had been authorised or instructed by the telecommunications operator. The words “engaged in”, in ss.9(2)(b) and (c) of the 1985 Act, denoted the person’s employment at the relevant time and not whether he was acting within his authority. Therefore evidence from an interception by a telecommunications engineer acting outside the scope of his employment was inadmissible evidence.
Defendant’s appeal against actual bodily harm conviction dismissed because: (i) any inconsistency in the jury’s verdict had not been Wednesbury unreasonable; and (ii) the inappropriate admission of evidence of the defendant’s dismissal from his employment after unsubstantiated allegations of racism against him had not prejudiced his case because the alternative count of racially motivated assault had been rejected by the jury.