[2018] EWCA Crim 1553 [2018] EWCA Crim 1553

Material relevant to demonstrating the mindset of those convicted of encouraging support for a proscribed organisation was admissible at trial in order to allow the jury to consider the appellants’ actual views and their willingness to express violent Jihadi views to others. Since none of the material was the subject of any allegation against an appellant, its relevance had been properly explained in jury directions and the defence’s case had been properly set out, there was no possibility of improper or prejudicial use being made of the evidence.

[2018] EWHC 1392 (Fam) [2018] EWHC 1392 (Fam)

In the context of a mother’s application to commit her children’s father to prison for making false statements of truth and breaching court orders in connection with securing the return of the children from Nigeria, the court considered that transcripts of conversations between the father and another man, which took place whilst the father was serving a prison sentence, were admissible. Although the transcripts had been improperly obtained, their provision had been a mistake rather than a deliberate act.

A magistrates’ court had not properly exercised its discretion in finding that it was in the interests of justice to allow a complainant’s written statement to be admitted under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.114(1)(d) where the appellant had failed to adequately particularise the areas of dispute for the trial, the appellant had required the complainant’s attendance at trial, the court had allowed time for the evidence and the complainant had attended to give evidence.

[2018] EWCA Crim 739 [2018] EWCA Crim 739

The court upheld an offender’s convictions for murder and attempted murder following the fatal shooting of a member of a rival gang.

[2018] EWCA Crim 690 [2018] EWCA Crim 690

A trial judge’s decision to withdraw a murder charge from the jury was overturned where it was found that the victim’s death by euthanasia was a direct response to his injuries and the unbearable suffering resulting from them for which the defendant was responsible. It was open to the jury to conclude that neither the victim’s suffering nor his decision to end his life could be described as “voluntary” in the sense of being the product of free and unfettered volition presupposed by the novus actus interveniens rule.