The Crown Court had been wrong to direct that the time spent by an offender on a qualifying curfew before a suspended sentence should not count towards his sentence once it had been activated; it had no discretion to do so under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 s.240A. The error was symptomatic of the labyrinthine nature of criminal sentencing legislation with which the courts had to deal.
A sentence of two months’ imprisonment for bringing a controlled drug into a prison was appropriate despite the fact that the offender was a carer for her disabled daughter and grandchild. The judge had also been entitled to activate part of the offender’s suspended sentence for a different offence and order it to run consecutively.
The court emphasised the importance of properly structuring the extension period to the length of a period of disqualification from driving as required by the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988 s.35A and s.35B, and in accordance with the guidance in R. v Needham (Paul Maurice)  EWCA Crim 455.
Fresh evidence revealed that the activation of a suspended sentence for breach of probation had been premature. The offender had been in hiding for fear of reprisals and attending voluntary drug rehabilitation rather than deliberately failing to comply with the terms of the suspended sentence.
The public interest in extradition was outweighed by other factors in the case of a 55-year-old man who was in poor health and who was required to return to Poland to serve a custodial term for non-payment of a £600 compensation order. It was possible that the man had been unaware of the requirement to pay compensation, and it would be disproportionate to extradite him given that the sum was small, he could not have paid it at the relevant time, and was only able to pay it now because of his employment in the UK.